FRANCE´S PLAN TO BRIDGE EUROPE AND ASIA / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

France’s Plan to Bridge Europe and Asia

Paris’ ambitions may be greater than its capabilities.

By Antonia Colibasanu 

France is implementing a new grand strategy in response to a rapidly changing world and an array of regional and global challenges. 

Defense is heavily featured in this new approach: President Emmanuel Macron announced earlier this year plans to raise military spending to more than 3 percent of gross domestic product, and he recently revealed that French weapons production has tripled in the past year. 

Much of this is directed at defending Eastern Europe from Russia, and in fact, Macron said last month that all of France’s defense industrial output in 2025 would go to Ukraine.

However, Paris’ ambitions are much bigger and bolder than just deterring Russia in Ukraine, as the French president’s tour of Southeast Asia in late May made clear. 

In short, France aspires to bridge the trans-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security architectures, while promoting a multipolar world anchored in multilateralism and sovereignty. 

Success will require France to balance cooperation with the U.S. with its pursuit of European strategic autonomy – a challenge that pales in comparison with France’s domestic budget constraints and political division.

Southeast Asia and Supply Chain Security

Macron’s Southeast Asia tour, which took him to Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore, underscored France’s growing role in the Indo-Pacific region. 

In Singapore, he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, emphasizing sovereignty, the rule of law and multilateral cooperation in an increasingly fragmented world. 

European and Asian security are “inextricably linked,” he said, because Europe’s prosperity depends on stable sea lanes, digital infrastructure and economic networks in the Indo-Pacific. 

To that end, Paris has urged its European Union partners to invest more in infrastructure, digital partnerships and maritime security with Southeast Asia.

A major impetus is China’s increasing assertiveness. 

Other European states could dismiss Beijing’s pressure tactics and growing influence over its neighbors as a distant affair, but France has several overseas territories in the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean, so Chinese actions in those waters hit close to home.

But France is also interested in securing buyers for its defense exports as it scales up its industrial base, as well as ensuring the resilience of its industrial supply chain. 

Paris and Jakarta signed a letter of intent for new Rafale fighter jets, Scorpene-class submarines, light frigates, Thales radar systems and Caesar 155 mm self-propelled guns, building on a 2024 order for 42 Rafales and two submarines. 

(Under the earlier agreement, the submarines would be built locally by Indonesia’s PT PAL.)

In Vietnam, Macron signed agreements on defense collaboration, cybersecurity, counterterrorism and satellite security. 

Other agreements concerned the aerospace, nuclear energy and rail sectors, reinforcing Paris’ civil-military technological cooperation with Hanoi. 

France also upgraded its partnership with Singapore, signing agreements covering defense, cybersecurity, civil nuclear cooperation and artificial intelligence. 

Local production agreements with companies in Singapore or with PT PAL, Indonesia’s largest maritime manufacturer, should add redundancies to French industrial supply chains, while overall positive relations will – Paris hopes – grant it reliable access to critical minerals, such as Indonesian nickel.

Complementing the U.S. Approach

France’s Indo-Pacific strategy complements but differs from the U.S. approach. 

While Washington focuses on strategic competition with Beijing, Paris stresses multilateralism and sovereignty. 

Still, the two strategies align.

Militarily, France is enhancing interoperability with U.S. forces while pursuing autonomous capabilities. 

Joint exercises, intelligence sharing and logistics coordination have increased, especially in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. 

Meanwhile, its defense agreements with Southeast Asian states indirectly reinforce U.S. interests by strengthening France’s industrial base and potential contribution to NATO.

Economically, France shares U.S. concerns about China-related dependencies but takes a more nuanced stance. 

Rather than decoupling, it advocates the EU’s “derisking” strategy: diversifying supply chains, screening investments and protecting critical technologies while maintaining economic ties. 

Macron has said engagement with China is necessary but must be balanced and reciprocal – an approach that aligns France with U.S. goals while remaining tailored to European priorities.

From Paris’ perspective, security is indivisible and threats are transregional. 

In this way, France’s growing involvement in Asia complements its European strategy. 

In 2024, France joined Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain and the U.K. in signing the Warsaw Declaration, which reaffirmed NATO as the bedrock of European security and called for higher defense spending and defense-industrial cooperation. 

Macron’s government has committed to exceeding NATO’s 2 percent defense spending goal and accelerated arms production to support Ukraine for the long term and meet alliance needs. 

A strong NATO enhances European security and strengthens France’s influence in both Europe and the trans-Atlantic framework.

Perhaps more importantly, France hosted the U.S.-France Defense Trade Strategic Dialogue in December 2024, an effort meant to streamline defense exports and align supply chains between the two countries and, ultimately, among all NATO members. 

In March 2025, Paris welcomed NATO ambassadors to its strategic air base at Istres, where French commanders showcased France’s nuclear strike force and its role in NATO deterrence. 

This kind of transparency about French nuclear deterrence – traditionally kept somewhat distinct – highlights France’s resolve to reassure allies and to deter Russia by demonstrating a willingness to adapt in the service of alliance unity. 

Efforts such as these serve the dual purpose of building up European strategic autonomy while still coordinating closely with Washington.

France’s credibility as a strategic actor, however, is only as strong as its capabilities. 

Thus, since 2024, it has moved aggressively to scale up its military-industrial base. 

As previously mentioned, France had tripled production of key systems and redirected all 2025 output to Ukraine. 

Mirage 2000 jets, SCALP missiles and AMX-10RC armored vehicles are now being delivered at pace. 

The Ministry of Armed Forces plans to expand munitions output by 250 percent over the next year.

This surge in production is not only about Ukraine. France leads NATO’s battlegroup in Romania, where it has deployed troops, air defense systems and logistics support. 

It also contributes to Baltic air monitoring and participates in exercises in the Arctic. 

And this is to say nothing of France’s nuclear deterrent and its role in NATO (which the meeting at Istres recently showcased).

Notably, French strategy extends to Asia. France does not seek to rival the U.S. in the Pacific but to complement it. 

Through its permanent bases in Djibouti, New Caledonia and La Reunion, France is a logistics hub and security contributor in the region. 

Its naval task groups offer credibility and deterrence, while its diplomacy is meant to add a European voice to Indo-Pacific security dialogues.

This is important because Paris’ efforts to enhance its military capacity enable France to project power beyond Europe. 

As its Indo-Pacific strategy evolves, having scalable, autonomous production lines ensures France can sustain operations and arms transfers in Asia without sacrificing European readiness. 

It boosts France’s value as a supplier for friendly nations such as Indonesia and India, both of which are increasing defense procurement from France. 

France’s perception of threats as integrative – cyber, space, maritime and hybrid – leads to an equally integrated military-industrial response. 

This holistic view positions France as a unique actor capable of linking Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security orders.

Challenges and Costs

While France’s strategic ambitions are bold and far-reaching, they come at steep financial and political costs. 

France’s debt-to-GDP ratio is approximately 113 percent, and its budget deficit stood at 5.8 percent at the end of 2024 – well above the EU ceiling of 3 percent. 

Macron’s goal to raise defense spending to 3-3.5 percent of GDP by 2030 would require an increase of around 30 billion euros ($34 billion) annually. 

But without tax increases or EU-wide borrowing, this level of spending could aggravate fiscal imbalances and cannibalize social spending and investment.

Defense obligations already cost France more than 67 billion euros in borrowing costs alone, while most economic commentaries warn that inflation and rising equipment costs could blunt real gains, potentially leaving France with fewer tanks and Rafale jets despite spending more money. 

Paris has ruled out new taxes, choosing instead to fund its defense ambitions through spending cuts and labor reforms, both of which are politically sensitive. 

Though EU “escape clauses” and common borrowing could help, France remains hesitant to raise deficits for fear of a volatile bond market. 

Meanwhile, Macron’s support for increased defense spending is diminishing, thanks to inflationary pressure that has already raised the prospect of political instability. 

Macron governs with a minority in parliament. 

Earlier attempts at austerity – including cuts and pension reform – sparked protests. 

Major budget reallocations for defense may reignite social unrest.

Either way, expanding production is harder than ramping up budgets. 

Suppliers often lack capacity, and legacy systems are resource-intensive. 

Europe-wide efforts to support new defense start-ups (e.g., drones and anti-drone systems) are underway, but they require significant scale and procurement reform. 

Defense spending and industrialization are also highly energy-intensive. 

For France to increase its production – and for Europe as a whole to scale up military output – Paris (and Brussels) must urgently address energy concerns. 

Military production cannot be sustained by green energy alone, and current industrial output levels are insufficient to generate the necessary economies of scale that support military industry.

This is why France’s energy policy remains central to its foreign policy, economic strength and national security. 

Between late 2024 and mid-2025, it made major strides in strengthening EU energy security and advancing its own transition, which is centered on nuclear power. 

By May 2025, the EU had cut Russian natural gas imports from 45 percent to just 19 percent, thanks in part to France’s push for liquified natural gas diversification from the U.S., Qatar and Norway. 

With limited reliance on Russian gas, France backed the EU’s REPowerEU plan and helped shape the May 2025 roadmap to phase out all Russian fossil fuels by 2027. 

(It included a ban on new gas contracts.) 

This underscores France’s hardening stance toward Russia and its commitment to reducing strategic dependencies. 

While nuclear energy indirectly supports the defense industry by ensuring energy security, Paris will likely need to take additional steps – industrial, logistical and financial – to meet the scale of defense production now required.

Conclusion

France’s ambitions also put Paris at a serious risk of overstretching. 

If the government stretches itself too thin, it could create gaps in capability or delays in delivery, especially in high-priority theaters. 

Any visible slowdown or failure to meet commitments could undermine France’s credibility among allies and adversaries alike, diminishing its leverage in shaping regional security architectures.

A core assumption of France’s defense strategy is that multilateral institutions like the EU and NATO will absorb part of the financial and logistical burden. 

However, these institutions are under growing strain – politically, bureaucratically and financially. 

Diverging threat perceptions, sluggish decision-making and disunited procurement approaches hinder the very economies of scale needed for meaningful rearmament. 

Without deeper integration and faster coordination, efforts to scale joint defense production or pool resources risk could fail.

France’s strategic commitments are also vulnerable to shifting domestic political winds. 

Alongside the rise of eurosceptic and far-right forces throughout the Continent, Macron’s low approval ratings could derail long-term defense planning. 

A populist surge or nationalist pivot may push France toward a more isolationist or inward-facing posture, leaving Paris unable or unwilling to lead European defense integration and broader security initiatives.

But so far, things look good for Paris. 

Macron’s Southeast Asia tour signals a deliberate effort to construct an integrated strategic arc from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. 

By aligning export-driven defense partnerships with broader geopolitical goals, France is reinforcing its credibility as both a European leader and a capable Indo-Pacific actor. 

The agreements with Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore not only boost France’s defense industry but also project long-term influence through industrial cooperation, maritime presence and diplomatic engagement – all critical in a world where future conflicts, supply chains and alliances are transregional.

At the heart of this approach lies a complex balancing act: maintaining strategic autonomy while deepening cooperation with the U.S. and regional allies. 

The risks are what they are, but if France pulls it off, it will be a globally networked, regionally embedded and industrially sovereign player in an era of growing fragmentation.