Why We Haven’t Heard From the Houthis
The Yemeni rebels now likely see Iran as a weak horse.
By Asher Orkaby
Houthi protesters in Sana’a, Yemen. Yahya Arhab/EPA/ShutterstockAnalysts predicting Yemen’s entry into the Iranian conflict are already drafting headlines about Red Sea shipping crises.
They may wait a long time to use them.
The Houthis have stayed out, but not because their leaders have become peaceniks.
Nor have they abandoned their militant rhetorical support for Iran.
The Houthi movement, representing the northern tribal confederations of Yemen, is responding to the exercise of military power, a language appreciated throughout the Middle East.
As long as Iran armed and financially supported the Houthi movement, the alliance with Tehran remained appealing.
Iran could influence destabilizing militant forces like Hamas and Hezbollah and maintain a missile stockpile and drone arsenal that threatened to wreak destruction on cities within about 1,200 miles.
As the regional hegemon, Iran offered potent benefits to its allies in Yemen.
This remained true through the 12-day war last June, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stood their ground against Israeli attacks and the U.S. bombing of Iran’s three key nuclear sites.
The Houthis in Yemen joined the June conflict, launching dozens of missiles and drones—enough to show solidarity with Iran and draw an Israeli retaliatory strike on Houthi leaders.
Among Israel’s adversaries, only the Houthis have regularly launched ballistic missiles since October 2023.
The recent killing of Khamenei and a large portion of the IRGC leadership, followed by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, have Houthi leaders questioning the Iranian regional hegemony.
They doubt Iran will be able to keep supporting its network of regional proxies.
Iranian allegiance may have become a liability rather than an asset to the Houthis.
Elements in the Houthi movement or among Iran’s military advisers could unilaterally launch a ballistic missile, unwittingly dragging Yemen into yet more conflict.
Yet it is worth considering how this moment in the regional war might present alternative scenarios.
When the Houthis entered the war against Israel in 2023, their movement was being forced to the negotiating table with the Saudi-backed and internationally recognized government of Yemen from a position of weakness.
The civil conflict in Yemen that began nearly 10 years earlier had reached a stalemate, and the Houthi leadership was losing popular legitimacy.
The moment they launched their first missile at Israel, however, the Houthis won the popular war in Yemen.
Few political goals bring the Arab street together like the defense of Palestinians, a cause championed by regional leaders and abused as a political means of deflecting criticism from failed domestic policies.
Across Yemen, Palestinian flags were raised alongside Yemeni banners.
Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the movement’s leader, and his entourage were depicted as heroic defenders of the Palestinian people.
Their popular legitimacy among Yemenis rose to new heights, all but cementing their presence in Yemeni national politics for decades.
Iranian flags, however, don’t engender the same public fervor.
Yemeni children don’t wake every day calling for the Yemeni defense of the Iranian homeland.
Retaliatory bombing raids against Sana’a, the capital, and other cities in Yemen would be far more difficult to endure knowing that this war was no longer about “defending the Palestinian cause,” but rather following misguided participation in a distant conflict with little benefit to Yemen.
The Houthis’ reluctance to enter the current conflict also reflects a centurieslong recognition of military power and influence.
Ideology will only take one as far as the barrel of a rifle.
This behavior of the northern tribal networks supporting the Houthi movement has remained constant throughout Yemen’s history.
Local leadership was maintained through the might of the sword.
Yemeni tribes sought foreign allegiances with those powers who could afford the most benefit for those in power, including the Ottomans during the 19th century, the British Empire in the first half of the 20th century, Saudi Arabia in the second half, Israel during the 1960s, and Iran over recent decades.
Yes, even Israel, whose air force was called upon to aid northern tribal militias during their civil war with the Yemeni republic and Egyptian forces.
This serves as further evidence that the antecedent of the Houthi movement respected the language of power, readily cooperating with those providing it, regardless of ideology.
The military power displayed against Iran over the past two weeks was seen by Yemenis as a possible threat to Iranian leadership and a sign of American hegemony in the Middle East.
It is unlikely that the people of Yemen will be waving the stars and stripes alongside Yemeni flags in coming weeks, but there may be a real possibility of rolling back Houthi militancy and reducing the immediate threat to Red Sea shipping.
Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has made the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—the southern entrance to the Red Sea—even more important for global shipping stability and as a secondary outlet for Gulf oil.
The Houthi movement and the U.S. recognize this.
For the first time, the Houthis have something to offer America—much-needed security relief and a guarantee on global shipping, rather than more Red Sea uncertainty amid a precarious maritime situation in the region.
In response, President Trump can offer the Houthis international recognition and U.S. agreement to have Houthi leadership become equal partners of a federated Yemeni state divided between north and south.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, and increasing evidence that overwhelming force will be used against regional militancy, suggests that the window for Houthi diplomacy and reconciliation with the U.S. is rather small.
The window is equally small for the U.S. to take advantage of Houthi indecision, transforming reluctance into long-term stability in the Red Sea—and perhaps the Middle East.
Mr. Orkaby is a faculty associate at Harvard and author of “Yemen: What Everyone Needs to Know.”
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