THE WAR, THE OIL CRISIS AND AMERICAN POLITICS / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The War, the Oil Crisis and American Politics

By: George Friedman

According to people who follow the oil trade closely, we are entering the point at which the oil buffer of global reserves is reaching its limits. 

In layman’s terms, this means oil prices are soaring as an actual lack of oil starts to be a real possibility. 

This is, of course, due to the war in Iran.

Iran’s strategy in the war has been clear: closing the Strait of Hormuz to create an economic crisis. 

The military imperative was to cause a political crisis in the United States; the global economic crisis was collateral damage.

Since World War II, U.S. wars have been elective. 

Except for 9/11, which triggered the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. has never been under direct attack. 

In the various conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Central America, the only true blowback Washington ever faced was U.S. casualties.

At the outset of wars, American public opinion frequently begins with, if not avid support, then a general acceptance. 

The assumption was always that U.S. power would result in quick defeat of the enemy. 

If a war was not rapidly successful, public support tended to be replaced by anti-war sentiment. 

Such was the case in the Vietnam War, which was fought from 1965-1973 and which created a political and social crisis in the U.S., ultimately forcing Washington to withdraw. 

Although there was an economic crisis in the United States in the 1970s, it was caused by the massive imports of Japanese automobiles and other products that hurt American industry, in addition to the Arab oil embargo from 1973-1974. 

The Korean War actually stimulated U.S. industrial and economic growth.

The war in Iran was meant to be short and decisive, as all elective wars are meant to be. 

So far, it has been neither, so it has turned into an economic and geopolitical crisis. 

It has also become a political problem for the Trump administration. 

At this point, the president’s popularity has declined significantly, with approval ratings hovering in the 30s. 

This is not an unprecedented level of approval, and often as not presidents rebound from it. 

But major spikes in the price of oil – and indeed an oil shortage – would almost certainly negatively impact Trump’s ratings, particularly in light of his campaign promises to end fruitless and extended wars.

Washington’s only option at this point is to force the opening of the strait militarily. 

There are two problems with this. 

First, the operation would likely take a long time and cost many lives. 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has shown itself to be an effective force, and the Artesh, Iran’s conventional, secular military, would be activated after having played a secondary role so far. 

The Artesh’s posture has been largely defensive, anchored as it has been in its control of Iran's air defense network, while absorbing heavy losses at sea, where its larger conventional fleet bore the brunt of U.S. naval strikes. 

The Artesh has also carried out scattered offensive actions, including drone strikes and at least one reported sortie that penetrated U.S. air defenses in Kuwait.

By contrast, the IRGC has handled virtually all of the war's escalatory operations, including missile strikes on Israel, attacks on Gulf states and the campaign to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, even as it has controlled Iran's missile and nuclear programs and dominated the senior military leadership. 

(Some have argued that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei quietly elevated the Artesh as a counterweight to the IRGC before his death, though even if that were the case, the process was cut short by the war.)

More important, whereas 10 years ago a conventional operation of air, naval and ground forces could have taken the areas around the strait, the nature of war has changed. 

Simply opening Hormuz and occupying the area around it would not keep the strait open. 

The existence of long-range drones allows the Iranians to potentially cede a great deal of land, exacting a high toll in blood and treasure. 

Iran would need intelligence on when ships are passing through, but it doesn’t have any satellites. 

(Notably, there are rumors that China and Russia provide Tehran with satellite intelligence.) 

But even properly trained commandos familiar with the terrain could, in theory, get close enough to target ships by radio. 

The U.S. could, of course, attack drone bases, but as the war in Ukraine has shown, it’s extremely difficult for either side of a conflict to completely shut down drone operations.

Complicating the situation is the unwillingness of private companies to insure expensive vessels. 

It’s unlikely that shipowners would be willing to risk their vessels without insurance, because many of these ships would not be American, so using U.S. shipping would not solve the problem.

The problem would be global, but in the U.S it would be particularly political. 

All political leaders in all countries want to be successful and praised for their actions. 

The U.S. is a democracy, and its public has been shown to be ruthless in judging presidents. 

So while the interests of the American public would be imperiled, so too would be the presidency.

To be sure, Iran has problems as well. 

The attacks on its military and industrial facilities have inflicted substantial but not yet decisive damage. 

While the political situation in Iran is more difficult to discern, there are unsubstantiated reports about divisions emerging in the IRGC. 

The reality is that the cost in terms of American lives in a U.S. invasion of Iran would be substantial. 

And as shown by Iran’s placing its nuclear facilities inside mountains and other well-hidden places, simply destroying these facilities would be possible but not certain.

Washington thus faces a choice. 

One is the dramatic, costly and dangerous expansion of the war. 

The other is to reach a settlement that nets far less than expected.

There are many in the U.S. who would expect American power to be great enough to settle the matter. 

Prior wars show that that is not the case. 

It’s likely that the U.S. has some military technologies not yet used on Iran, but given the stakes for the Iranian government, and considering the will and seeming solidarity shown thus far, it is far from clear that additional conventional U.S. forces would be successful. 

A move beyond the conventional is difficult to imagine. 

This reality creates a political problem for the Trump administration – one that will be a factor in how this war ends.