Greece comes back to haunt eurozone as anti-Troika rebels scent power
Greece's finance minister warns ECB could “strangle the Greek economy in a split second” if it cuts off life-support for banks.
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
7:11PM GMT 29 Dec 2014
Greece comes back to haunt eurozone as anti-Troika rebels scent power
December 28, 2014 12:17 pm
Emerging states must make their own mark
A boom based on borrowing cheaply is easier than to take on vested interests, writes Alan Beattie
Given the disparate paths and policies among middle-income economies, it is implausible that the emerging market boom dating back to the early 2000s reflected only cheap borrowing and expensive commodities. But with a supportive external environment dissipating, even stable economies may find growth harder to achieve in the future.
In January fears of the US Federal Reserve tapering off its quantitative easing programme caused a general sell-off of emerging markets currencies and assets. In the past two months falling global oil prices and turmoil in Russia have triggered another widespread correction.
With substantial foreign exchange reserves and little dollar-denominated public debt, the impact of a fall in the rouble should have been to protect the value of the government’s rouble-denominated tax revenue. Instead, it sparked all-round panic and surging outflows of capital, requiring an emergency rise in interest rates.
Though comparisons between the current emerging market volatility and the Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997-98 can be overdone, one parallel is the similarity of capital flight from Indonesia in 1997 and Russia this year, which turned a currency slide into a rout.
In 1997 Indonesia’s Chinese business community, fearing economic chaos and ethnic violence, reacted to market volatility by taking their money and themselves out of the country, causing the rupiah to go into freefall. Similarly, wealthy Russians have been sending their money abroad in the past few months, driving the rouble far lower than is justified by the falling price of oil.
The growth in Turkey’s economy over the past decade has been real and substantial, but the country has become far too reliant on cheap borrowing. Last year it ran a current account deficit of about 8 per cent, and despite a lower oil import bill is likely to record a gap of almost 6 per cent this year.
With the government publicly bullying the central bank into keeping monetary policy loose, short-term interest rates have been kept too low, inflation has risen out of control and long-term borrowing costs are high. The Turkish lira has lost more than a quarter of its value against the dollar since the start of 2013.
There is not much policy makers can do about this but focus on the fundamentals of their economies and wait for calm to return. Unfortunately, far too few have been doing that over the past decade.
With one or two exceptions, productivity-enhancing structural reform has been notably absent from emerging markets. It turns out to be far easier and more rewarding to ride a boom based on cheap external borrowing and commodity export revenue than to take on vested interests to increase long-run growth.
Infuriating though it may be to many involved, investors’ discrimination between emerging markets is still a work in progress. That makes it ever more important, now that the supporting pillars of the commodity boom and cheap lending are being kicked away, that countries build their own reputations rather than relying on the brand of the emerging market bloc. The days of easy living for emerging markets are ending and hard work lies ahead.
The baseball-card bubble
How a children’s hobby turned into a classic financial mania
Dec 20th 2014
FOR evidence that the inclination to barter and truck is in our genes, one need venture no farther than the nearest schoolyard. Lurking within school walls is a thriving economy, which begins with swaps of one lunch item for another and progresses to the flogging of assorted sweets picked up on a weekend run down the candy aisle. Yet the informal economic education goes beyond the mechanics of supply and demand. Often enough it runs to finance: it is on the playground that many children get their first real taste of the temptation of speculation.
Every now and then a particular craze sweeps across the swingsets. The allowance money chasing the suddenly hot trinkets grows. If the frenzy builds for long enough it can attract much bigger fish: adults, yes, but also Wall Street itself. There is no better illustration of how the seductive power of the fast buck stretches from the schoolyard to high finance than the madness that swept the world of baseball cards in the 1980s and 1990s.
Your correspondent fell under the spell of the mania, shelling out what meagre allowance money was available for prized “rookie cards” (those issued for a player’s first professional season), encasing the treasure in hard plastic and then mentally spending the riches that were certain to result. While comparing collections the young punters would swap apocryphal tales of forgotten hoards found in attics or cellars that fetched unimaginable sums at auction—or similarly valuable collections thrown away by oblivious parents during an overzealous round of spring cleaning. We all made it clear to mothers and fathers that under no circumstances were our boxes full of treasure to be tossed away.
And we would wait anxiously for the arrival of the bible of our trade: Beckett Baseball Card Monthly. We paid little mind to the articles clogging up the front of the magazine and turned straight to the pages upon pages of price listings, ready to mark our collections to market and watch our paper profits grow. Collecting baseball cards was better than playing the stockmarket. The cards were real, physical, beautiful items you could flip through and admire. And card values only went up.
A baseball card is a rectangular piece of cardboard paper, about the size of a small smartphone, with the picture of a baseball player on one side and his biographical details and statistics on the other. Its origins lie in the mid-19th century, writes Dave Jamieson in “Mint Condition”, his history of the phenomenon. Early ball clubs created “trade cards” of some of their players, a popular advertising strategy at the time. Tobacco companies soon hit on the idea of putting cards inside their cigarette packages: each part of a numbered series, intended to bring the buyer back until he had collected the whole set. The pictures proved most popular with children, however, who would besiege smokers on the street asking for the picture that came in the pack.
In the 1920s the baseball card began appearing in more child-friendly form when the market for chewing gum began to expand. Gum producers snagged children’s pennies during the Depression years thanks to the lure of the collectables, and the market rebounded strongly after wartime when the Topps Chewing Gum Company released, in 1952, the first set of recognisably modern baseball cards—big and glossy—to be sold in its packages. The card industry grew alongside the popularity of baseball, then America’s undisputed national pastime.
Through the 1970s cards appealed mostly to kids interested in finding pictures of their heroes, or in completing a collection. Yet a subtle change was under way. Older aficionados, many of whom had been building their collections for decades, began swapping cards and hunting for especially rare and valuable specimens. One such cardhound, a professor of statistics named James Beckett, began polling traders on the prices they had seen or paid for particular cards.
In 1979 he put together the first edition of what would become a regular price guide. In late 1984 the Beckett guide went monthly, the better to capitalise on soaring interest. Not long after that your correspondent took up collecting cards, just as that interest was turning into a speculative fervour.
Mr Beckett may not deserve sole credit for the baseball-card bonanza, but it is hard to imagine the mania having erupted without him. In the 1970s only aficionados knew that unique cards were fetching higher prices at trade shows and auctions. Beckett Baseball Card Monthly helped create a much larger market for the cards. Readers everywhere could see how prices were moving around the country, and decide to sell old memorabilia—or fill their attics with cards in anticipation of future price rises.
Economists have wrestled with the question of whether markets are “efficient” or not for more than half a century. Eugene Fama was awarded a Nobel prize in 2013 for pioneering work demonstrating that markets quickly incorporate new information and cannot systematically be beaten. Yet others reckon markets often go haywire. Robert Shiller, for instance, showed that market returns could in fact be predicted at longer time horizons. He also reckoned people are prone to certain behavioural tics, misjudgments that depart from rationality and which can drive markets to heights of “irrational exuberance”. He was also awarded the Nobel prize, jointly with Mr Fama. Other economists have investigated ways in which markets can overshoot in one direction or another. “There are idiots,” Larry Summers once wrote in a paper on the subject. “Look around.”
Yet Mr Shiller, who warned of both the stockmarket bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the 2000s, has pointed out that it is often not just the fools piling into speculative frenzies but the experts themselves. The bankers putting together dodgy mortgage-backed securities at the height of the housing bubble were not simply corrupt or stupid: they believed that they had discovered new ways of capturing high returns at low risk—which is why they retained so much dangerous stuff on their balance-sheets. Neither did big institutional investors pile out of equities before the crash of 2000-01. The potency of a bubble is in its plausibility, to laypeople and experts alike, right up until the moment the game is over.
Bubble-spotters tend to identify a few key contributors to financial mania. There is often an initial spark of enthusiasm rooted in real value: the promise of new technology in some cases, the recognition of the worth of a scarce commodity in others. Then there is the entry of many new market participants, to add fuel to the flame. A deepening market naturally places upward pressure on supply-limited goods. But new participants also add liquidity to the market, and thus the confidence that you will be able to find a willing buyer when you wish to sell and a willing seller when you wish to buy. For local dealers, buying cards at trade shows or from the factory became less risky as the stream of eager youngsters through the shop doors grew.
Perhaps most important, speculative fervour thrives on expectations of rapidly rising prices—rising rapidly enough that buyers find it rational to make bets they could not normally afford.
By the late 1980s these ingredients were firmly in place in the market for baseball cards. The initial spark seemed to be a wave of sales of rare, vintage cards at eyebrow-raising prices. Early in the decade the 1952 rookie card of one of baseball’s all-time greats, New York Yankees star Mickey Mantle, sold for $3,000: a remarkable sum for a small piece of cardboard. There were more headlines for the repeated sales of the most valuable of all baseball cards: the 1909 Honus Wagner. The vintage tobacco card was made particularly scarce by its limited production run (due, according to rumour, to Wagner’s objection to the use of his image to sell cigarettes). Only three of the cards that survive are in decent condition. One changed hands for a shocking $25,000 in 1985. It subsequently fetched $110,000 in a 1987 sale, then $451,000 in a 1991 auction (won by the ice-hockey star Wayne Gretzky).
Such prices were the result of very limited supply meeting new demand, in the form of nostalgia-driven consumption. The baby-boom generation that had grown up in a golden age of baseball entered its prime earning years in the 1980s. Some of its members used their new-found purchasing power to recapture the stuff of their childhood memories. Their demand pushed up prices, and higher prices attracted attention.
Your correspondent came to the hobby around the time the Wagner card was selling for six figures.
You could still walk into a drugstore and find packages of cards sitting by the cash register, complete with a piece of gum which had by then become an afterthought, thrown away more often than not.
Kids discovering the hobby would nag a parent or spend their allowance money on a package or two and add the cards to their hoard, often as not stored in a shoebox. The most prized cards would go in the bookbag, to be paraded before peers on the playground, or swapped to fill gaps in the collection.
The exuberance building within the community of hobbyists quickly made its way to the core market.
One schoolmate or another inevitably brought in a binder, with cards neatly ordered inside and sheathed in protective plastic. From there it was a relatively short journey to purchases of box sets: complete collections produced by card companies containing all the cards produced each year. They would sit untouched, often enough, gathering dust but remaining pristine on a closet shelf, the better to fetch a good price years down the road. I can recall the anxiety I experienced before shelling out for one of the hot new properties of the era: the Ken Griffey Jr rookie card.
Mr Griffey, who made his debut in 1989, was a near-instant superstar: a number one draft pick by the Seattle Mariners who walloped a double in his first plate appearance. He went on to enjoy a stellar career, retiring at sixth on the league table for career home runs. Yet back then he was more than a hero-in-waiting; he was a hot stock—a must-have for any baseball-card portfolio. I bought the card, sealed within a lucite case, from a dealer located in a strip mall not far from my house. And there it sat, untouched, rising in value.
In 1979, when Mr Beckett published his first official price guide, the 1963 rookie card for Pete Rose (the all-time Major League Baseball hits leader) was valued at $5, while the 1973 rookie card for Mike Schmidt, a Hall of Fame third baseman, went for 12 cents. Just five years later, when Mr Beckett’s guide went monthly, those values had risen to $350 and $65 respectively. In 1994, at the top of the market, the cards purportedly fetched $1,100 and $425. Among high-value cards the rise in prices in the decade to 1994 was on a par with equity-price increases in the ten years to 2000 and home-price gains in the decade to 2006.
Cards went for outrageous sums; and, as always happens in bubbles, people who had shared only a passing interest in the hobby found themselves buying with aplomb, for fear of looking like suckers later for having missed the obvious route to wealth. For a few strange years, children—like your correspondent and his similarly crazed brothers—piled up boxes full of cardboard, confident that their contents would only grow in value, never quite asking themselves who would buy their hoards, but never doubting that someone would.
As the boom neared its apex interest in the phenomenon spread well beyond the world of collectables, eventually garnering the interest of those more accustomed to trading stocks and bonds. Even the Wall Street Journal touted cards as an investment worth investigating, as Mr Jamieson notes in his book. “[T]he key player isn’t really Rose or [Dwight] Gooden or even Honus Wagner, but rather Paul Volcker, the rangy Federal Reserve Board Chairman. His nifty squeeze play against high inflation has made card-collecting a whole new ballgame.” In an amusing reversal of the old legend of Joseph Kennedy, the financier and political patriarch who famously sold out of the market just before the crash of 1929 after receiving a trading tip from a bell boy, the youngsters might have known something was amiss in their little hobbying world when Wall Street got involved.
The baseball-card world responded in dramatic fashion to the insatiable desire for the hot items. The older, more valuable cards had never been produced in particularly massive runs, and many were lost to carelessness or the rubbish bin in the intervening decades, when there was little reason to suspect the little cardboard headshots would ever be worth a thing. Once the world began to cotton on to the possibilities in baseball cards, however, the supply dynamic changed. Less sentimental adults ransacked basements and attics for long-lost supplies, adding marginally to the number of relative rarities in circulation. But such efforts were dwarfed by the mobilisation of the card industry itself, which kicked production into high gear, producing hundreds of millions of new cards each year. New entrants appeared, like Upper Deck, which debuted a slick, upmarket set of baseball cards in 1989 to attract those buying as an investment.
In 1991, reckons Mr Jamieson, Upper Deck sold around 4 billion cards, earning $250 million in the process.
The boom continued as long as it did only because of the relatively limited interest in cashing in; cards, many collectors understood, were something one held for a time, and so many of the boxes full of newly produced sets headed directly for storage. Yet interest in collecting could only maintain momentum while published values were rising. The values published in Mr Beckett’s monthly could only wander so far from the reality in card shops and trade shows around the country. And in 1994 conditions in those markets turned decisively for the worse.
The Federal Reserve was perhaps to blame. In 1994, then under the control of Mr Volcker’s successor, Alan Greenspan, it began a series of interest-rate increases that squeezed an economy that had not fully recovered from the previous recession. But the effect of monetary tightening was overshadowed by a crisis in the sport of baseball itself. Several years of caustic negotiations between team owners and the players’ union culminated in a work stoppage in 1994 and the cancellation of the World Series for the first time since 1904. The strike cost Major League Baseball dearly—attendance and revenues fell sharply when play finally resumed—and spelled doom for the card traders and dealers whose success depended on unbroken good fortune.
Card prices fell dramatically in subsequent years and in relation to their scarcity. Cards produced during the boom years of the 1980s and 1990s frequently lost half their value or more. Few have come anywhere close to regaining their bubble highs, even after adjusting for inflation. Older cards proved more resilient. The 1963 Pete Rose had dropped in value from $1,100 in 1994 to a reported $800 ten years later, but has since rebounded to an even $1,000, according to current Beckett valuations. The true gems sailed through the crash without a scratch. The Honus Wagner card that went for just under half a million dollars in 1991 sold for $1.3m in 2000 and $2.8m in 2007.
The great boom permanently transformed the collectables industry and led, as bubbles often do, to innovation. Seeking to entice new generations of buyers, card manufacturers have experimented with new formats, including cards with pieces of game jerseys and scraps of used bat embedded: gimmicks, true, but tempting ones to those with a desire to commune with actual heroes of the diamond.
Meanwhile, a generation is still holding on to boxes upon boxes of baseball cards: children’s toys, essentially, that somehow became transmuted into something quite different. Mr Jamieson recalls his own experience attempting to unload his hoard in 2006, boggling at the rock-bottom prices they commanded on eBay, an auction site. “One guy wanted $1,500 for his ten thousand cards. He didn’t understand: we all still had our ten thousand cards.”
And so we do. Yet it is such a strange thing to have lived through and forgotten. Just a few years after the bitter collapse of the baseball-card boom, many of the same kids were intoxicated again, swapping tech stocks across fancy new online trading platforms from dorm rooms and group houses.
And then, older but no wiser, they were at it once more, borrowing recklessly for a first home and a ticket to future wealth. Three strikes, as it were.
Is Putin Winning The Oil War?
by: Shareholders Unite
- Admiration for Putin's decisiveness has largely subsided in the West, but not totally. There are still people arguing Russia will come out the other end reinforced.
- While low oil prices will also produce problems in the US shale sector, it's strange to close one's eyes to the problems these cause in Russia's energy sector.
- The fall in the ruble could, long-time provide a boost to non-energy production and exports from Russia, but not without serious reforms.
- And Russia first has to survive a rather acute crisis.
- Only if oil recovers and Russia embarks on reforms would it be a good place to invest.
- Oil prices have nearly halved in less than a year
- The ruble has nearly halved in a year
- The economy is stagnating
- Capital is fleeing the country
- Foreign direct investment is drying up
- Interest rates have been hiked to 17%
- Inflation is high and rising above 10%
- Russian companies have $700B+ in foreign debt
- These companies have little, if any access to foreign capital, as a result of the sanctions
- The Russian budget breaks even at $100 oil and half of the budget comes from energy
Not really says Marin Katusa, author of "The Colder War," and chief energy investment strategist at Casey Research. Katusa believes that falling oil prices will eventually give Russia the upper hand and deeply injure the U.S. energy industry. The falling ruble makes Russian oil less expensive and more desirable to other countries-Russia also produces oil quite cheaply while the American shale industry has a larger cost of operation. Russia is more than able to weather the current storm, Katusa says. "They have a $200 billion a year trade surplus. They have over $400 billion in reserve currency. They've increased their gold reserve. They have much lower debt to their GDP than America. So yes there's pain in the economy… [but] it's far from terminal."This is an odd comment. Yes, the low oil prices might very well dent, or even damage US shale prospects. Opinions are really divided on how much though. For instance, Citygroup argues:
"Production is going to continue to grow. Could we see another million barrels a day of growth next year over this year? We happen to think so," said Edward Morse, global head of commodities research at Citigroup. Morse expects an average Brent crude price of $80 per barrel next year, but if it's lower, he says U.S. oil production could still add 800,000 barrels per day.But a more pessimistic assessment comes from Bank of America:
The bank said in its year-end report that at least 15% of US shale producers are losing money at current prices, and more than half will be under water if US crude falls below $55 (€44.4, £35.1). The high-cost producers in the Permian basin will be the first to "feel the pain" and they would have to cut back on production soon.Many players are hedged against falling oil, providing something of a cushion. On the other hand, much of the expansion is based on leveraged finance and with cash flows rapidly decreasing, quite a few players might go under. In the greater scheme of things that won't matter all that much, as their licenses and assets will quickly move to more capitalized companies.
There are odder parts in the comment from Marin Katusa. Oil is priced in dollars, nobody from abroad is buying in rubles, so for export purposes, Russian oil isn't cheaper. The $200B trade surplus is also rapidly disappearing and is testifying to that.
According to US Energy Information Administration (NYSEMKT:EIA) figures, oil and gas shipments accounted for 68pc of Russia's total $527bn of gross exports in 2013, when Brent crude - comparable to Russian Urals - traded at an average of $108 per barrel. Should the current price of Brent, at around $60 per barrel, be sustained over the next 12 months, that would result in Russia's export income from crude dropping to $95bn, from $174bn in 2013. However, these losses will be amplified by the total loss of revenue accrued from lower prices for refined petroleum products and domestic sales of crude, which totalled $122bn in 2013, according to the EIA. [Andrew Critchlaw]Yes, we realize that over time, China might buy more oil and gas from Russia and payments might be partly settled with currency swaps enabling Russia to pay its imports from China bypassing hard currencies altogether. But this is a slow movement, and Russia and China aren't exactly buddies.
The Kremlin is counting on acquiescence from the BRICS quintet as it confronts the West, and counting on capital from China to offset the loss of Western money. This is a pipedream. China's Xi Jinping drove a brutal bargain in May on a future Gazprom pipeline, securing a price near $350 per 1,000 cubic metres that is barely above Russia's production costs. [The Telegraph]But to suggest that the fall in oil will in time be a blessing in disguise is, well:
Every $10 fall in the price of oil cuts export revenues by 2pc of GDP. The "financing gap" will soon be 10pc of GDP.Let's see how they get out at the other end of this first. We're also not convinced (to put it mildly) that Russia's energy sector is thriving without Western capital and technology. According to the International Energy Agency, it needs $100B investment a year for two decades to stop its oil and gas output from declining.
Russia's reserves of cheap crude in West Siberian fields are declining, yet the Western know-how and vast investment needed to crack new regions have been blocked. Exxon Mobil has been ordered to suspend a joint venture in the Arctic. Fracking in the Bazhenov Basin is not viable without the latest 3D seismic imaging and computer technology from the US. China cannot plug the gap. Andrey Kuzyaev, head of Lukoil Overseas, said it costs $3.5m to drill a 1.5 km horizontal well-bore in the US, and $15m or even $20m to drill the same length in Russia. "We're lagging by 10 years. Our traditional reserves are being exhausted. This is the reality for our country," he said. Lukoil warns that Russia could ultimately lose a quarter of its oil output if the sanctions drag for another two or three years. [The Telegraph]Then there are serious problems in the banking system:
the combination of economic contraction, a liquidity crunch and the falling exchange rate is likely to lead to the failure of a number of banks. Russia has more than 800 banks, many them with low capitalisation, weak finances and weak corporate oversight. As of December, the RCB had withdrawn licenses from more than 80 banks in 2014 alone. While the sector is in need of consolidation, however, the disorderly failure of a large number of banks could cause significant economic disruption, deepening the recession and further undermining public confidence in the financial sector. [The Economist]What would be the way forward for Russia? Well, they should embark on something they've promised for years, reform their economy:
Russia ranks 136 for road quality, 133 for property rights, 126 for the ability of firms to absorb technology, 124 for availability of the latest technology, 120 for the burden of government regulation, 119 for judicial independence, 113 for the quality of management schools, 107 for prevalence of HIV, 105 for product sophistication, 101 for life expectancy and 56 for quality of maths and science education. This is the profile of decline. [The Telegraph]And they should diversify their economy away from energy and commodities, which are cyclical, highly capital intensive sectors that lock the economy in a boom-bust cycle generating little employment. Now they have to make that transition largely without the help of the West. It could have been so much easier after the end of the Cold War.
We have already argued that Russian stocks, no matter how cheap, are a dubious bet at the minimum. We haven't seen much to change our minds. Only an oil recovery would do the trick.
But bigger tasks remain, getting Russia of the energy and commodity trap would be one.
But there is a simple gauge to assess which way Russia will turn, the oil price. Should the price of oil recover the next year, then things might turn out less dire. Some (but only some) comfort can be taken from the fact that Saudi Arabia itself seems to predict $80 next year.
Les doy cordialmente la bienvenida a este Blog informativo con artículos, análisis y comentarios de publicaciones especializadas y especialmente seleccionadas, principalmente sobre temas económicos, financieros y políticos de actualidad, que esperamos y deseamos, sean de su máximo interés, utilidad y conveniencia.
Pensamos que solo comprendiendo cabalmente el presente, es que podemos proyectarnos acertadamente hacia el futuro.
Gonzalo Raffo de Lavalle
Las convicciones son mas peligrosos enemigos de la verdad que las mentiras.
Quien conoce su ignorancia revela la mas profunda sabiduría. Quien ignora su ignorancia vive en la mas profunda ilusión.
“There are decades when nothing happens and there are weeks when decades happen.”
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.
No soy alguien que sabe, sino alguien que busca.
Only Gold is money. Everything else is debt.
Las grandes almas tienen voluntades; las débiles tan solo deseos.
Quien no lo ha dado todo no ha dado nada.
History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.
We are travelers on a cosmic journey, stardust, swirling and dancing in the eddies and whirlpools of infinity. Life is eternal. We have stopped for a moment to encounter each other, to meet, to love, to share.This is a precious moment. It is a little parenthesis in eternity.
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