THE ARC OF INSTABILITY IN EASTERN EUROPE / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Arc of Instability in Eastern Europe

The question now is whether, when and how Russia will continue collecting territory. 

By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

It’s no secret that President Vladimir Putin, taking pages from the playbooks of Russian leaders of yore, is trying to secure strategic depth. 

Much of that depth naturally lies in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, which have been contested since at least the 16th century as Russia began to reclaim lands of Kievan Rus. 

Stalin continued to incorporate these territories before and after World War II, and in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, they became vast borderlands from the Baltics to Central Asia comprising newly independent states.

Russia’s latest attempts to recreate its buffer zone have created an arc of instability from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus. 

Many of these states were already unstable, of course, and Russian revanchism has only made things worse. 

The question now is whether, when and how Russia will continue collecting territory.

Existing Instability

To briefly recap Eastern European instability: The region has been essentially dissolved three times in the past few hundred years. 

The first was when Eastern Slavs lost Kievan Rus, a loose federation stretching from present-day Ukraine to present-day western Russia. 

The second time was when Moscow partially lost its control over Eastern Europe in 1917. 

The third and greatest happened in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. 

In 2014 or so, modern Russia returned to the idea of rolling back some of the geopolitical “successes” of the West, creating a line of confrontation with the West in Ukraine, Moldova, Crimea and the Caucasus.

Four main factors contributed to Russia’s success in reclaiming lands it holds as its own: an international order that favored the geopolitically ambitious; political instability in the areas it meant to reclaim; the emergence of domestic groups in these countries that want to be part of Russia; and a strong military. 

Notably, actual military invasion has rarely been Moscow’s preferred course of action. 

It tends to rely on a mix of other tactics For example, in Moldova, Belarus and Armenia, Moscow relied heavily on pro-Russia groups and on regional geopolitical factors. 

In Georgia, Moscow worked hard to maintain close relations with the Orthodox Church and conservative groups. 

Elsewhere, it has leveraged its role as diplomatic mediator to gain a foothold. Russia believes that resolving the Ukraine issue would resolve geopolitical tensions in the entire region. (It isn’t resolved, and it didn’t.)

Turning Point

The turning point for the entire region happened late last year, starting with the Belarusian presidential election held last August. 

Pro-Russia incumbent Alexander Lukashenko won in what many considered a sham election. 

Partly with Russia’s help, Lukashenko fought off protesters by redirecting their anger and undermining their resources.

Then, in late September, war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed territory de facto managed by ethnic Armenians located entirely inside Azerbaijan Moscow helped negotiate an end to hostilities, and in doing so made Armenia much more beholden to it. 

Its generally pro-West prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, is now fighting for his political life as pro-Russia officials reap the benefits. 

Moreover, the war’s resolution established a Russian military presence in the Caucasus through its deployment of peacekeepers. 

It’s also important to note that the West did not resolve the crisis. 

Washington either couldn’t or wouldn’t, leaving Russia and its historical competitor Turkey as the guarantors of regional security. 

A few days later, on Sept. 31, Georgia held parliamentary elections. 

The results were disappointing for opposition parties, which refused to recognize the results and abstained from any political dialogue with the ruling party. 

Now they are demanding new elections. The incident has put the West in a tough position. 

It has tried but failed to manage the crisis – odd, considering both sides in Georgia are generally pro-NATO and pro-EU. 

The West’s failure has given Russia the tools to further undermine democracy and stability in the country. 

Moscow can, and does, discredit Western influence and legitimacy and provides support for various groups. 

For Moscow, it will be important to see if things deteriorate further and, if they do, whether they lead to the emergence of non-democratic groups, since that would also complicate ties between Tbilisi and the West.

Then there is Moldova, a country with a population of 2.6 million that is likewise in the throes of instability. 

Last November, the country held presidential elections in which pro-West candidate Maia Sandu won over pro-Russia candidate Igor Dodon. 

Yet Dodon and pro-Russia forces have a majority in parliament, and they have vehemently resisted Sandu’s attempt to consolidate control. 

Naturally, Russia keeps a close eye on Moldova. 

Moscow would like to see strong and effective pro-Russia policy, but the country is too geographically isolated for Russia to intervene even if it wanted to. (This might be possible only if Moscow establishes control over southern Ukraine.)

Finally, there is Ukraine, where three distinct and important trends have emerged. 

First, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has failed to deliver on his promise to stabilize Donbass, the breakaway territory in the east. 

Russia expected that he would be at least partially successful, perhaps by creating a new grey zone or frozen conflict like in Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. 

But the situation has only grown worse. Second, local elections returned Ukraine to the pre-Maidan revolution era, at least somewhat. 

Pro-Russia forces made serious gains in regional parliaments, the biggest of which were in the so-called region of “Novorossiya,” which Russia considers extremely important. 

Third, Zelenskiy started to prosecute pro-Russia oligarchs and to close pro-Russia TV channels and newspapers despite the fact that such measures would be considered undemocratic in any country.

Ukraine is a unique challenge for Russia. 

It is vitally important, but Moscow won’t simply invade; it considers much of the local population to be part of “Russian civilization,” and it would be immediately opposed by the West. 

Both Russia and the West would like to minimize direct contact there.

In short, within the past six months, Russia has achieved serious successes in Belarus and Armenia. 

It helped the Lukashenko government survive against well-organized democratic protests, and military integration is at historic new levels. 

It managed to increase its military presence in the South Caucasus by keeping Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenian control. (And it did so without the participation of the West.) 

Relations with Yerevan and Baku remain stable for now. 

In Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, however, the situation is less certain. 

Russia would like to use Georgia against the West, but the most it can hope to achieve there is a normalization of relations in the next few years. 

In Moldova, Moscow would like to see a friendly political regime, ready to maintain a status quo and avoiding any joint anti-Russia actions together with Ukraine. 

The arc of instability, for now, is here to stay. 

The bigger danger, however, is that this arc could extend from the political to the military realm, especially in Ukraine.