US, Russia, Ukraine and Diesel: With Iran at the End
By: George Friedman
Last week, I wrote on the paradox of China – a relatively straightforward issue as far as paradoxes go.
This week, I must address the actions of the United States, which are far from being as orderly as a mere paradox.
That doesn’t mean that they lack meaning but that late on Sunday, even tracking what happened is difficult, let alone what will follow.
So let’s recap: U.S. President Donald Trump recently started to criticize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and then demanded that he resign.
Later, he announced that an understanding had been reached with Russia whereby the U.S. agreed to waive the provisions of the Lindsey Graham sanctions package aimed at Russia’s largest buyers of oil and gas, in exchange for Russian deliveries of diesel fuel to the United States.
Moscow denied that any such agreement had been reached, though Trump continued to act as if it had been reached.
Prior to Trump’s announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin had demanded that he be permitted to place troops on the Ukrainian side of the border, implying that it would be a narrow deployment.
At roughly the same time, Kyiv announced that the satellite intelligence Washington had been providing to facilitate the war with Russia had been blocked.
That intelligence had been critical in the defense of Ukraine from Russia.
Putin eventually acknowledged that a deal had been made and that diesel oil would be shipped.
Over the weekend, the Ukrainian government reported that the intelligence was being shared again, but as of the time of writing, there has been no signal from Russia that the diesel deal is off, nor any indication that the diesel is being loaded for shipment to the U.S.
European countries – clearly uninformed of the situation – seemed not to know how to respond, saying rather mildly that they regretted Trump’s action.
Meanwhile, France was (unrelatedly) faced with widespread student protests, first from high school students and later joined by other groups, that caused major damage throughout the country.
Students in Italy and Albania rose up as well.
I add this only to point out that chaos in Europe seems to benefit Russia, even if there is no evidence that Russia had anything to do with the unrest.
In the U.S., some observers have assumed that Trump made the diesel deal because of the midterm elections, which may result in the Democrats retaking both houses of Congress.
The idea, they say, is that the deal with Russia would help with fuel and ease the affordability crisis.
The problem is that the affordability crisis was created by tariffs and intensified by the war in Iran.
Simply buying more diesel will not necessarily lower high prices.
Russia doesn’t even have the capacity in diesel or other refined oil products to significantly offset the losses from the closures of maritime transit routes in the Middle East.
Moreover, the midterms are only two weeks away.
Trump may have thought that a diesel deal and the mere idea of more oil flowing in the near future would dramatically change the outcome of the election, but that’s dubious speculation.
Of greater interest is the fact that on Sunday, Iran announced that it was prepared to open the Strait of Hormuz, through which vast amounts of oil normally flow, in exchange for a halt to the war.
(Tehran also said it would not meet any demand to end its nuclear program – one of the main reasons the U.S. began the war.)
The Iranians said that the strait would be opened in less than a week if the United States agreed to their terms.
If Trump is truly worried about the midterms, Iran’s proposal is far more attractive than some diesel from Russia because not only would it be more effective in solving the oil crisis but it could do so on a time frame that actually matters to American voters.
It’s worth noting that given my model of geopolitics, I would like to think Trump made the deal with Russia to trigger a deal with Iran.
But I don’t think that’s what happened.
Nor do I believe that he acted on that premise, and I don’t think the Iranians are afraid of being undercut by Russian diesel fuel.
Even so, it is an attractive option for Trump, assuming it is genuine and that he is prepared to live with a potentially nuclear Iran.
He ostensibly started the war to prevent that from happening.
I certainly don’t think I have done this issue justice, but when something happens that challenges my way of thinking, I am duty-bound to lay it out as best as I can, admitting that I am unable to see the logic of Trump’s actions.
Not seeing the logic does not preclude the possibility that it is guiding his actions.
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