A weakened Trump arrives at Xi’s court
China holds the cards — and might settle for flashy but empty announcements while playing a long game
Gideon Rachman
© James FergusonDonald Trump travels to Beijing this week against the backdrop of two wars that have gone wrong: the real war that he launched against Iran in February and the trade war against China that he dramatically intensified in April 2025.
The US president’s trademark bravado will be used to obscure the weakness of his position.
The Chinese are unlikely to rub his nose in it.
They know how to give face to foreign visitors, when convenient.
The reality, however, is that it is Xi Jinping who “has the cards” — to use a phrase that Trump likes.
The Chinese president’s ace is his country’s near monopoly over the production of rare earths and critical minerals that are crucial to the functioning of American industry.
China played this card to dramatic effect in response to Trump’s “liberation day” tariffs — which briefly raised US levies on Chinese imports to 145 per cent.
Beijing’s almost instant response was to restrict exports of critical minerals.
Within weeks, production lines in some US factories were shutting down.
Within months, the US had agreed to a trade “truce” that lowered tariffs.
American levies on Chinese goods are still high by historical standards but they seem to be at a level that Beijing can easily live with.
China’s global trade surplus remains at near-record highs.
Scott Bessent, the US Treasury secretary, claims that America will be able to break China’s lock on critical minerals within two years.
Few experts agree.
On the contrary, it may take a sustained effort of a decade or more to develop the alternative supply chains that will free western industry (and parts of the US military) from dependence on inputs from China.
America’s equivalent to the Chinese grip on rare earths was meant to be its lead in high technology — in particular, the most advanced semiconductor chips.
The Biden administration imposed significant restrictions on tech exports to China, in an effort to preserve that edge.
But these restrictions, while very inconvenient for China, have not prevented the rapid development of the country’s tech industry.
China’s AI models are now said to be just six months or so behind their US rivals.
China is also well ahead in some industries of the future, such as electric vehicles.
Meanwhile, America’s leading chip manufacturers, in particular Nvidia, have agitated to soften restrictions on tech exports — arguing that they will lose valuable markets to fast-developing Chinese competitors.
Trump’s strategic position has been further weakened by the fiasco of the Iran war.
The US president was originally scheduled to travel to Beijing in mid-April.
He delayed the trip, apparently hoping to get the conflict with Iran wrapped up before he met Xi.
Instead, he will arrive in China, with the Strait of Hormuz still effectively closed, and fuming about the US’s inability to bend Iran to its will.
So will Xi take advantage of Trump’s weakness?
If the Chinese leader plays his hand well, he will use his visitor’s need for some “wins”.
China is likely to agree to some big-ticket purchases of American goods — “Boeings and beans” — that will give Trump something to boast about.
A Chinese offer to make large investments in the US might tempt Trump, although it would be viewed with suspicion by his security advisers.
In return, the Chinese may look for further concessions on trade.
China may also sign off on the establishment of a Board of Trade.
Like Trump’s Board of Peace, this will be presented by the White House as an alternative to failing multilateral institutions — the UN, in the case of peace, and the WTO when it comes to trade.
The reality is that a new trade board is highly unlikely to resolve trade imbalances — just as the new peace board has mysteriously failed to end conflict in the Middle East.
But for the Chinese, there is little downside in agreeing to a flashy announcement, if it keeps Trump happy.
The big geopolitical issue on the table will be the future of Taiwan.
The Chinese have made it clear they want something on this.
In advance of the visit there has been speculation that Trump may change the American position on the island’s future by saying explicitly that the US opposes Taiwanese independence rather than simply not supporting it.
That may sound like a tiny semantic change. But it would be regarded as a big win for Xi in both Beijing and Taipei — increasing the pressure on the Taiwanese to agree to “reunification” talks.
I have even heard some eager Chinese commentators compare Trump’s visit this week to Margaret Thatcher’s trip to Beijing in 1984 during which the British leader agreed to return sovereignty over Hong Kong to China.
That analogy is flawed. Taiwan is not an American colony so Trump cannot sign it over to China.
The US president can, however, seriously weaken Taiwan’s position by signalling a reduction in political and military support for the self-governing island.
Trump himself may not care much about the fate of Taiwan.
But many of his advisers and the US Congress do.
They are likely to object strongly if the president makes a radical shift in policy.
Trump arrives in Beijing as an unpopular leader in a weakened position.
But Xi may be satisfied with incremental gains for now.
He can afford to play a long game.
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