TURKEY VS. IRAN VS. THE U.S. / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Turkey vs. Iran vs. the US

Tehran has few options to meet newly empowered Arab Sunnis.

By: Kamran Bokhari

A few developments over the past week bode ill for the Middle East’s sectarian rivalries, with implications for U.S. strategy in the region. 

On Dec. 27, Hamid al-Shatri, the intelligence chief of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated (and thus Iran-influenced) government, met with Syria's de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who also heads Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Sunni Islamist militia that toppled the Assad government. 

This in spite of a Dec. 24 statement from Syria’s foreign minister warning Iran to “respect the will of the Syrian people and the country's sovereignty and security” and against “spreading chaos.” 

The statement was a direct response to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who on Dec. 22 said: “We predict that a strong and honorable group will also emerge in Syria because today Syrian youth have nothing to lose. 

Their schools, universities, homes, and streets are unsafe.” 

Meanwhile, Turkey remains vigilant in the north, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan saying he would “bury” any remaining Kurdish separatists who refused to lay down their arms.

Put simply, the fall of the Assad regime has created a dangerous situation: Turkey has become increasingly assertive, and its regional rival, Iran, has become increasingly defensive. 

Though they may wish to avoid confrontation, their interests will necessarily clash. 

And all the while, the United States is waiting in the wings.

Iran and its allies in Baghdad are worried that Sunni empowerment in Syria could spill over into Iraq. 

Sunni Arabs represent a majority of the population on large tracts of territory on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi frontier. 

These were the same areas in which the Islamic State group established its caliphate in 2014. 

Ironically, the head of the new Syrian government traversed this cross-border region between the mid-2000s and early 2010s to join al-Qaida in Iraq (which later became the Islamic State) until he decided to leave the transnational jihadist movement to form his own Syria-focused Islamist insurgent group. 

Tehran and Baghdad benefited immensely from the international fight against the Islamic State from 2014 to 2018; Sunni areas in western Iraq came to be controlled by a Shiite militia coalition known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, an official extension of the Iraqi security establishment.

Now, having lost its grip over Syria and, by extension, Lebanon, Iran wants to make sure that Iraq remains firmly in its orbit. 

Not only is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham a hostile force, but it is backed by Turkey, which has a large military presence in northern Syria and an imperative to degrade Kurdish separatists and ensure Sunni Arab domination over the areas currently under Kurdish rule. 

Eventually, Ankara wants Iraq’s Sunnis and Turkmens to be re-empowered because they could serve as a counterweight to the Iran-backed Shiite majority, and it already has a close relationship with the Kurdistan Democratic Party in northern Iraq, which controls the areas that border Syria.

The U.S., of course, sees the Syrian Kurds differently. 

For years, it has believed they are the only viable force to lead the charge against the Islamic State. 

And for years, the disagreement between Ankara and Washington benefited Iran. 

But with the Assad regime gone and the incoming White House pledging to reduce U.S. military involvement in the region, it’s possible that President-elect Donald Trump and Erdogan will strike a deal that puts pressure on Iran while keeping the Islamic State in check. 

Turkey and the Trump team will surely discuss as much after the inauguration (if they haven’t already).

Iran, meanwhile, is already on the defensive. 

It understands that the Iraqi Shiite landscape is highly fragmented and thus may not be able to meet a potential Sunni resurgence. 

The decimation of Hezbollah, which led to the collapse of the Assad regime, has severely degraded Iran’s strategy of using regional proxies. 

It has no leverage at the moment, and it’ll be hard to gain more if Trump pursues a policy of maximum pressure. 

(The timing is bad, too, as Iran approaches a historic political transition that will only add to the pressure on Tehran.)

Iran needs to show that it isn’t without options. 

One possibility would be to deploy a military task force to Iraq, sanctioned by Baghdad, with the stated objective of enhancing the country’s security in light of the power vacuum in Syria. 

Khamenei alluded to just such a move during his Dec. 22 speech, saying: “They [the Americans] keep saying that the Islamic Republic has lost its proxy forces in the region. 

This is another mistake. 

If one day we want to take action, we do not need a proxy force.”

This is not without its challenges, of course. 

Allied though they may be, Iraq’s Shiite government would be reluctant to agree to Iranian military personnel on its soil. 

Moreover, the United States still has around 2,500 troops in Iraq, and it’s unclear if Tehran wants to risk a U.S. response to a major military provocation. 

The move may also face opposition from the largest Iraqi Shiite faction, led by maverick politician Muqtada al-Sadr. 

But the Iraqi Shiites may feel so imperiled that they decide acceding to Iran is less risky than leaving themselves vulnerable to newly empowered Sunnis.

Regardless of Iran’s military posture, the fragility within Syria has the potential to spread across the border to Iraq. 

For the U.S., it’s an opportunity and a threat. 

For Turkey, it’s an opportunity to return to its old stomping grounds. 

And for Iran, it threatens the collapse of its four-decade-old national security strategy.