Trump, Putin and the future of Ukraine
There is a danger for both Kyiv and Europe that they lose sight of a strategic vision of where they want to get to
Gideon Rachman
© James FergusonThe Munich agreement of 1938 is often cited as a vague shorthand for a failure to stand up to dictators.
The Trump-Putin summit planned for this Friday in Alaska resembles Munich in one precise respect.
The Czech government was not represented at the negotiating table, as Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini and Daladier agreed a deal that carved up their country.
As things stand, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine will not be present as the Russian and American leaders discuss the fate and borders of his country.
And, as the saying goes: “If you are not at the table, you’re on the menu.”
Donald Trump’s loose talk of “land swaps” has also set off alarm bells in Ukraine and across Europe.
The fear is that a vain and vague Trump will be easily manipulated by Putin — a steely, detail-oriented dictator.
For the Ukrainians and Europeans, the worst-case scenario is that Trump and Putin emerge from the meeting with an agreement on “land swaps” — which would, in reality, mean Ukraine ceding large swaths of its territory permanently to Russia.
Putin’s goal is probably to reach a deal with Trump that is then presented to Ukraine as a fait accompli.
As Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center puts it, the sort of deal that Putin wants would leave Ukraine “indefensible, uninvestable and on a path to implosion”.
If Ukraine rejects that deal, the Russians hope the US will then cut off support to Kyiv.
These are plausible scenarios.
But the Ukrainians and their European backers also believe a more positive outcome is achievable.
A good outcome from their point of view is agreement on a ceasefire — with the threat of secondary sanctions on Russia if Putin restarts the war.
Discussions on territory would only take place afterwards.
Amid all the fast-moving diplomacy and high emotions, there is a danger for both Ukraine and Europe that they lose sight of a strategic vision of where they want to get to — and what is achievable.
War is unpredictable.
But the most convincing analyses I have seen are that Ukraine is slowly losing — with the country’s manpower problem on the frontline becoming steadily more acute.
That means that a complete breakdown in talks and a continuation of the war would probably be better for Russia than Ukraine.
Kyiv’s position that no territory can be ceded is principled — but also unrealistic as things currently stand.
The critical distinction is between de facto and de jure concessions of territory.
A legal recognition of Russia’s forcible annexation of Ukrainian territory is rightly unacceptable to Ukraine, the EU and the UK.
But a de facto recognition of Russian occupation of some territory as a brutal reality — in the context of a broader peace deal — may be necessary.
The Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic states after 1940 was never legally recognised by the US and most European countries.
But it was a fact of life, until, eventually, the Baltic states regained their independence.
Thinking more broadly about the future of Ukraine, the key European governments understand that the debate cannot solely be about territory — important though that is. President Alexander Stubb of Finland, an influential player in the current diplomacy, has suggested a useful framework for thinking about the future — drawing on his own country’s experience after fighting two wars with Russia in the 1940s.
The eventual peace treaties did involve Finland conceding about 10 per cent of its territory.
Postwar Finland was also compelled to remain a neutral state to avoid antagonising Moscow.
But — crucially — Finland retained its legal independence and its democracy.
That enabled it to become a prosperous, free and successful country.
Stubb suggests that ensuring Ukraine’s future involves thinking about three issues: independence, sovereignty and territory.
Using that framework — and the experience of Finland — suggests that Ukraine does not have to achieve 100 per cent of its goals in all three areas to emerge from this war with a positive future.
If Ukraine can keep its independence and its democracy — then making some de facto territorial concessions might be a painful but acceptable concession.
The question of sovereignty is also crucial.
Russia has demanded enormous limits on Kyiv’s freedom to chart its own course — including limits on the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian military, as well as a ban on Ukraine’s membership of Nato and possibly the EU.
Ukraine clearly cannot accept any military limits that might damage the country’s ability to defend itself.
But if Kyiv is allowed to push on with its drive for EU membership then the question of Nato might be taken off the table for a while — particularly given that the political reality is that Nato membership for Ukraine seems unrealistic in the foreseeable future.
One clear danger at the Alaska summit is that Putin has thought very hard about all these issues for some time.
Trump, as ever, will be more interested in claiming a triumph than in the tedious nitty-gritty of a deal.
But any Alaska agreement is likely to be the start rather than the end of a process.
The Ukrainians and Europeans know that they need to humour Trump and play the long game.
It is not a great option.
But it is the best they have got.
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