THE JAPAN-CHINA DISPUTE, EXPLAINED / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Japan-China Dispute, Explained

Japan’s strategy is to keep the U.S. aligned with its own threat perceptions. China’s strategy is the opposite.

By: Victoria Herczegh

Over the past month, the diplomatic conflict that began as a war of words between China and Japan has gradually intensified, leading to maritime confrontations around a disputed island chain and culminating with Chinese fighter jets aiming fire-control radar at Japanese F-15s near Okinawa. 

The dispute started when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said any Chinese blockade or use of force against Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan – a legal threshold that allows the nation’s Self-Defense Forces to participate in collective self-defense. 

No sitting prime minister had ever said as much explicitly.

In response, Beijing has suspended cultural exchanges, announced travel warnings, halted seafood imports and issued several diplomatic rebukes. 

It has also deployed warships and armed coast guard vessels around contested waters and called on the United Nations to denounce Takaichi’s remarks as state media circulates rhetoric invoking Japanese aggression in World War II. 

(For its part, Japan deployed medium-range anti-aircraft missiles to Yonaguni, an island located only 70 miles, or 113 kilometers, from Taiwan, despite Chinese condemnation.) 

For Beijing, Japan’s posturing threatens explicit involvement in a potential invasion of Taiwan, an issue China considers crucial to its sovereignty and legitimacy.

The confrontation clearly implicates the three major powers of the Western Pacific, the geopolitical environment of which is now more fragile than it was just a few weeks ago. 

U.S.-China reconciliation is being tested, Japan’s military normalization is accelerating, and Washington is struggling to distance itself from regional crises it had hoped to delegate to its allies.

There’s reason to believe Beijing asked the U.S. to intervene. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated a phone call with President Donald Trump, after which Trump spoke with Takaichi. 

Trump reportedly asked Takaichi to “temper” her rhetoric, though Tokyo was quick to deny the report. 

Still, it makes sense that he would reach out. 

China and Japan both want U.S. support, albeit for different reasons, but neither wants to publicly admit as much. 

This suits the U.S. fine, coming as it does at a time when Washington wants to focus on domestic affairs instead of entangling itself in a conflict on the other side of the world.

Either way, the phone call between Xi and Trump shows that China wants to reconcile with the U.S. so that it can access U.S. capital to revive its economy. 

During the call, Xi reportedly argued that Taiwan’s “return” to China is integral to preserving the post-World War II international order. 

By making mention of the Allies’ wartime cooperation, Xi attempted to elevate the U.S.-China relationship from pragmatic accommodation to a higher level of shared historical responsibility. 

This is essentially tantamount to a request that the U.S. halt or slow Japan’s military normalization process, which Beijing sees as corrosive to the spirit of the Potsdam Declaration (which set the terms for Japan’s surrender in World War II) and China’s regional aspirations.

Even before the Trump-Xi conversation, Beijing had framed Japan’s comments on Taiwan as a revival of WWII-era militarism. 

A recent People’s Daily editorial explicitly called on the U.S. to “jointly safeguard the postwar international order” and oppose Japan’s “dangerous strategic moves.” 

Chinese diplomats have noted that Japan’s missile deployments and legal reinterpretations violate postwar norms. 

China views Japan’s growing military capabilities – specifically its “counterstrike” options, its expanding amphibious forces and the almost complete militarization of the Ryukyu Islands – as a strategic threat that could complicate military operations around Taiwan. 

Despite its relatively stable trilateral ties with Russia and North Korea, China is (correctly) concerned about the prospects of squaring off against a Japan with the full backing of the United States. 

China’s objective, then, is clear: curb Japanese “aggression” by reaching an understanding on it with Washington.

This goes against what Washington has been working toward for years. 

The U.S. has encouraged Japan to remilitarize so it can shoulder more of the region’s security responsibilities. 

Joint operational planning, more and larger military exercises, and expanded U.S. deployments in the Ryukyus all attest to this encouragement. 

However, the Trump administration’s goals are more complex. 

Trump has prioritized economic stabilization with China. 

Though reconciliation is less urgent for the U.S. than it is for China, Trump is working toward reciprocal visits with Xi in 2026, and he does not want Taiwan-related tensions to derail those plans. 

(Not for nothing, Trump is historically skeptical of military commitments in Asia and opposed large-scale involvement in a potential Taiwan conflict.)

Washington is not about to abandon Japan or put a stop to its military reforms, but it may be open to slowing or fine-tuning the pace of Japan’s normalization if doing so produces a broader economic or strategic deal with Beijing. 

Recent developments suggest a subtle shift toward this option: Trump appears to be willing to consider Xi’s requests in a way previous U.S. presidents did not. 

At the same time, Japan wants reassurance that Washington will not abandon the alliance or trade Tokyo’s interests for temporary U.S.-China stability. 

Its missile deployments, joint exercises and expanded amphibious capabilities reflect a nation preparing for a Taiwan contingency in which U.S. forces might be delayed or constrained. 

While Japan is making preparations, China is looking for quiet acceptance of its interpretation of the postwar order and Taiwan’s future. 

Beijing's pointing back to WWII history is a political maneuver aimed at isolating Japan diplomatically and forcing the U.S. back into conflict. 

The problem is that the U.S. cannot satisfy both simultaneously.

So even though Washington wants to be more hands-off, the Japan-China dispute threatens to pull Washington back into direct arbitration. 

The more intense the confrontation becomes, the more difficult it will be for the U.S. to avoid direct involvement.

Importantly, Japan’s principal fear is not war with China but being abandoned by the United States. 

Takaichi’s sharp rhetoric over Taiwan is at least partly meant to make sure the U.S. doesn’t reach a deal that excludes Japanese interests. 

Tokyo has always been deeply concerned when Beijing uses World War II rhetoric because it places Japan in a diplomatically defensive posture, especially when the U.S. stays quiet. 

Japan’s strategy is to keep the U.S. aligned closely with its own threat perceptions. 

China’s strategy is to pull the U.S. away from them.

Xi’s requests and Trump’s willingness to entertain them demonstrate converging needs: China needs economic stabilization, while the U.S. seeks manageable relations during a politically and economically sensitive period. 

Both want to avoid a Taiwan crisis. 

Even so, Beijing’s escalation pattern has shifted: It wants to increase coercion against Japan and other U.S. allies while avoiding challenging U.S. forces. 

This reflects an attempt to secure gains without risking systemic conflict. 

Washington does not want Japan to provoke a crisis that could force U.S. intervention. 

But it very much needs Japan to remain the primary regional counterweight to China. 

Japan’s missile deployments, joint exercises and counterstrike preparations will thus continue, even if its public statements over Taiwan may soften.

Beijing’s World War II rhetoric, Japan’s military modernization and the ambiguity of Trump’s commitments create a strategic environment in which signaling errors could escalate tensions quickly. 

The Xi-Trump-Takaichi connection is a clear demonstration that the U.S. still wields decisive power in East Asia. 

The fact that Trump is even considering Xi’s suggestions marks a significant shift in U.S. behavior. 

It opens the possibility of a new, if fragile, U.S.-China understanding.

However, it also deepens Japan’s abandonment issues and could thus expedite Japanese efforts to become more autonomous and militarily capable. 

The coming months will determine whether this moment becomes a turning point toward stability or the beginning of a destabilizing three-way rivalry in the Western Pacific. 

If tensions are managed well, the region can stabilize. 

If they aren’t, a dangerous conflict could be in the offing.