Understanding the Enigmatic Houthis
The rebel group is increasingly positioning itself as a new power player in the Middle East.
By: Hilal Khashan
This perception is far from accurate.
The relationship between the Houthis and Iran is one of mutual benefit, not one of direct subordination or subservience.
Iran has supported the Houthis as a means of blackmailing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and maintaining pressure on Red Sea shipping.
Thus, it views the Houthis as an instrument to implement its regional policies, not an ally that operates on equal footing.
On the theological front, the Houthis have their own religiously driven project that competes with the tenets of the Iranian Revolution.
Iran and its Shiite allies in Iraq and Lebanon privately accuse the Houthis of vulgarizing Shiism, viewing the group as an isolated tribal militia, born out of Yemen’s internal disarray.
Houthi Religious Doctrine
The Houthis are followers of the Zaydi sect.
This branch of Islam recognizes the entitlement of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants to the imamate (or Islamic leadership) but does not support the principle of hereditary imams.
It thus differs from other Shiite sects in its refusal to accept the 12th imam’s occultation and infallibility.
The Houthis have grown closer to the Twelver Shiite sect prevalent among Shiites in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, but the two camps still have major differences, and the group does not follow Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s religious doctrine.
The first Zaydi theocratic state was founded by the religious and political leader Yahya ibn al-Husayn in 983, in what is now Yemen’s Saada province.
Husayn arrived in Yemen from the Hijaz region, located in western Arabia, and became known as al-Hadi ila al-Haqq, meaning “guide to the truth,” because he sought to lead Yemenis along a righteous path.
The Zaydi imams ruled northern Yemen with an iron fist for hundreds of years, isolating the region from the rest of the world and preventing the provision of modern education and basic services.
In 1962, a military coup overthrew the imamate, established a republican regime and sidelined the Zaydis.
Hardline Zaydis are today determined to return to power.
The Houthi group itself is an offshoot of the Zaydi Imamate Revival Movement, which emerged in the early 1990s.
The first Houthi leader, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, led a rebellion against the government in 2004 and was killed that same year.
His brother, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, is the current leader.
Their father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, was a prominent Zaydi scholar and influential figure.
All three belong to the Jarudiya, one of the most extreme Zaydi sects in Islam.
While most Zaydis believe that an imam does not have to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (though it’s preferred), followers of Jarudiya believe descendance from the prophet’s line is a strict prerequisite.
For them, imams are on the same level as prophets, as they are chosen by God.
They also believe that their divine right to rule extends not only to Yemen but to the entire universe.
To consolidate their authority, the Houthis established a theocratic police state.
The group venerates its founder as the speaker of the Quran and its current leader as the head of the Quranic march, referring to the group’s political and religious program.
Its founding document states that God chose the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad in general and the group’s leader in particular to lead the Islamic community and preserve the Quran.
Its current leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, is referred to as the “emblem of guidance.”
These qualities underscore his sacred status, which demands absolute obedience from his subjects.
The Houthis’ confidence in their mission stems from their belief, like Sunni and Shiite Islamic groups, that the Prophet Muhammad told his companions that a figure from his household, whom he referred to as the Mahdi, would appear before the Day of Judgment.
Whether out of conviction or through sheer force, people pledge allegiance to the Mahdi in Mecca.
And according to this prophecy, the Mahdi will lead his army to Jerusalem, where he will establish an Islamic caliphate in preparation for the coming of the Messiah.
The Houthis believe their actions throughout the region are paving a path toward this destiny.
Their ability to defeat their opponents during the Yemeni civil war reinforced their belief that God is on their side.
Their attacks in the Red Sea against Israel have become part of a holy war on behalf of the Islamic community, for which the group has been preparing for decades.
Attacking Israel
Revolution against an unjust ruler is at the heart of the Zaydi faith.
Today, the unjust ruler refers mainly to Israel.
Zaydis believe that the Mahdi will appear among them and seize Jerusalem from the Jews.
One month after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, the Houthis began missile and drone attacks against Israel, in addition to targeting Israeli-bound ships in the Red Sea.
The Houthis justified their actions based on humanitarian, moral and religious principles.
The Houthi leader has said his group’s aim is to lead the struggle against Israel on behalf of Arab and Islamic states.
(He’s also trying to increase the group’s support among locals in Houthi-controlled areas amid anger over the group’s inability to pay employees’ salaries on time.)
The Houthis continued their attacks against Israel, despite the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces and Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the confrontation.
They refused to suspend their attacks even after two months of deadly U.S. airstrikes and devastating Israeli reprisals.
In so doing, they demonstrated their resilience and political independence from Iran.
Their attacks do not follow traditional military logic.
While they have forced Israelis into shelters and disrupted air traffic, these strikes have been largely militarily ineffective.
Still, the Houthis have touted these assaults – even the launch of a single missile or drone that breached Israeli airspace – as evidence of their ability to challenge Israel and threaten its security.
The Houthis know full well that no foreign power can win a war against them, because Yemen’s terrain, particularly the rugged Saada Mountains, protects them against foreign invasion and guarantees their independence.
Indeed, despite Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, the lack of accurate intelligence on the locations of Houthi missile launchers has hampered Israeli airstrikes.
The Israeli air force has thus repeatedly bombed civilian infrastructure in the Hodeida harbor and the capital, Sanaa, without significantly damaging Houthi military assets.
Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas hold weekly mass demonstrations in solidarity with Gaza, following calls from the Houthi leader to do so, validating the political leadership’s role in attacking Israel despite severe Israeli reprisals.
Yemenis in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government have appealed to their government to stop criticizing the Houthis, thankful for their strikes against Israel and defense of Palestinians.
Unlike Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, who halted their missile and drone attacks against Israel, Houthi strikes have only intensified.
The group believes that continuing its assault will extend its political life and give it time to achieve its ultimate goal of dominating Yemen.
External Supporters
Iran does not view the Houthis as a reliable ally, and Twelver Shiites do not recognize them as part of their ideological fabric.
In fact, Shiites view the Houthis as unwanted intruders into the faith.
Their differences aren’t marginal, as they relate to the concept of religious authority.
The Zaydis believe that the imamate is not absent but rather present and hierarchical in nature. Abdul Malik al-Houthi himself is its current representative.
He has claimed a level of spiritual legitimacy even greater than that of Iran’s supreme leader.
Meanwhile, the pro-Iran camps in Iraq and Lebanon view the Houthis as an alien minority, lacking religious legitimacy, political structure and regional acceptance.
The Houthis have thus developed close relations with other external partners.
China has adopted a pragmatic approach toward the group, balancing economic and security interests, including ensuring the safety of Chinese ships in the Red Sea.
In this context, China has provided the Houthis with ship-marking equipment, satellite imagery and drone components.
China views Yemen and the Red Sea as a testing ground for the U.S.-led global order and the Houthis as a strategic force in reshaping regional alliances.
China does not necessarily view the instability caused by Houthi actions negatively, especially if it undermines U.S. credibility in the Red Sea basin.
It benefits from continued U.S. military involvement in the Middle East, which prevents Washington from focusing on fronts more important to Beijing, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan.
Russia has also provided support to the Houthis, sending military experts to Sanaa to advise the group on how to carry out its attacks and avoid targeting Saudi Arabia.
By allying with global powers such as China and Russia and establishing a network of proxies in the Horn of Africa region, the Houthis are strengthening their strategic position at the crossroads of global trade.
Along with developing their capabilities in asymmetric warfare, these advances pose complex challenges to the West, which has focused primarily on containment as the Houthis advance toward their long-term strategic goals.
Their growing ambitions, resilience and ideological foundation increasingly position them as a new power player in the region, with the potential to establish a new Islamic republic in its own right.
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