RUSSIA´S SILENT SUPPORT FOR VENEZUELA / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Russia’s Silent Support for Venezuela

Washington wants to expand the geography covered by U.S.-Russia negotiations.

By: Ekaterina Zolotova

In late August, after talks between the United States and Russia failed to bring any kind of resolution to the war in Ukraine, Washington deployed naval assets to Venezuela – a staunch Russian ally – to combat drug trafficking and transnational criminal organizations. 

Then, in early September, Washington deployed five F-35 fifth-generation fighter jets to the former Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Puerto Rico for similar purposes. 

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro said the deployments were tantamount to open aggression and has since activated his country’s defenses, announcing a massive military mobilization and ordering the deployment of 25,000 troops on the border with Colombia, as well as on the Caribbean and Atlantic coasts of the country.

Many of those sympathetic to Venezuela’s situation have said the BRICS, including Russia, should respond to U.S. threats in the Caribbean. 

Others have suggested that Russia could protect Venezuela from possible U.S. intervention by deploying its Tu-160 strategic bombers, as it has done in the past. 

Russia itself has been unusually quiet on the issue, considering how often it uses its South American assets to needle the United States.

Venezuela is especially useful in this regard. 

Geographically, its location on America’s underbelly and its access to the Caribbean Sea allow Moscow to be a threat that Washington must take seriously. 

In 2024, for example, a naval strike group from Russia’s Northern Fleet entered the Venezuelan port of La Guaira as part of a long-distance voyage – seen as a show of force and public reminder to Washington that Russia can sneak into its backyard if it so chooses.

This explains why Russia has cultivated such a special relationship with Venezuela, one that is characterized by deep military and energy cooperation. 

Since 2005, Venezuela has been Russia's largest military-technical cooperation partner in Latin America. 

Russia also sees Venezuela as a market for its exports, including weapons. 

In July, Rosoboronexport announced the completion of the first stage of construction of a Venezuelan plant that will produce up to 70 million rounds of ammunition per year for Kalashnikov assault rifles in Venezuela. 

For its part, Caracas recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the results of the referendum in Crimea – a politically useful arrow in Russia’s quiver. 

But Moscow is also interested in Venezuela’s resources. 

Russia is involved in the country’s oil industry, especially with regard to getting oil to its other Caribbean ally, Cuba. 

During the Cold War, Caracas played a major role in Soviet-Cuban trade, with Venezuela supplying oil to Cuba in exchange for Soviet supplies of the same volume of oil to Eastern European countries, significantly reducing transportation costs. 

It has maintained this involvement in the post-Cold War era, slowing only after U.S. sanctions on Venezuela tightened in 2019-2020.

Yet it still keeps a notable presence there. 

Rosneft may have sold its Venezuela-related assets to a Russian state-owned enterprise, Roszarubezhneft, in March 2020, but it did so only to shield Rosneft from U.S. sanctions. 

(Though the name "Roszarubezhneft" suggests it's a distinct entity, reports indicate it is effectively a shell company used by the Russian state to manage its oil interests in Venezuela.

It had later planned to transfer its assets to another Russian-based firm, Petromost.) 

Moscow continues to forge partnerships with active and potential oil producers to regulate the oil market through production volumes within the OPEC+ framework.

Meanwhile, Western countries are discussing new packages of sanctions and price ceilings for Russian oil. 

These may require the U.S. to pressure Venezuela into making good on its threats of sanctions against Russia, assuming the Ukraine war fails to end amicably anytime soon. 

In theory, Venezuela could benefit from future sanctions if its oil can be bought in Europe. 

This could offset the shortfalls of Russian imports and stabilize the energy market. Italian and Spanish firms are already exploring these options.

It is therefore in Moscow's interest to prevent the U.S. from turning Venezuela against it. 

This, coupled with Russia’s ongoing advocacy of a multipolar world order and its imperative to keep what few allies it has, means Moscow can be expected to at least offer rhetorical support to the Maduro regime. 

But there’s only so much Russia can do. 

It’s not as if the Russian navy could break a Caribbean trade embargo. 

And the last known interaction between Maduro and Russian President Vladimir Putin took place on May 7, when they signed an agreement on strategic partnership and cooperation between the two countries, covering such areas as global and regional security, countering terrorism, extremism, and the fight against the “falsification” of history and the glorification of Nazism.

This could be seen as a sign that the Ukraine war is preventing Russia from helping its strategic allies. 

After all, the conflict is a huge drain on resources, and sanctions have prevented the Kremlin from reforming its economy. 

But it’s also a sign that Moscow doesn’t believe the U.S. will undertake serious military action. 

Russia needs all the leverage it can get in Ukraine negotiations, so it can’t afford to show weakness in one of the few places it can undermine the United States. 

Nor would Moscow allow Venezuelan oil reserves to fall into Washington’s hands. 

Moscow hasn’t abandoned Caracas, of course. 

But instead of mobilizing armed forces for a conflict it doesn’t believe is coming, the Kremlin has instead chosen to counter U.S. sanctions with Venezuela by further integrating technology, energy and mining operations.

Even so, Russia’s inaction is nonetheless revealing. 

While it needs leverage in Ukraine negotiations, it can’t afford to escalate tensions too far. 

This is especially important in light of the recent incident in Poland, where 19 Russian drones crossed Polish airspace in an event that Warsaw described as a deliberate act of provocation. 

Moscow can’t afford to escalate the conflict to other parts of the border, and it needs at least some security guarantees on the Western front.

It’s no coincidence that Moscow is staying silent about Venezuela at the same time it is drawing attention to the presence of NATO forces near Russia’s borders. 

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, recently published an article about a visit to the Leningrad region, near the Finnish border. 

According to Medvedev, since joining NATO in 2023, Finland has been preparing to attack Russia, disguising its increased military activity as defensive measures. 

However, Moscow in recent years has recreated the Leningrad Military District, deployed additional forces to the region, and bolstered its air and coastal defense systems. 

Therefore, were Finland to attack Russia, Medvedev warned, it could spell the end of Finnish statehood.

Medvedev has a reputation for making bombastic statements, and NATO’s deployment in Finland is far too small to credibly threaten northern Russia. 

(The Northern European command base in Mikkeli, for example, has a staff of about 10, which will increase to approximately 50 in a few years.) 

Nevertheless, Putin ordered that fortifications be built along the border, suggesting that the Kremlin is taking NATO’s presence in Finland seriously. 

Just as the United States will not tolerate Russian submarines in the Caribbean, Moscow wants to communicate that it will monitor and respond to any increased Western military presence near its borders.

That said, Russia recognizes that some of the U.S. interest in Finland is commercial. 

Specifically, to have a role in the Arctic’s development, the U.S. will need icebreakers, and no country has been more successful than Finland at icebreaker design. 

(Finnish companies have designed nearly 80 percent of the world’s icebreakers.) 

At the same time, Washington recognizes how important the oil market is for Moscow’s budget, and Venezuela is an important producer. 

And the U.S. is confident that Russia does not want to start a conflict with NATO, just as Russia is convinced that the U.S. does not want a conflict in Latin America.

The truth is that the Kremlin does not think it likely that Washington will attempt to overthrow the government in Caracas or provoke a major escalation. 

It does, however, want to expand the geography covered by U.S.-Russia negotiations. 

In Moscow’s ideal scenario, Russian and U.S. negotiators would discuss shared interests and risks concerning Russia’s presence in Venezuela as well as NATO’s activity in Finland, the Arctic and the Baltics. 

This, more than a lack of military resources or funds, might explain Russia’s forbearance in the face of U.S. threats against its Latin American ally. 

Although the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian presidents have been mostly fruitless so far, Moscow is playing the long game.