Postwar Security in Gaza
There are no ideal options, but some are worse than others.
By Kamran Bokhari
The situation in Gaza is so untenable that the fighting will soon have to come to an end.
This means that whatever remains of the Hamas regime will, one way or another, come to an end, and that someone else will have to be responsible for Gaza’s security.
Who that is remains an open question.
The Associated Press reported May 28 that a U.S.-backed and Israel-approved group called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation will assume responsibility from the U.N. and international nongovernmental organizations for distributing aid in the strip.
The move comes following a three-month Israeli blockade of food, fuel, medicine and other supplies that has created a humanitarian crisis.
U.S., British, French and German leaders have expressed their opposition to Israel’s continued military offensive.
Meanwhile, the negotiations to free the remaining hostages held by Hamas have been mired in confusion with conflicting statements issued by U.S. and Israeli officials and the Islamist militant group, according to a report from The New York Times.
These negotiations have proved difficult because of two sticking points: the release of the hostages and the end of Hamas rule in Gaza.
The group, which has suffered serious losses in the war, likely understands it cannot continue to control the Palestinian territory for much longer.
Moreover, it’s under pressure not just from the Israel Defense Forces but from other regional and international actors who do not want Hamas to remain in power.
Hamas’ objective in any negotiation, then, is probably to salvage as much of its organization as possible.
What continues to embolden Hamas is the fact that there is no international consensus on a postwar political mechanism in Gaza.
Central to the group’s survival strategy is the assumption that Israel-inflicted suffering would so outrage the governments of the world that they would pressure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the violence.
Hamas also figured that the demand for the return of hostages would sow divisions within Israel.
But this strategy can only get Hamas so far – and Hamas knows it.
Israeli decapitation efforts continue to shake its organizational structure.
And though the pressure on the Israeli government has indeed grown, so too has the pressure on Hamas, which has undermined its own base of support.
The longer the situation continues, the more likely that Gazans will turn against Hamas.
Countries like Egypt and Qatar, which have long played a mediator role in the Israel-Hamas conflict, and others like Turkey, which have some degree of influence over the group, are also likely encouraging it to end to the suffering – for they, too, run the risk of domestic unrest if conditions continue to deteriorate.
(Jordan’s decision to ban the Muslim Brotherhood after allowing it to legally exist for 80 years, for example, is not unrelated to the war in Gaza.)
Hamas knows it cannot continue to be a military organization, so it is likely trying to find a way to remain relevant as a social and political entity.
Amid so much uncertainty, the question is who will be responsible for security in Gaza once Hamas’ rule comes to an end.
One of the more obvious answers is Israel, which already controls large swaths of the territory.
But that would be unacceptable to the U.S., regional Arab states, Turkey and the broader international community.
Indefinite Israeli occupation would be further destabilizing at a time when the Trump administration is pursuing a complex strategy for regional stability.
There is also the issue of whether the Israeli military, which is already engaged on multiple fronts, could handle the strain.
But even if Israel isn’t the sole custodian of Gaza security, it will reserve the right to influence how the area is administered, especially after the Oct. 7 attack.
A second option, then, is for the U.S. to take over – as President Donald Trump said in February he’d consider doing.
That plan involved rebuilding the entire area and included the relocation of some 2 million residents to other countries.
There are a number of problems with this approach.
First, there is very little appetite in the U.S for that kind of undertaking, which also conflicts with Trump’s goal of reducing America’s footprint across the world.
Second, no country is willing to accept Gazans into its borders.
In fact, there has been strong international opposition to the idea.
Third, even if Gazans remain in place, and even if the U.S. could physically rebuild the territory, it would be unable to forge a viable political economy.
Trump’s statement on the future of Gaza is therefore likely part of a broader effort to pressure Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to take ownership of the Palestinian issue.
Washington would prefer Riyadh work with Israel to find a solution rather than expect a U.S.-led effort on a two-state solution, which no U.S. government has been able to accomplish in nearly 40 years.
This would explain why Trump acknowledged in a speech a few weeks ago that the Saudis would join the Abraham Accords on their own time.
This would give room for Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab and Muslim states, to take responsibility for security, reconstruction and governance in post-conflict Gaza.
The problem is that Riyadh has no experience with this kind of mission.
Its vast wealth gives it plenty of influence to form a coalition that could collectively manage Gaza’s postwar transition.
About a decade ago, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (then the defense minister) announced the formation of an Islamic military alliance of 41 Arab and Muslim nations designed to combat terrorism and coordinate regional security.
The coalition lacks troops at its disposal, but Riyadh appointed former Pakistani army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif as its commander.
And though the alliance has yet to undertake a mission, it remains a vehicle through which the Saudis can mobilize a task force from member states to provide security in Gaza until such a time that the area can be brought back under the Palestinian Authority.
A task force could consist of troops from Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, among other nations.
It would be a less controversial arrangement than having U.S. or Israeli troops on the ground, but there are many issues that would have to be ironed out for such a force to be effective.
The most important would be Israel, which would still dominate access to the area and would want a say in the shaping of post-war Gaza.
Such a force will have to be subordinate to a political entity that would oversee the political and economic transition.
But perhaps the biggest issue would be the status of Gaza and the West Bank as Palestinian Territories, which would require Saudi-Israeli negotiations and necessarily involve the United States.
Rebuilding Gaza without a political settlement would only reset the conflict.
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