TO CHINA, JAPAN IS A BIG THREAT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

To China, Japan Is a Big Threat

PLA-linked reports evince a new regional order is emerging.

By: Victoria Herczegh

A meaningful shift is underway in China's view of Japan as a military threat. 

According to assessments linked to the People's Liberation Army, most notably in a report published last week by Beijing-based defense think tank Lande, Japan is no longer framed merely as one of the many allies of the United States but as a military actor of the same level – one whose capabilities must be addressed independently, and one that may complicate U.S.-China reconciliation efforts.

China’s concern about Japan is most clearly illustrated by assessments of the Japanese and U.S. response to PLA exercises conducted near Taiwan last month. 

Chinese reports noted that several American MQ-4C Triton drones and Japanese Falcon 2000MSA surveillance aircraft diverted from their routine patrols to monitor the drills. 

The wording of the reports made clear that Beijing no longer sees Japan as a passive observer in the regional surveillance architecture. 

Indeed, Japanese intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, basing infrastructure, and data-sharing arrangements allow Tokyo to act independently in the regional intelligence network. 

Chinese analysts now openly acknowledge that any major PLA deployment near Taiwan would be detected almost immediately, forcing a doctrinal shift away from concealment and toward mission effectiveness under constant U.S. and Japanese observation. 

The repeated pairing of the two allies in these assessments signals that Beijing views both as equally critical constraints on PLA operational freedom.

Chinese rhetoric on the matter reflects more than mere irritation. 

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statement in 2025 that a Taiwan contingency could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan already marked a decisive break from previous ambiguity. 

For Beijing, the implication was that Japan could intervene militarily without being attacked first. 

It thus responded by banning the export of dual-use goods, issuing warnings to Chinese tourists and heightening diplomatic pressure. 

Subsequent PLA exercises have been designed to send messages to Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. 

And the message is: Japan’s potential involvement in a Taiwan intervention would be answered. 

Meanwhile, China’s emerging “five-sea integration” concept – coordinating pressure across multiple maritime theaters – explicitly treats Japan as a key actor to be reined in, particularly through the possibility of coordinated pressure from China, Russia and North Korea that could limit Japan’s ability to reinforce the Taiwan Strait.

The accelerated integration of U.S. and Japanese military capabilities has only increased China’s concerns. 

Recent agreements on joint missile production, expanded joint drills in Japan’s southwest and coordination on supply chains for critical minerals point to an alliance that is becoming more operationally sophisticated and more strategically resilient. 

Okinawa, already important to U.S. power projection, is increasingly being reinforced by Japanese initiatives such as new radar deployments on remote islands that tighten surveillance coverage over the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

Adding to Beijing’s anxieties is Japan’s defense spending. 

Tokyo’s decision to move toward 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense expenditures, acquire long-range strike capabilities and expand missile production reflects a conscious effort to increase its value as an ally while boosting its independent deterrent capacity. 

Though Japan insists that its military posture is still defensive in nature, the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles, the extension of the range of its Type 12 missile and the development of hypersonic systems evince a shift toward regional deterrence. 

This undermines Beijing’s confidence that it could pull off a quick or limited campaign in Taiwan. 

Even if Japan cannot match China quantitatively, its ability to impose losses, particularly in coordination with U.S. forces, complicates Chinese planning and increases the risks of escalation.

Indeed, China still has an overwhelming numerical superiority in defense spending, missile inventories, and naval and air forces. 

Also, despite its efforts to remilitarize, Japan is falling short of its recruitment goals and lacks the manpower needed for sustained high-tempo operations or a prolonged conflict. 

Even so, strategic impact is not determined by numbers alone. 

Japan’s geographic position along the first island chain, combined with its ISR capabilities and anti-access systems, allows it to exert substantial influence over Chinese operations in the East China Sea and around Taiwan. 

Japan’s coastal missile units, advanced submarines and growing fleet of F-35 fighters form a layered defensive network that can significantly disrupt PLA movements. 

More important, Japan’s forces are highly interoperable with U.S. systems, meaning that their effectiveness increases in a crisis situation. 

This is a big reason that Chinese military analyses increasingly treat Japan as a similar constraint to what the United States poses, rather than as a secondary player.

The consequences of Beijing’s new threat perception are many. 

China’s need for foreign capital, stable export markets and technological access has made confrontation with the U.S. economically unsustainable in the near term. 

Similarly, the U.S. continues to rely on China as a major trade partner and manufacturing hub, making a complete rupture economically untenable. 

Japan complicates this dynamic. 

Even if Washington and Beijing succeed in managing their rivalry, Japan’s military modernization and explicit connection of Taiwan’s security to its own survival ensure that regional flashpoints cannot be resolved through U.S.-China accommodation alone. 

For Beijing, this means that an agreement with Washington does not completely neutralize the strategic challenge posed by Japan’s rise.

In strategic terms, China does indeed have some reason to fear Japan’s rise – not because Japan rivals China’s power but because it constrains China’s options. 

The decision by Chinese analysts to place Japan at the same level as the U.S. is likely to yield tangible changes in China’s military posture. 

The PLA will increasingly plan for Japanese involvement in any major crisis, particularly in scenarios involving Taiwan. 

Rather than assuming Japan’s role will be insignificant or delayed, Chinese operational planning is likely to treat Japanese bases, surveillance assets and command infrastructure as key facilities that must be neutralized early. 

(To be sure, this does not imply a desire for war with Japan; it merely suggests that Japan will feature far more prominently in Chinese targeting, electronic warfare planning and counter-surveillance efforts than it has in the past.)

At the same time, China is likely to intensify its reliance on horizontal escalation and multi-theater pressure to counter Japan’s growing qualitative advantages. 

Increased coordination with Russia and, to a lesser extent, North Korea would stretch Japan and other U.S. allies across multiple fronts, complicating Tokyo’s ability to concentrate resources on the Taiwan Strait. 

This approach aligns with emerging PLA battle concepts and reflects a broader effort to decrease Japan’s deterrent effect by forcing it to manage simultaneous risks rather than maintain a single focus. 

Beijing will also continue to expand capabilities designed to undermine Japan’s evolving deterrence strategy. 

This includes more investment in missile forces capable of saturating Japanese air and missile defenses, as well as cyber and electronic warfare tools meant to counter Japan’s surveillance, command and logistics networks. 

The goal will not be to defeat Japan militarily in isolation but to preserve China’s ability to maintain coercive leverage, even as Japan’s defensive and counterstrike capabilities improve.

Diplomatically, Beijing will try to maintain economic ties and trade relations with Tokyo where possible, while using selective economic pressure to signal red lines on security issues. 

(Japan has already made modest progress in diversifying away from China on rare earth processing since the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fishing boat incident of 2010.) 

Full-scale decoupling is highly unlikely, particularly given China’s need for foreign capital and economic stabilization, but political trust is likely to remain low. 

Efforts to dissuade Japan from deepening its security role, or to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, will continue, though their effectiveness is likely to be limited by Japan’s own perception of the threat.

Ultimately, China’s decision to treat Japan as a peer-level constraint of the U.S. is not a temporary shift in rhetoric; it’s evidence of an emerging regional order. 

Japan’s rise limits Beijing’s strategic options at the same time that China is seeking external stability to address internal economic challenges. 

That tension will define China’s attitude toward Japan in the coming years.