The Iran War Around the World
China sees opportunity. Europe is divided. Aside from Tehran itself, Russia has the most to lose.
By Walter Russell Mead
With the Iran war in its sixth week, we don’t yet know how or when it will end.
But we know that it matters.
A lot.
All wars matter intensely to those caught up in them, but not every war matters to the whole world.
The Iran war does, and every great and near-great power is adjusting its foreign-policy strategies in light of a conflict that is reshaping world politics.
China is thousands of miles from the Persian Gulf, but between its own need for Gulf oil and the effects of the Iran war on China’s neighbors and trading partners, the conflict is having major effects on Beijing.
Some effects are positive, from Xi Jinping’s point of view.
China’s return to its program of building new islands in the South China Sea has passed almost unnoticed in Washington, where attention is firmly fixed on the Middle East.
But China doesn’t welcome higher fuel prices, and its export-dependent economy will be hard hit by any global recession.
We can expect Beijing to focus much harder on gaining the ability to project power in and around the Gulf.
Already China has managed to take advantage of its relationship with Pakistan to enhance its diplomatic and security influence over events in the Middle East.
This will likely lead, among other things, to an intensification of Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. China will seek more access to strategic ports and routes.
India will struggle to frustrate those designs.
Japan has also discovered that distance doesn’t insulate it from events in the Middle East.
At the same time, Tokyo understands that doubts about President Trump don’t insulate it from its need for a strong relationship with a powerful U.S.
China’s efforts to increase its power and sway in the Gulf and along the prime sea routes pose strategic threats to Japan’s access to the Gulf’s resources.
Tokyo fully realizes that without American power, access to Gulf oil and gas will depend on the caprices of an Iranian government of religious fanatics aligned with Russia and China.
Expect Japan to double down on its efforts to rearm, expand security partnerships with friendly neighboring states, and stay focused on maintaining the closest possible relations with an unpredictable Washington.
For India, the shock of the Iran war has been profound.
The country has sustained a serious economic setback from high energy prices and disruptions in shipping and travel.
In addition, India’s rival Pakistan has managed to insert itself into the heart of Middle East diplomacy, even as it deepens its relationship with China.
As a neighbor of Iran and a Sunni-majority country with historic links to the Gulf Arab states, Pakistan is well placed to act as a broker for peace talks.
Its success in selling itself to Washington as a potential mediator has given it renewed diplomatic clout that India must now work to counter.
For Europe, the Iran war is yet another example of the Continent’s declining significance in world affairs, the problems of maintaining a positive relationship with the U.S. in the Trump era, and the difficulty of getting European states to align their policies on important issues.
European countries weren’t consulted over the decision to launch the war, they have little to no influence over the course of the war, and their interests are unlikely to be uppermost in the minds of those who finally end the war.
Worst of all, perhaps, the war has done more to divide European countries than to unite them.
While Mr. Trump and the Iran war are deeply unpopular almost everywhere in the European Union, Italy and Spain have taken actions designed to raise difficulties for the American war effort, while Germany and Romania have been more supportive.
Next to the actual belligerents, Russia may have the most to lose in the war.
The fuel shortage has boosted Russian oil earnings at a critical moment, and a longer war will likely mean more demand for Russian oil and gas at higher prices in more markets around the world.
Beyond that, Russia’s interests are more complex.
Ukraine’s ability to sell its drone expertise to the Gulf Arab countries must have been a disagreeable shock to the Kremlin.
The increasing bitterness between Iran and its Arab neighbors also creates problems for Russia’s attempts to maintain its deep ties to Iran while building cooperation with countries like the United Arab Emirates.
Meanwhile, the risk of alienating the Trump administration is growing.
The Kremlin may get some emotional satisfaction from retaliation against American support for Ukraine by helping Iran target American facilities in the Gulf, but the costs could be high.
From the Russian perspective, the worst possible end to the war would be a collapse of the Iranian regime and an end to Iran’s long isolation from the West.
This would deprive Moscow of an ally and reduce the perceived value of a Russian alliance among the world’s despots.
It would also seriously damage Vladimir Putin’s most cherished goal: the restoration of Russian power across the former Soviet Union.
Reintegrating Iran into the global economy would lead to the development of multiple pipeline and freight routes for oil, gas and mineral exports from the landlocked ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia, likely ending any hope that Moscow could reassert dominance over any of them.
From an American point of view, increasing the economic dynamism of Central Asia while reducing its dependence on China and Russia would substantially improve the chances for a long-term world peace.
The war shows us all that the security of the Gulf matters to everyone.
If at the end of the war Iran retains the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, every country on earth will need Tehran’s blessing to access vital fuel and supplies.
Whatever one thinks of Mr. Trump and his decision to initiate hostilities, a quick and comprehensive American victory offers the best hope for a peaceful future in the Gulf and beyond.
Walter Russell Mead is the Ravenel B. Curry III Distinguished Fellow in Strategy and Statesmanship at Hudson Institute, the Global View Columnist at The Wall Street Journal and the Alexander Hamilton Professor of Strategy and Statecraft with the Hamilton School for Classical and Civic Education at the University of Florida.
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