Saudi Arabia and US Strategy for the Middle East
Trump’s visit to Riyadh underscored Washington’s pursuit of a new balance of power in the region.
By: Kamran Bokhari
The United States has upgraded Saudi Arabia’s international standing as part of Washington’s broader strategy to rebalance power in the Middle East.
The Trump administration expects Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to lead the kingdom toward assuming a greater regional and global role, enabling the U.S. to reduce its exposure to the region’s chronic instability.
However, Riyadh’s limited power projection capabilities, combined with the conflicting interests of other major stakeholders, will likely constrain the extent of any U.S. retrenchment from the world’s most volatile region.
Several key developments occurred during President Donald Trump’s May 13-14 visit to Saudi Arabia.
He and the crown prince, who is widely known as MBS, signed agreements on Saudi investments in the United States worth $600 billion.
Of that, $142 billion was a defense deal – the largest in U.S. history – that will provide Riyadh with advanced military hardware and services from at least a dozen American defense contractors.
The remaining $458 billion comprised Saudi financial commitments across various sectors, including technology, artificial intelligence, aerospace, energy and infrastructure.
But the most significant moment of the trip was Trump’s meeting with Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa – the former leader of the Syrian branch of al-Qaida – held in the presence of MBS, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attending virtually.
Trump’s decision to make Saudi Arabia the first stop of his first major international trip underscores how Washington is betting on Riyadh not just economically but also strategically.
Despite its financial power, Saudi Arabia remains the weakest of the major regional actors, behind Turkey, Israel and Iran.
Since the landmark 1945 meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman, the U.S. has acted as the kingdom’s security guarantor.
That relationship endured through the Cold War and well into the post-Cold War era.
Over time, the circumstances that shaped the U.S.-Saudi partnership gradually shifted, beginning with the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union, then the 9/11 attacks and subsequent wars, the 2011 Arab Spring, the rise of Turkey as a regional power and Iran’s increasing influence in Arab states.
These developments reshaped Washington’s approach to the Middle East, in line with a broader effort to minimize America’s exposure to global risks.
Given the region’s volatility, a new security architecture is needed – one that relieves Washington of the burden it has carried for nearly a century.
Any such structure must account for the region’s ongoing transformations.
Iran’s regional position has weakened considerably, and the Islamic Republic is on the cusp of an unprecedented leadership transition at a time of profound political and economic fragility.
Meanwhile, Turkey has eclipsed Iran as the dominant actor in Syria, which has become the region’s geopolitical center of gravity.
Were it to leave Turkey and Israel to decide Syria’s fate, the United States would have to remain deeply involved.
This is where Saudi Arabia’s enhanced role becomes critical.
As the leading Arab power and one of the top three global oil exporters (alongside the U.S. and Russia), Saudi Arabia wields significant financial leverage.
The kingdom also opposes Turkish dominance in Syria, aligning it with U.S. interests.
Turkey has long supported Syria’s ruling Sunni Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, making Riyadh’s involvement essential.
Trump has publicly credited Erdogan with shaping the new Syria.
But Trump’s decision to meet al-Sharaa – a former jihadist leader – in Riyadh signals that Washington seeks to balance power among Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
To maintain this triangle, the Trump administration must prevent a clash between Israel and Turkey, which has a considerable military presence in Syria and is heavily involved in establishing the post-Assad regime.
From Israel’s perspective, having a Turkey-backed Sunni Islamist regime on its northern border is equally problematic to having an Iran-backed regime there.
Israel has already created a buffer zone in southern Syria, and deconfliction talks with Turkey are underway.
Despite a 15-year downturn in bilateral relations, Turkey and Israel continue to maintain diplomatic ties.
Integrating Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords is a cornerstone of this regional rebalancing.
Just days before Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, it appeared that Saudi Arabia and Israel were close to normalizing relations.
That prospect has since become a casualty of the Israel-Hamas war, which escalated into a broader regional conflict in 2024.
Although both parties may still favor normalization, their respective imperatives now diverge.
Saudi Arabia cannot move forward while the war in Gaza continues, and it needs to position its actions as steps toward resolving the Palestinian issue.
Israel, for its part, cannot end the war and leave Gaza in Hamas’ hands.
Washington understands this deadlock.
As Trump said: “It’s my fervent hope, wish and even my dream that Saudi Arabia … will soon be joining the Abraham Accords.
But you’ll do it in your own time.”
The Trump White House is not pressuring Riyadh to act immediately but expects gradual progress.
It is asking the kingdom to assume leadership on the Palestinian issue – a responsibility Riyadh and other stakeholders have long deferred to Washington.
Successive U.S. administrations – both Republican and Democratic – have led efforts toward a two-state solution, though to no avail.
But now Washington is pressing Riyadh to step up, just as it is pushing Europe to manage its own security amid the Russia-Ukraine war.
The premise is that Saudi engagement with Israel will eventually address the Palestinian question.
The U.S. message to Saudi Arabia is clear: We will help, but we cannot solve this for you.
More important, Washington also believes Iran exploited the conflict for so long because Saudi Arabia failed to lead and instead wanted the U.S. to bring the Israelis to the table.
From the U.S. perspective, that must now change.
How Riyadh will respond remains to be seen.
But if the Saudis want to prevent Turkish dominance in Syria, they also will not want Ankara to appropriate the Palestinian cause for its own strategic ends.
The challenge is that Saudi Arabia has little experience playing such an assertive regional role, and building those capabilities will take time.
Still, circumstances are favorable: Iran is weakened, and the U.S. is helping elevate the kingdom’s stature.
Complicating this picture are ongoing U.S.-Iran negotiations.
Tehran has observed how Washington is now diplomatically engaging Syria’s new leaders, who once constituted al-Qaida’s most powerful branch in the region.
Some within the Iranian regime likely want to emulate this opening to secure sanctions relief and preserve the regime – not to mention salvage its influence in Iraq and Yemen.
But Tehran’s ideological rigidity remains a major obstacle.
Trump has initiated a significant reshaping of the Middle East to reduce America’s resource drain from prolonged engagement in regional conflicts.
However, too many variables pose challenges to a coherent security framework.
Aligning them into a unified system will be a formidable task.
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