The Limits of a US-Russia Detente
Washington’s challenges in the Middle East are too great for Moscow to resolve.
By Kamran Bokhari
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are linked, at least in U.S. efforts to resolve them.
In many ways, a contiguous shatter belt now stretches from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea.
The Trump administration seeks a deal with Russia to restore stability across this volatile landscape, but success is uncertain given the many competing stakeholders in the Middle East.
The White House readout of a 90-minute call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin underscored the linkage between Ukraine and the Middle East.
The two leaders agreed that Moscow and Kyiv would immediately pause attacks on each other’s energy and infrastructure.
They also agreed that impending talks in the Middle East would pursue a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, as well as a full ceasefire and permanent peace.
In addition, the communique said Trump and Putin broadly discussed cooperation to prevent future conflicts in the Middle East and “the need to stop proliferation of strategic weapons.”
Finally, it said both leaders “shared the view that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.”
As part of a broader bargain, Washington hopes Moscow will pressure Iran into negotiations.
Russia has signaled a willingness to cooperate but will demand serious concessions on Ukraine.
Russian involvement is critical.
Not only is Russia a great power ally of Iran, but it also has relied on Tehran for drones and missiles in its war against Ukraine, now in its fourth year.
The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran cannot succeed without Russian cooperation.
This approach is not new.
The Obama administration secured crippling sanctions on Iran in 2012 by aligning with Moscow, which led to the 2015 nuclear deal – later scrapped by Trump during his first term.
But the current landscape is different.
The Russia-Ukraine war has shifted global dynamics, complicating Trump’s push for a new foreign policy paradigm in which regional allies take greater responsibility for regional security.
Trump’s goal of detente with Russia will take time and faces a deep trust deficit dating back to the Soviet collapse.
Moscow sees little reason to stop leveraging Iran in its dealings with Washington.
Any cooperation will be tactical.
At the same time, Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and it must also consider that with sanctions relief Iran could become a competitor on its southern flank.
After all, Iran’s current northern borders were established when the Russian Empire seized Persian territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 19th century.
Therefore, the Kremlin must balance its immediate U.S. dealings with long-term concerns about Iran, using a tactical realignment to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons while preparing for a resurgent Iran after some sanctions are lifted.
For now, Russia’s priority is relieving its own economy of sanctions pressure and reducing NATO’s presence near its borders.
Moscow sees a strategic opportunity: If it secures these objectives, it can strengthen its position despite losing some ground to rivals amid its preoccupation in Ukraine.
It is keenly aware of Turkey’s expanding influence in the South Caucasus and, more important, China’s deepening geoeconomic presence in Central Asia.
From a U.S. perspective, this three-way competition serves U.S. interests in Eurasia.
Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea and the trans-Caspian region serves as a check on Russia, while Russia’s rivalry with China in Central Asia and beyond complicates their shaky alignment against the United States.
Yet even a detente with Russia will not resolve U.S. challenges in the Middle East.
Washington is trying to elevate Saudi Arabia’s regional role, especially as Iran has lost ground in the Levant.
However, Turkey has emerged as the primary beneficiary of Iran’s setbacks, particularly in Syria.
While Israel welcomes Iran’s diminished influence due to the fall of the Assad regime, it now faces a longer-term threat from Turkey’s Sunni Islamist proxies.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia remains years away from assuming a regional security leadership role.
The Trump administration hopes Riyadh will at least engage with Israel to manage the Palestinian issue.
Meanwhile, the Houthis will continue to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern flank, even if the U.S. contains Iranian-backed disruptions of commercial traffic through the Red Sea.
And in the north, Turkey and Iran will remain locked in competition over Iraq, a crucial arena for Turkish security interests.
These fault lines will persist. U.S. strategy can shape the broader landscape only to a limited extent, and there is only so much the Russians can do to help.
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