RUSSIA´S PEACEFUL ATOM STRATEGY / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Russia’s Peaceful Atom Strategy

Moscow is relying on its nuclear industry to secure allies, stabilize the budget and maintain global influence.

By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Russia is making a serious foray into nuclear diplomacy abroad. 

Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear corporation and a leader in the global nuclear industry, just signed a memorandum of cooperation with Niger’s Ministry of Energy. 

The comprehensive deal covers uranium mining, electricity generation, nuclear power plant construction, medical applications and scientific research – everything Niger would need for its own civilian nuclear ecosystem. 

In recent months, Kazakh authorities approved Rosatom as the lead contractor for the country’s first nuclear power plant, Moscow signed intergovernmental nuclear cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso and Mali, Rosatom signed a deal with Uzbekistan’s Uzatom to explore building a large-capacity nuclear plant, and Rosatom and Vietnam agreed on a roadmap for nuclear energy development through 2030. 

Russia and Egypt also earlier in July reviewed progress on the El Dabaa nuclear power plant, which Rosatom is building on the Mediterranean coast.

For Moscow, this is about more than just commercial ambition. 

With its economy stagnating and the threat of new sanctions looming, the Kremlin sees long-term nuclear projects as both a geopolitical tool and an economic lifeline. 

These projects could reinforce Russian influence in strategic regions while diversifying its revenue streams.

Advantages

Nuclear energy is certainly a favorable market for Russia to pursue. 

First, Russian companies are major players in the sector despite Western sanctions. 

Second, energy demand is expected to continue rising, especially in countries with growing populations. 

Finally, nuclear projects are long term by nature, involving construction, fuel supply, maintenance and training services over decades. 

Differences in technology and cost discourage clients from switching suppliers once a project is underway. 

In this way, nuclear contracts ensure Russia’s continued presence in partner nations, helping it break out from Western attempts to isolate it.

 

Much has changed since 1954, when Russia built the first nuclear power plant connected to a public power grid. 

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia’s nuclear sector underwent major reforms. 

Today, Russia is a global leader in exporting reactors and enriched uranium. 

According to Rosatom, it is building 22 of the 25 nuclear power plants under construction abroad. 

(The 2024 World Nuclear Industry Status Report says 20 of 26 units under construction involve Russian participation.) 

Last year, a quarter of the United States’ enriched uranium came from Russia, more than twice as much as the next foreign source, and South Korea imported almost half its supply from Russia. 

In addition, China is on its way to becoming the biggest buyer of Russian uranium, having more than tripled its purchases from Russia in the first 10 months of 2024 compared to the previous year. 

Other countries where Russia is building nuclear power plants, such as Turkey and Bangladesh, will likely also depend on Russia for their nuclear fuel.

Although nuclear exports contribute less directly to the Russian federal budget than oil and gas, the nuclear sector has proved its value during earlier crises. 

In the 1990s, for example, Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant project supported Russian industry, involving some 300 companies and research institutes and sustaining or creating approximately 20,000 jobs. 

Now that the Russian economy is slowing down, it may be called on again. 

Revenues from oil and gas sales are projected to fall, while the costs of the war in Ukraine remain steady. 

To keep foreign currency flowing into the country, Russia is likely counting on nuclear projects abroad – even if it must finance them with loans from its National Welfare Fund.

These projects help sustain Rosatom, a sprawling state-controlled conglomerate of more than 400 entities. 

It spans civilian and military nuclear companies, research institutions and the nuclear icebreaker fleet, and employs more than 250,000 people. 

Domestically, Rosatom supplies 18 percent of Russia’s electricity and supports development of the Arctic via the Northern Sea Route. 

Given its strategic value, the Kremlin is keen to avoid a crisis in the nuclear sector.

Competitors and Sanctions

At least for now, Rosatom’s global endeavors are insulated from sanctions. 

Aside from measures targeting Rosatom’s leadership, the sector has largely escaped Western restrictions. 

The Kremlin believes nuclear energy enjoys de facto immunity because of its importance for global partners. 

The U.S. even lifted sanctions on Gazprombank in June to allow financing for Hungary’s Paks-2 nuclear power plant, a Rosatom project. 

And since Russia controls about a third of the enriched uranium market, it can use export controls as coercion – as it did last November, when it restricted exports to the United States.

Still, Russia’s position is far from secure. 

In Europe, Moscow is losing ground. 

Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Finland and the Czech Republic – all former users of Soviet-designed VVER reactors – are seeking alternative suppliers. 

And competition from China, France, the U.S. and South Korea is heating up. 

In Central Asia, for example, Rosatom won contracts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan over rival bids, but the victory was only partial; France’s Assystem will supervise construction.

To maintain demand, Moscow has begun reasserting the principle that all countries have the right to access peaceful nuclear technology. 

The recent Iran-Israel conflict heightened Russia’s concern. 

Russia was particularly worried about the safety of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and the presence of its own technicians. 

Though the facility was not targeted or damaged, President Vladimir Putin coordinated with Israel to ensure the safety of Russian personnel. 

Later, Moscow offered to assist Iran with uranium depletion – a signal of its desire to retain influence. 

The Kremlin has no desire to see Iran – a rival for influence around the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus – develop nuclear weapons, or for a weakened Iranian regime to lose control over Bushehr or its spent fuel.

The Kremlin also fears future sanctions could hit the nuclear sector. 

Construction delays are already mounting. 

On July 23, workers at Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant staged a protest over unpaid wages. 

Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak earlier accused Germany’s Siemens of violating contractual obligations to supply equipment for the Turkish project. 

Though Russia has found alternate suppliers, construction has been delayed. 

Moscow is now rushing to lock in long-term contracts before competitors erode its market share in the Global South.

Despite its leading role, Russia lacks confidence in its long-term position. 

The nuclear sector remains one of the few not under sweeping sanctions and is essential to Moscow’s global presence. 

Income from exports also helps the Kremlin delay negotiations over Ukraine. 

Should the nuclear industry come under broader sanctions, the impact on Russia could be severe.