FOR WASHINGTON, AMERICA FIRST MEANS AMERICAS FIRST / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

For Washington, America First Means Americas First

Western Hemispheric security is no longer a given. 

By: Andrew Davidson

For more than two decades, U.S. strategy rested on the assumption that the Western Hemisphere was secure. 

But that may no longer be assumed. 

Cartel violence in Mexico and its effects in South America, state collapse in Haiti, and Venezuela’s role as a hub for cartel-driven instability and platform for Russian and Iranian influence are turning America’s backyard into a potential vulnerability. 

China, meanwhile, has embedded itself in regional infrastructure, including ports with potential military utility. 

Several of Washington’s recent military initiatives – deploying dual-carrier patrols at the Arctic’s entrances, sending 4,000 Marines and sailors to the Caribbean, and channeling Haitian stabilization through the Organization of American States – mark the return of a strategic logic of hemispheric defense.

If the Western Hemisphere becomes an active theater, it would undermine the foundation on which every U.S. global commitment is based. 

And though it would demand a shift of attention to activity closer to the U.S. mainland, it would signal a structural recalibration rather than a withdrawal from commitments overseas – the purpose of which would be to rely less on partnerships and more on its own power to compel others to stabilize its perimeter in a way that makes its global role more sustainable.

Logic

The logic of hemispheric defense has long been employed by Washington. 

Since the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, U.S. strategy has rested on denying its rivals a foothold in the Americas. 

In World War II, German U-boat activity in the Caribbean and Nazi influence in South America reinforced the need to secure the hemisphere as a base for global war. 

During the Cold War, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and repeated interventions in Central America underscored the notion that instability close to home could jeopardize U.S. national security and power projection abroad. 

The end of the Cold War made the matter less urgent since there was no longer a threat capable of matching U.S. power.

Years later, the 9/11 attacks turned Washington’s attention sharply away from its backyard to the Middle East, where it burned through political capital and consumed force structure throughout the 2000s. 

In the next decade, NATO’s confrontation with Russia drew resources toward Europe. 

And by the 2020s, competition with China in the Indo-Pacific became the defining axis of U.S. strategy as the Western Hemisphere drifted to the margins of military planning.

But for a variety of reasons, things are starting to change. 

Europe appears to be stronger than at any point since the Cold War; NATO has expanded, defense budgets are rising and allies are reportedly willing to take on more of the front-line burden against Russia. 

The Middle East still hosts 30,000-40,000 U.S. troops, but Washington has begun to adopt a partner-enabled model that entails arming, linking and supporting regional states rather than fighting the fight directly. 

In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. continues to field heavy formations but is dispersing them across allied territory as Japan, Australia and the Philippines reinforce the front line (and as European navies rotate carriers into the theater).

These adjustments give the U.S. more room to maneuver in the Americas. 

Canada remains a stable partner and crucial anchor for Arctic defense, but Mexico presents a persistent vulnerability: cartel-driven violence and migratory pressure that tie U.S. domestic politics directly to hemispheric stability. 

To the south, partners are weaker still. 

Colombia is overstretched, Ecuador faces spiraling violence, and Haiti has collapsed outright. 

Venezuela is a cartel haven, of course, but unlike other unstable states, it actively resists U.S.-led frameworks and positions itself as a regional outlier aligned with external rivals.

Washington believes it cannot rely on others to stabilize the region, so it needs to rely on itself. 

For U.S. leaders, this belief guides global strategy by prioritizing national security: cartel violence, migration crises and external footholds are treated as direct threats to the domestic front. 

By this logic, continental defense becomes the base of U.S. global endurance and the barrier against threats to the U.S. mainland.

Its strategy is four-fold: block foreign rivals like Russia, Iran and China, the latter of which invests in infrastructure projects throughout the hemisphere; secure maritime routes in the Panama Canal, the Caribbean Sea and the Arctic Ocean; contain the flow of transnational criminal organizations and migrants; and preserve strategic depth that sustains foreign commitments.

Limits

But there are limits to how far Washington can pursue its strategy. 

The first is fatigue; after decades of war in the Middle East, the U.S. public has little appetite for expensive interventions, forcing decision-makers to operate with a lighter footprint. 

The second is regional capacity; even the stronger states of the hemisphere are politically divided or militarily overstretched, leaving Washington with few reliable partners if it ever needs them. 

The third is China’s economic influence; Beijing offers debt relief, infrastructure investment and market access that many states cannot ignore. 

The fourth is overstretch; Europe still relies on the U.S. to contain Russia, and the Indo-Pacific contest with China absorbs the lion’s share of resources.

There is evidence to suggest that the new U.S. posture is already taking shape. 

A recent deployment to the Caribbean (focused on Venezuela) now includes three Aegis destroyers and an amphibious group led by the USS Iwo Jima, carrying 4,000 Marines and sailors – a scale more typical of expeditionary missions than routine patrols. 

U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance flights now run deep into Mexican airspace in a move meant to suggest cartel violence is being treated as a continental, not just bilateral, security issue. 

Carrier coverage at both Arctic entrances reinforces the perception that the hemisphere’s “gates” are being actively guarded. 

In parallel, the Army’s 2022 reactivation of the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska shows that the Arctic flank would not rely on naval presence alone but on a dedicated ground formation designed for high-latitude operations. 

The 2025 transfer of Greenland from European Command to Northern Command reframed the island as part of continental defense, while major renovations at Pituffik Space Base upgraded radar, runway and space-tracking facilities to cement its role in missile warning and orbital surveillance. 

Also this year, an Army reform plan proposed the consolidation of U.S. Army North and U.S. Army South into a single Western Hemisphere Command headquartered in San Antonio – an indication that the entire region is now being treated as one strategic theater.

Here again, Washington has acted mostly unilaterally. 

To the extent it works within regional frameworks, it will do so in the ones it can dominate, such as the Organization of American States. 

Yet new bilateral opportunities open up all the time. 

Ecuador has sought a defense cooperation agreement with Washington, Panama is deepening coordination on canal security with joint PANAMAX drills, and U.S. naval visits to Guyana and Suriname highlight emerging ties on the Caribbean’s southern flank.

Partners will favor access agreements over permanent bases. 

Ecuador’s request for a defense cooperation agreement could lead by example. 

Though it does not seek a similar deal, Panama has already started to slowly adopt rotational cooperation and canal security arrangements – a model that could evolve into deeper access agreements. 

Guyana and Suriname are also plausible candidates for future frameworks.

This trajectory aligns with what analysts have described as the Trump-Rubio doctrine: a revival of hemispheric primacy rooted in the Monroe Doctrine. 

Washington is less concerned with projecting dominance for its own sake than with blocking external rivals from gaining footholds that could compromise U.S. security and economic stability. 

At the same time, the competition will heighten with China. 

Infrastructure projects financed by Beijing across Latin America will be subject to closer scrutiny, while U.S. access agreements and naval patrols will try to serve as counterweights. 

The defining feature of the coming U.S. military posture will be a light footprint that relies on partner states to provide a front-line presence. 

For Washington, it’s a matter of necessity, reflecting the oldest U.S imperative: the Americas first, or nothing abroad endures.