TRUMP`S ULTIMATUM TO IRAN / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Trump’s Ultimatum to Iran

Washington doesn’t want war, but backing down is getting harder as the rhetoric heats up.

By: Hilal Khashan

War is looming between the United States and Iran at a time when the regime in Tehran is facing its most serious challenges since the 1979 revolution. 

Economic sanctions have crippled the economy, and the discontented public is growing more daring in challenging the state’s brutal coercive machinery. 

Strategically, Iran is suffering from several crises, including U.S. and Israeli pressure, damage to its nuclear program and weakness within its proxy network in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza. 

What sets this moment apart from others is U.S. President Donald Trump’s explicit warnings that killing protesters could lead to American intervention. 

They came at a time when the Trump administration was pushing Tehran to dismantle its nuclear facilities, curtail its missile program and cease meddling in other countries’ affairs. 

However, the administration understands that any full-scale war with Iran could unleash a broader conflict within the country and havoc across the region. 

If Trump orders an attack, which is highly expected, its aim would be not to launch a general war but to reset the course of negotiations to extract maximum concessions from Iran.

U.S. Strategy

Policymakers in Washington believe now is the time to intensify pressure on Iran, as it’s strategically isolated, militarily weak and burdened by public discontent.

In doing so, they hope to extract maximum concessions related to Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile program and regional endeavors. 

Some even openly advocate regime change. 

Their logic rests on Iran’s declining deterrence, weakened allies, fragile leadership and growing internal opposition. 

Trump’s strategy, however, rests on the principle of peace through strength. 

Military force is not an end in itself but rather a tool to drive negotiations toward a favorable outcome. 

Limited and decisive military action aims to deter adversaries, reassure allies and demonstrate resolve, without embroiling the U.S. in a protracted conflict.

Washington is clearly trying to force Tehran to the negotiating table. 

It’s banking on broad economic sanctions, particularly targeting Iranian oil exports, to systematically cut off the Iranian regime’s sources of revenue and deny it any opportunity for economic recovery. 

This policy aims to push Iran to surrender or at least make extensive concessions without igniting a major regional war or imposing regime change by force. 

This way, the U.S. can strike at the heart of the Iranian regime, absorb a limited response and maintain control over the degree of escalation without igniting a broader conflict.

At the same time, Trump does not want to fully link the Iranian agenda to the Israeli agenda. 

A recent meeting between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received little of the usual media coverage that comes with a summit between world leaders. 

Netanyahu even entered the White House through a back door to avoid pro-Palestinian protesters. 

The subsequent statement by Vice President JD Vance, who has been skeptical about going to war with Iran, that Trump alone will determine the red lines in talks with Tehran appeared to be a response to Netanyahu’s push for war. 

Unlike Netanyahu, Trump wants to give diplomacy another chance, while maintaining readiness to boost the U.S. position in negotiations and convince Tehran that an attack would be inevitable if it does not show maximum flexibility. 

Trump wants full control of the decision to go to war this time around, unlike last June, when Israel seemed to be the one that pulled the trigger.

Netanyahu’s conditions would require substantial capitulation from Tehran to reach a deal. 

They include disallowing Iran to enrich uranium on its soil, removing 60 percent enriched material from Iran, destroying the Iranian missile program and halting all forms of Iranian support for regional allies. 

Netanyahu fears Trump will heed the calls of regional leaders to avoid or at least limit the use of military force. 

He has therefore accelerated the annexation of West Bank territory, forcing the White House to issue a statement reiterating Trump’s opposition to this policy.

The U.S. and Israel agree that Iran poses a threat and must be confronted. 

The central objective of both countries is to prevent the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear power and expanding its regional influence. 

But they differ on how to accomplish this goal. 

Trump prioritizes reaching “a good agreement,” which his administration is pursuing through a maximum pressure strategy that combines economic sanctions and military deterrence. 

In contrast, Israel fundamentally doubts the viability of an agreement with Tehran. 

From the Israeli government’s perspective, the problem lies not only in the terms of a potential agreement but also in the assumption that Iran will adhere to it in the long term.

Netanyahu’s frequent visits to Washington are aimed not only at confronting Iran but also at improving Israel’s international image. 

Its reputation in the U.S. and Europe has been damaged, reducing Washington’s willingness to provide unconditional support for a full-scale Israeli military operation against Iran. 

For the U.S., regional and global stability is a bigger priority. 

It must therefore consider not only Israel and its European allies but also energy markets and the risk of regional escalation. 

Reaching an agreement could buy some time and prevent wider conflicts, even if it does not address all of Israel’s security concerns.

Risks of Escalation

The U.S. operation in Venezuela reinforced the fact that Washington is willing to target the head of state of a sovereign nation to meet its objectives. 

Even though the circumstances in Iran differ from those in Venezuela, Iranian decision-makers now believe that removing the top of the power structure is no longer beyond the pale for Washington.

Still, the U.S. must strike a delicate balance. 

Bargaining through force can backfire, even when both sides try to avoid all-out war, as miscalculation or misreading an opponent’s intentions could push them beyond their original goals. 

When force becomes the language of communication, signals become distorted and actions intended to deter could unintentionally provoke. 

In such a climate, the line between controlled escalation and unbridled conflict becomes thin, sometimes apparent only when it is too late.

The question is no longer whether force will be used but whether it can be used without opening the door to a conflict that would be difficult to contain. 

This is the paradox of bargaining with force: It is used to avert war but also brings war closer. 

Iran and the U.S. are navigating a narrow corridor where every signal has weight, every step has consequences and the margin for error is shrinking at an alarming pace. 

The most likely option for the U.S. is to decapitate the regime (which could include Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or senior military and political leaders), take out missile infrastructure and command and control structures, and adopt a strategy of dominance rather than escalation.

For Iran, optimism regarding negotiations with Washington could be dangerous or misleading. 

Accepting Trump’s conditions would amount to capitulation, denying the regime in Tehran of its ideological identity. 

Therefore, Iran will not accept these terms under any circumstances. 

However, it also has a difficult calculation to make. 

A U.S. attack would likely include naval and commando operations, in addition to airstrikes. 

It could also set the stage for massive urban rebellions that could ultimately lead to the regime’s collapse.

The massive U.S. military buildup and the escalation in rhetoric have made it difficult for Trump to back down without obtaining significant concessions regarding Iran’s nuclear program. 

The president’s advisers see the deployment of force not as a symbolic pressure tactic but rather as a sign of its readiness to act. 

There are no indications that Tehran is backing down from its positions, as it consistently affirms that it will negotiate with the U.S. only on the nuclear issue and categorically refuses to include its missile program or regional activities in talks.

The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is still present in the collective memory of Americans, given the financial and human costs, as well as the reputation the U.S. earned as a hegemonic power. 

Regime change in Iran has been discussed in American political circles for decades, but this has never translated into a viable strategy. 

Despite its internal crises and crippling sanctions, the Iranian regime has proved its resilience and ability to survive, relying on a cohesive security and military apparatus and a network of regional and international alliances.

If war breaks out, it will not remain a bilateral conflict between Washington and Tehran and will affect the security of the Gulf region, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. 

Its repercussions could even extend to global energy markets, threatening the international economy with a new crisis. 

Therefore, the cost-benefit calculations for both sides make all-out war more of a threat than an actual possibility.

Trump’s interest in the Iranian protests is driven by tactics rather than ideology; the goal may be to weaken the system enough to extract substantial concessions. 

The security structure of the Iranian regime revolves around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij, a group of volunteer paramilitary forces affiliated with the IRGC. 

For protests to succeed, large crowds must be sustained for much longer than in the past, and some sectors, particularly the security forces, must split from the regime. 

The failure of the ongoing protests and external threats to create a divide within the security apparatus indicates the regime’s ability to overcome these challenges.

There is no reliable, organized Iranian opposition that the U.S. could use to bring about radical political change. 

And Washington has no intention of sending ground troops to Iran or launching a large-scale, sustained air campaign – all prerequisites for toppling a regime the size of Iran’s. 

The assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would not lead to the regime’s collapse because the power structure is based not on one person but on a network of institutions. 

Foremost among them is the IRGC, which will not give up its influence easily and could hasten to appoint an alternative leadership so it can control the reins of power. 

If the regime falls, it will not automatically turn Iran into a democracy. 

Rather, it could lead to internal power struggles, potentially resulting in chaos or even civil war.