A Bad Iran Deal Could Spark a Nuclear Arms Race
To reassure regional allies, the U.S. needs to open the Strait of Hormuz and be poised to use force again.
By John Bolton
President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington, June 4. Jonathan Ernst/ReutersWhatever deal President Trump makes with Iran, his often-contradictory decisions during the conflict have laid the groundwork for more nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
If the race for nuclear weapons widens and accelerates, the region will become more unstable, heightening risks for the entire world.
To prevent this, Mr. Trump and Iran’s internal opposition must remove or gravely weaken the principal threat to regional peace: Tehran’s regime.
But Gulf Arab states and others believe Washington, hitherto their chief guarantor of security and deterrence, is in shaky hands.
Accordingly, they are revising their strategies to survive in a dangerous neighborhood, amid Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats.
Among many things Mr. Trump didn’t do before striking Iran was consult most of America’s allies.
Not the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, not the Gulf’s oil-producing Arab monarchies, and not our Indo-Pacific allies, heavily reliant on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons.
This failure will haunt Washington for decades, but the most immediate effects are felt among the Gulf Arabs.
Mr. Trump compounded his error of keeping these allies in the dark with his launch of Project Freedom to open the Strait of Hormuz.
What went wrong is disputed, but it is disappointing that Project Freedom lasted less than two days.
The U.S. is now assisting ships exiting the strait, but American credibility was damaged.
As the conflict unfolded, Gulf Arabs were surprised when Iran attacked them.
Their earlier efforts to insulate themselves from such strikes failed, stoking Arab enmity toward Tehran.
The United Arab Emirates launched significant attacks on Iran; Saudi Arabia did to a lesser extent.
But Arab leaders generally worried that U.S. deterrence and even capabilities weren’t what they believed, further undermining confidence in the Trump administration’s resolve.
If America’s conventional deterrent is deemed unreliable, fears about the extended nuclear deterrent are even greater.
Gulf Arabs and other regional states have long contemplated whether to acquire nuclear capabilities to hedge against a fickle Washington.
Since at least 2018, for example, Saudi Arabia has said it would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran did.
Turkey and Egypt have had similar thoughts.
While the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Middle Eastern allies isn’t imminent, questions about U.S. reliability make this a troubling long-term possibility.
To develop a meaningful deterrent, no country would wait until conclusive public evidence proved its adversaries had nuclear weapons.
The work necessary to establish a nuclear deterrent would have to begin long before that point.
Unease about America’s nuclear umbrella isn’t confined to the Middle East.
European allies are increasingly worried.
They have heard Mr. Trump’s verbal assaults on NATO and seen the diminished U.S. participation in alliance activities, as well as the possible downgrading of the level of the European commander, who also serves as supreme allied commander in Europe.
Low-key conversations about acquiring nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan that have gone on for years are increasingly spilling into public view.
Whenever America reduces its collective-defense responsibilities, our adversaries enhance their own positions or spread anarchy.
In turn, America and our allies become less secure.
Isolationist skeptics view Washington’s global defense posture as more beneficial to allies than to America, but we have the most to lose when our alliances weaken and global stability declines.
Our forward-defense policies aren’t acts of charity but are central to our self-interest.
If we don’t protect our interests, who will?
The best way to forestall a Middle Eastern nuclear-arms race is to re-establish confidence in Washington’s resolve and reliability.
At a minimum, that requires American action to open the Strait of Hormuz to oil and gas shipments from Gulf Arab states while maintaining the U.S. blockade on Iranian exports.
Military force would likely be needed to protect commerce in the Gulf and the strait against Iranian mines, antiship missiles, and drone and fast-boat attacks.
Force would help restore U.S. credibility and re-establish deterrence against Iranian efforts to open and close the strait like a light switch.
Tehran is counting on Mr. Trump’s reluctance to resume military activity, which is exactly what worries Israel and many Gulf Arabs.
If Iran is left able to dominate the strait, the Gulf Arabs’ economic future is endangered, along with regional peace and security.
The decision lies with Mr. Trump.
Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”
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