ON IMMIGRATION, WILL EU MEMBERS GO IT ALONE? / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

On Immigration, Will EU Members Go It Alone?

Unilateral measures could undermine a pending collective migration agreement.

By: Antonia Colibasanu

Summer months in Europe traditionally bring calmer seas, which in turn bring more immigrants across the Mediterranean. 

Some nations are already wary. 

This year, for example, Greece has seen a fourfold increase in arrivals on outlying islands thanks to a newly active southern route from Libya. 

More than 7,000 people arrived in the first half of 2025, compared with roughly 1,750 during the same period in 2024. 

In response, Greek authorities warned of a “sharp increase in irregular arrivals by sea from North Africa” and, in July, the Greek parliament voted to suspend asylum processing for migrants arriving by sea from North Africa for three months.

Several other countries have seen an uptick too. 

Crucially, the surge is explained not just by calmer waters but also by several overlapping factors, some of which reflect long-term structural pressures affecting the Middle East and North Africa.

Conflicts new and old remain a primary driver of displacement. 

The war in Sudan, which erupted in 2023, has forced millions from their homes. 

Persistent violence in the Sahel, ongoing instability in Syria and deteriorating security conditions under Taliban rule in Afghanistan also continue to push people toward Europe. 

Even regions without full-scale conflict have become major points of departure. 

Eastern Libya, for example, remains unstable and lightly governed, allowing smuggling networks to operate with impunity. 

As a result, Libya has become a key launching point for boats bound for southern Europe. 

Many of those arriving in Greece – particularly on the islands of Crete and Gavdos – are refugees from war-torn countries.

Severe economic decline is another major force behind the rise in migration. 

Tunisia is in the throes of financial crisis, with rampant inflation and soaring unemployment, which has pushed Tunisians and sub-Saharan African migrants to risk dangerous crossings to Europe. 

Similar economic malaise is evident in Lebanon and Turkey, where collapsing currencies and strained public services have diminished quality of life and increased outward migration. 

In West Africa, a lack of opportunity – compounded by the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and persistent governance challenges – has driven many young people from countries like Senegal, Mali and the Ivory Coast to undertake the perilous Atlantic journey to Spain. 

These economic pressures feed what experts call "mixed migration": movements that include people fleeing persecution and those seeking better economic futures.

Environmental degradation is also playing a growing role in driving migration. 

Across the Middle East and Africa, prolonged droughts, extreme heat and crop failures have undermined rural livelihoods and food security. 

In many cases, climate-related hardship pushes people to migrate internally first, toward cities, and eventually abroad. 

The Sahel, already volatile due to armed conflict and weak governance, is experiencing intensified resource competition as climate change makes land and water scarcer. 

This convergence of crises – war, economic collapse and ecological deterioration – has created the conditions for mass displacement.

Preemptive Measures

The coming migratory pressure – and its political discontents – forced the European Union to take preemptive action. 

In 2024, it approved a landmark agreement called the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the purpose of which was to strike a better balance between responsibility and solidarity, ensuring that no single country bears a disproportionate burden. 

The pact also includes regulations designed to streamline asylum procedures, particularly at the bloc's external borders, to accelerate the return of those deemed ineligible for protection, and to expand cooperation with third countries to manage migration flows more effectively. 

A key feature is a new solidarity mechanism that allows member states to contribute either by hosting relocated asylum seekers or by offering financial and operational support instead. 

However, the agreement isn’t going into effect until 2026, so the member states are effectively hedging their bets, prompting a mix of crisis response policies to address migration flows. 

The way they are proceeding now, however, will likely shape how the pact is implemented next year.

Greece

Greece’s decision to suspend asylum processing for migrants arriving by sea from North Africa for three months is a case in point. 

Approved by the Greek parliament by a 177-74 vote, the emergency measure was framed as a response to a dramatic increase in landings on Crete and other southern islands. 

Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis defended the suspension as “difficult but absolutely necessary” to manage inflows at one of Europe's southernmost borders.

Under this policy, Greek authorities are empowered to repatriate arrivals without initiating asylum procedures – a sharp departure from established EU norms and the most overt form of deterrence adopted by an EU member state in years. 

The move follows a broader trend: After relatively low arrival numbers post-2016, Greece saw 48,721 irregular entries in 2023 (a nearly 160 percent increase from the previous year) and more than 60,000 in 2024. 

The emergence of a new Libya-to-Crete route has compounded the crisis.

Greece has since deployed naval vessels near the Libyan coast and announced plans for a dedicated reception facility on Crete despite local opposition. 

Human rights organizations and international bodies, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, have strongly criticized the policy as unlawful and discriminatory, warning that it violates the right to seek asylum. 

Greek officials counter that the measure is temporary and targeted, citing the strain on rescue and reception operations. 

Either way, this episode has intensified the debate across Europe about the limits of unilateral national action.

Italy

Italy has taken similarly hardline measures without formally suspending asylum rights. 

One major initiative, started in 2023, was an agreement with Albania to process up to 3,000 single male asylum seekers in offshore centers on Albanian territory. 

Though the centers operate under Italian jurisdiction, the move has faced multiple legal hurdles. 

Italian courts ruled parts of the scheme unlawful in late 2024, and the case has since been referred to the European Court of Justice. 

Despite legal setbacks and the fact that the centers remain underused, the Italian government insists the plan will proceed.

Domestically, Italy declared a migration "state of emergency" in 2023 after receiving 157,600 sea arrivals – the highest since 2016. 

Subsequent enforcement measures, including repatriation agreements and increased maritime surveillance, helped reduce arrivals by nearly 60 percent in 2024. 

Even so, seasonal upticks in 2025 have tested the sustainability of those gains.

The government has also cracked down on humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, restricting multirescue missions and assigning distant disembarkation ports. 

Between early 2023 and late 2024, Italian authorities detained rescue ships dozens of times and grounded NGO aircraft. 

Meanwhile, Rome continues to support the Libyan coast guard and has championed EU-level deals with Tunisia to curb migration despite human rights concerns.

Spain

Spain, which manages migration through land borders in Ceuta and Melilla and sea routes to the Canary Islands, has responded by enhancing external cooperation and dispersing incoming migrants throughout its territory. 

In 2023, Spain recorded 56,800 irregular arrivals, an 82 percent increase from 2022, with nearly 40,000 arriving in the Canary Islands alone. 

That number rose again in 2024, prompting logistical strain and political friction between the central government and regional authorities.

Madrid's strategy has centered on diplomacy and burden-sharing. 

Agreements with Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco have enabled joint patrols and repatriation efforts, with EU border agency Frontex assisting along West African routes. 

These efforts have already been somewhat successful: In the first half of 2025, irregular entries dropped by about 31 percent compared with the same period in 2024.

While Spain has not suspended asylum like Greece has, it enforces a strict border regime. 

The practice of "devoluciones en caliente" – immediate returns at the Ceuta and Melilla fences – continues under legal provisions from 2015. 

Spain’s asylum approval rate was just 18.5 percent in 2024, the lowest in the EU. 

However, Spain has also shown a humanitarian approach domestically, announcing in late 2024 a plan to regularize approximately 300,000 undocumented migrants annually for three years. 

This combination of strict external control and internal integration distinguishes Spain's approach from other southern member states.

Malta

Malta has taken one of the most restrictive stances within the EU, effectively closing its maritime doors to asylum seekers. In 2024, a record-low 238 migrants landed in Malta. 

This is due to an unofficial policy of avoiding rescues and deflecting responsibility to neighboring countries. 

Numerous cases have been documented where Maltese authorities failed to respond to distress calls in their search and rescue zone, instead relying on NGO vessels or Italian intervention. 

NGOs and EU partners have criticized Malta’s strategy as a de facto "pushback" through inaction. 

Although no law formally suspends asylum, Malta’s tactics – non-rescue, coordination with the Libyan coast guard and strategic avoidance – have effectively sealed its borders.

Domestically, Malta enforces strict detention policies for the few who do arrive, drawing criticism for poor conditions and prolonged confinement. 

While the approach has minimized political fallout at home, it has placed increased pressure on Italy and other neighbors, and raised serious questions about Malta’s compliance with international maritime and asylum obligations.

Following Suit?

Although no other EU member state has yet adopted a formal suspension of asylum like Greece, many are shifting toward more restrictive policies. 

In Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary and Poland have long blocked asylum access through legal and physical barriers. 

In Northern Europe, Denmark passed legislation that allows third-country processing, echoing Italy’s Albania model.

Pushback has also become common along the EU's eastern and southeastern frontiers, with countries such as Croatia and Lithuania engaging in illegal summary returns. 

These tactics reflect a broader willingness to override EU asylum norms when national governments deem it politically necessary.

Greece’s three-month asylum suspension is the clearest and most formal challenge yet to the EU’s asylum framework, but it exists within a wider trend of increasingly hardline national policies. 

Italy’s offshore processing, Spain’s containment partnerships and Malta’s silent deterrence all reflect a common strategic shift: discouraging arrivals by limiting access to protection. 

Whether these moves represent temporary crisis management or the new normal for EU migration policy remains to be seen, particularly as the bloc prepares to implement the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2026.

More important, the question remains whether unilateral and often restrictive actions taken by Greece, Italy and others align with the pact’s spirit, or whether they undermine it. 

Greece’s decision to suspend asylum processing for migrants arriving by sea from North Africa has drawn criticism from legal experts and EU officials, who argue it violates existing EU law requiring individual assessment of asylum claims. 

Though the pact allows limited flexibility during crises, it does not allow blanket suspensions. 

Greek officials defend the move as a stopgap response to overwhelming pressure, pointing to the absence of solidarity mechanisms in the current system.

Italy’s deal with Albania to offshore asylum processing is also under scrutiny. 

EU law doesn’t ban external processing outright, but it requires third countries to meet specific human rights standards that Albania may not fully satisfy. 

While Italy’s approach mirrors the pact’s intent to speed up procedures and reduce pressure on border states, its unilateral nature poses risks to the cohesion of the EU system. 

The pending ruling from the European Court of Justice could determine whether such outsourcing is compatible with EU law.

On border control, however, national policies often echo the pact’s goals. 

Greece’s expanded fencing and Italy’s cooperation with Libyan patrols are consistent with the pact’s emphasis on reducing irregular entry. 

Even Malta’s controversial hands-off rescue policy underscores why the pact’s solidarity mechanism is essential: Without shared responsibility, countries will resort to closing themselves off.

The most significant challenge is solidarity itself. 

While the pact obliges member states to support those under pressure – either by accepting asylum seekers or contributing financially – many countries still rely on unilateral or bilateral fixes. 

Hungary and Poland opposed the pact outright, and by late 2024, more than half of EU members had yet to submit implementation plans. 

Without full buy-in, the pact could be undermined before it even takes effect.

Ultimately, current national measures may be more a reflection of a system in transition than outright defiance. 

But the longer these ad hoc approaches continue, the harder it will be for the EU to deliver on its promise of a collective migration policy.