The Return of the Nation-State in the Middle East
China’s rise on the global stage could give the region a chance to recover after years of turmoil.
By: Hilal Khashan
A prime example was the founding of the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, a result of the U.S. intervention following Baghdad’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Fragmentation intensified in the early 21st century, when the United States introduced the idea of a new Middle East, in which chaos prevailed and small, weak entities became the norm.
In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq, toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, and enabled Iranian-backed Shiite militias to proliferate and dominate the government in Baghdad.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah created a ministate and became the country’s preponderant political actor.
In Yemen, the Houthis captured most of the country’s northern regions by 2014.
In Syria, the 2011 Arab Spring uprising led to a bloody civil war and the Assad regime’s eventual demise.
However, the mood in Washington shifted dramatically after China’s rise as a formidable global economic and military power.
The U.S. stopped viewing partition as an opportunity and came to see it instead as a strategic threat that could allow China, Russia and other states to exploit the new regional reality and further their interests at America’s expense.
The logic of U.S. policy has shifted, therefore, from dealing with fragmented entities to encouraging the preservation of unified states.
This paper will examine the drivers of the new U.S. policy in the Middle East and its implications for the region.
China’s Challenge
Following decades of unipolar world order, the return of great power competition has become a reality in contemporary global politics.
China has put forward many proposals, hosted conferences on regional security, and advanced ideas for implementing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
It has presented a model for development in the Middle East that appeals to the region’s authoritarian rulers.
China’s presence could be a win-win for both Beijing and regional governments, especially regarding development cooperation and the transfer of technological expertise.
While great power competition during the Cold War was characterized by grand visions and narratives, the current race is merely transactional.
It lacks overarching organizational principles or comprehensive political projects.
The United States realizes that it’s too preoccupied to start new conflicts or manage existing ones in already fragmented Middle Eastern countries.
China is now Washington’s top priority and main rival, and is looking to fill the gap.
Many states in the region rely on a multi-axis policy, simultaneously cultivating partnerships with the U.S., China and other major powers.
The global and regional environment is conducive to the expansion of Chinese influence.
Beijing, for its part, recognizes that controlling trade and energy routes in the Middle East would help reduce its reliance on the United States.
For the administration in Washington, maintaining dominance in the Middle East has become crucial to preventing China from achieving hegemony.
China supports Iran economically and bolsters its military capabilities.
Chinese purchases of Iranian oil generate billions of dollars, ensuring the regime’s survival despite maximum pressure sanctions.
Militarily, Chinese technology has enhanced Iran’s drone and missile capabilities.
Beijing and Tehran are therefore not so much allies as they are complementary partners, with China providing economic and diplomatic cover, while Iran creates regional instability that serves the interests of both parties at a relatively low cost to Beijing.
The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, supported by China, has taken the region by surprise, overturning established equations and raising fundamental questions about the future of the Middle East.
What’s happening between Saudi Arabia and Iran goes beyond the mere resumption of diplomatic relations; it signals a redrawing of the political boundaries of security and influence in the region.
The agreement signed between the two countries in March 2023, brokered by China, reflected a profound shift in their strategic visions and opened the door to a new phase in the regional structure.
The shift is important because of its timing, coming at a moment when traditional alliances are eroding and new balances are emerging, demanding a comprehensive reassessment of the Gulf states’ role in the regional and international system.
The rapprochement is not a passing event in the ebb and flow of bilateral relations but rather a strategic step that has implications for security, energy and alliances.
The agreement was the result of a complex web of internal factors, regional pressures and international transformations.
The fragile internal situation in Iran, evidenced by the recent popular protests and economic challenges, has prompted its leadership to seek a strategic way out that reduces pressure on the regime and opens channels of communication with influential regional powers.
For Saudi Arabia, strategic and developmental factors influenced its decision to engage Iran.
From a political and security standpoint, the Yemeni conflict was a top priority for Riyadh, given the ongoing human and financial costs of the war.
The Saudi leadership believed that any settlement in Yemen required direct engagement with Tehran, given its influence on the Houthis.
Economically, striking a deal could benefit Saudi Arabia’s troubled Vision 2030 project, which focuses on diversifying the economy, enhancing regional stability to attract international investment and reducing reliance on its security alliance with the United States.
Chinese mediation added an extra geopolitical dimension to the agreement.
China, the primary trade partner of both Saudi Arabia and Iran, sought to solidify its image as a global power capable of playing political roles in regions traditionally considered within the Western sphere of influence.
Beijing’s success in bringing the two sides together was a clear indication of a shift in the balance of power in the international system, as rising powers move to fill the gaps left by the United States’ declining direct involvement in regional issues.
The chances of sustaining the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran depend on both parties’ abilities to turn the agreement into a strategic partnership.
Regional actors today have a rare opportunity to build a more inclusive and flexible regional system, based on a balance of interests rather than the imposition of hegemony.
If this path succeeds, we may witness the Middle East transition from a theater of conflict to an arena of multilateral understandings – a transformation that will redefine the region’s position in the new international order.
The U.S. has no interest in taking military action to oust the regime in Tehran.
It will not repeat the 1953 coup d’etat that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh or the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The U.S. has foregone the use of military force to change regimes or reshape societies in the Middle East, preferring instead to see change come from within.
It’s keen on transforming Iran into a normal country that’s devoid of revolutionary religious ideology.
As it stands, the deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran gives the Islamic Republic a new lease on power, which runs counter to the U.S. strategic outlook for the Middle East.
What Washington finds unacceptable is that Iran expects it to recognize Tehran as a leading regional power on par with Israel.
Washington doesn’t object to close economic cooperation between Middle Eastern countries and Beijing, but it doesn’t want the region’s countries, including Iran, to fall outside the U.S. security, technological and political umbrella, and the Saudi-Iranian deal could pave a path to such a scenario.
The Nation-State Reasserts Itself
The Middle East faces major challenges, including the redrawing of regional balances, maritime and regional security, structural economic reforms, religious and ethnic conflicts, and humanitarian concerns like poverty, hunger and displacement.
But Washington is increasingly making efforts to ensure that further political and territorial fragmentation isn’t added to this list.
The U.S. does not want to open Syria’s east to China or its south to Russia.
In Iraq, too, Washington’s policy has changed; after previously dealing with the Kurdistan Region as an autonomous entity, it now supports a strong central government because any fragmentation could create an opportunity for Chinese involvement in oil pipelines and infrastructure.
In Yemen, which was on the verge of splintering into two states, Washington has come to reject partition because it could give China a military presence in Bab el Mandeb, one of the world’s most important straits.
Saudi Arabia would not have dared to militarily confront the UAE in southern Yemen and defeat the separatist Southern Transitional Council without the tacit approval of the Trump administration.
Likewise, in Syria, government troops would not have driven out the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces from most areas of the country’s northeast without a green light from Washington.
Both cases clearly reflect the Trump administration’s desire to maintain the system of states in the region that emerged after World War II.
It appears Washington is following in the footsteps of Britain, which pushed for the creation of the Arab League in 1945 because it preferred to deal with the Arabs as a single bloc rather than as divided states (though Arab nations never actually acted as a single political entity, rendering the Arab League ineffective).
The rivalry between the great powers has become a protective umbrella for weak states, and national unity has become a geopolitical necessity for major powers.
China’s rise on the international stage has given the Middle East a chance to recover after years of turmoil.
A poet born in central Arabia in the mid-7th century once said, “My sheep scattered one day, so I prayed to the Lord to unleash the wolf and the hyena upon them.”
A wolf and a hyena will fight over prey, resulting in the sheep’s survival.
It’s a metaphor for the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East today.
The major powers’ preoccupation with each other has convinced them to maintain the unity of the region’s countries.
The Middle East has been and will remain a contested region between the major powers, but it could also be a player in shaping their policies.
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