The Future of Hezbollah
The militant group would prefer martyrdom over disarmament.
By: Hilal Khashan
Last month, the Lebanese Cabinet approved a U.S. proposal calling on Beirut to impose state sovereignty over all Lebanese territory, demarcate the border with Israel and disarm Hezbollah.
Under the plan, Israel would then begin a gradual withdrawal from the positions it occupied in southern Lebanon last year.
The Lebanese government subsequently announced its intention to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.
The group, unsurprisingly, has rejected the plan.
As Cabinet members met to discuss the issue of disarmament, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem criticized Prime Minister Nawaf Salam for his support of the U.S. proposal and urged the Cabinet not to waste time trying to implement U.S. dictates.
This situation effectively means Hezbollah would have to confront the Lebanese army to maintain control over its military infrastructure and weapons.
However, weakened by Israel’s offensive last year and continuous attacks on its commanders and military infrastructure, Hezbollah isn’t willing to start a fight with the Lebanese army, and vice versa.
But if it continues to refuse to disarm, it will invite an escalation of hostilities with Israel.
Indeed, given the stalemate within Lebanon, Israel could be planning a renewed offensive against Hezbollah beyond its current low-intensity war of attrition – which would have disastrous consequences for an already fractured Lebanon.
Pressure to Disarm
U.S. envoy to Lebanon Tom Barrack presented the U.S. proposal to the Lebanese government as a way to ensure a lasting cessation of hostilities with Israel.
It builds on the Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War in 1989, and U.N. Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701, which call for the Lebanese state’s total control of weapons and the end of armed militias in the country.
U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham, who recently visited Beirut, stressed that the time has come to disarm Iranian-backed Hezbollah and transition it into a formal political party.
He also said if Hezbollah refuses to give up its weapons, then there will be no choice but to disarm it by force.
Israel is prepared to do so, Graham insisted, noting that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has previously expressed willingness to assist Lebanon in eliminating Hezbollah’s military arsenal.
Hezbollah now faces a fateful choice.
It still refuses to disarm but also wants to avoid confrontation with the army and being declared a banned entity.
The army leadership also doesn’t want a military confrontation with Hezbollah and a possible splintering of the army along sectarian lines, as occurred in 1976 and 1984.
Hezbollah has reneged on its approval of a ministerial statement issued last February that stipulated the state’s monopoly on arms, as well as its parliamentary deputies’ granting of a vote of confidence for the government on that basis.
Its defiance was boosted by the Iranian foreign minister’s visit to Beirut, during which he stated that efforts to disarm Hezbollah would fail and Tehran would continue to support the group’s resistance.
The Lebanese government’s decision to, albeit reluctantly, task the army with developing a plan to remove the group’s weapons (including precision missiles, drones, surface-to-air missiles, mortars, and even hand grenades and explosives) was an unprecedented step, given the country’s sectarian and ideological divides.
Its significance is that it shifts the Hezbollah issue from a Lebanese-Israeli conflict to an intra-Lebanese one.
Hezbollah can disrupt the functioning of the accommodationist Lebanese political system by withdrawing its ministers from the Cabinet and deputies from parliament.
Such a move would not relieve it from the pressure to disarm, but it would accelerate the resumption of war with Israel.
Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem has already threatened to renew the military confrontation with Israel.
Neither Israel nor Lebanon takes the threat seriously, considering that Israel has been launching strikes against Hezbollah at will daily.
Hezbollah is attempting to buy time by suggesting dialogue with the government, hoping regional developments (or divine intervention) will divert international attention to more pressing matters.
The Lebanese army is now in a difficult position, as it is not inclined to use military force against a fundamental component of Lebanese society.
Israel will thus likely resume its war against Hezbollah.
The U.S. proposal emphasized that the Lebanese government’s failure to comply would lead to its international isolation, its denial of foreign support and withholding of reconstruction aid.
It would also lead to an escalation of Israeli airstrikes.
Martyrdom Over Disarmament
For doctrinal reasons, Hezbollah would rather resist and risk its own destruction than agree to disarm.
The head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, compared the fight ahead to the Battle of Karbala, which took place in 680 between Hussein bin Ali, the second imam of Shiite belief, and the Umayyad army, in which Hussein and his 72 followers lost their lives.
The contest has become a symbol of revolt against injustice among Shiites and has catalyzed Shiite political movements ever since.
Hezbollah, which views itself as the guardian of the Shiite faith, considers jihad the path to martyrdom and urges its fighters to cherish martyrdom as a gateway to heaven.
While most who go to war are motivated by the spirit of survival and a desire to return home safely, Hezbollah fighters go to battle with an eagerness to become martyrs in defense of their honor, dignity and religion.
The concept of martyrdom, characterized by rebellion against the regime, holds a central place in Shiite doctrine.
Many of the historical events that Shiites commemorate occurred just after the dawn of Islam and relate to the acquisition of authority and governance within the community of believers.
Many of these struggles failed, and the men who led them lost their lives, further contributing to the legacy of martyrdom.
Consequences for Lebanon
If Hezbollah does not willfully surrender its weapons and abandon its military project, Lebanon will become marginalized in the region and lose all foreign support.
Following the elimination of most of Hezbollah’s leadership and the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, Washington believes a unique opportunity has arisen to reshape the landscape in Lebanon and marginalize Hezbollah.
It is unlikely that the Trump administration will agree to allow Israel to launch a comprehensive war against Hezbollah, which Netanyahu may not want anyway, given his preoccupation with Gaza, the West Bank and Syria.
However, Israel can continue its daily targeting of Hezbollah personnel and increase pressure on it by launching surgical commando operations in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah strongholds in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the east of the country.
Increased Israeli military pressure will crack Hezbollah’s popular base, and many of its members will eventually give up their weapons.
Barrack recently indicated that financial compensation would be offered to Hezbollah fighters who lay down their weapons, suggesting the existence of a plan to systematically target Hezbollah’s remaining assets, with the army eventually filling the vacuum left by the group’s collapse.
Should another round of fighting break out, Israel will demand additional security arrangements, likely including making all of southern Lebanon a demilitarized zone, thus effectively ending Hezbollah’s presence in the area.
Meanwhile, meetings are underway between Syria and Israel under the auspices of the U.S. and Gulf countries (namely, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) on a security agreement between the two archrivals.
One possible arrangement would see Syria annex the Lebanese coastal city of Tripoli and northern region of Akkar in exchange for relinquishing its claims over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
For Damascus, Tripoli’s importance lies in the fact that the administration of President Ahmad al-Sharaa has been unable to consolidate its control over the Syrian coast, where Alawites constitute the majority.
The Syrian government’s access to the ports of Latakia and Tartus is therefore questionable, hence its interest in Tripoli, which has a Sunni majority.
(During the Ottoman era, Tripoli was the capital of a province that included the Syrian cities of Homs and Hama.)
The Syrian government has not denied leaks in the media about al-Sharaa’s desire to swap parts of northern Lebanon for the Golan Heights.
Al-Sharaa would like to resettle many of the 2 million Syrians who fled to Lebanon during the Syrian civil war there, which would pave the way for demographic changes in Lebanon.
Even though the Syrian government insists that it has no intention of clashing with Hezbollah, Hezbollah’s eradication as a fighting force would likely tempt the Syrians to move into eastern and northern Lebanon and reclaim a large swath of Lebanese territory.
Barrack has said that, if Lebanon does not address its internal problems, it could once again become part of Greater Syria.
More than a century after France’s High Commissioner of the Levant declared the creation of Greater Lebanon, the precursor to modern-day Lebanon, it’s clear that the project has failed.
Maronite Christians might today prefer to abandon this endeavor in favor of an all-Christian Mount Lebanon ministate.
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