THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE UKRAINE TALKS / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Geopolitical Context of the Ukraine Talks

The status of things like the Arctic and tariffs could complicate negotiations toward a lasting peace.

By Antonia Colibasanu 

As negotiations continue between Russia and the United States over the conflict in Ukraine, the prospects for a comprehensive peace agreement remain dim, the limited progress both sides have made notwithstanding. 

Fundamental differences persist, and it appears increasingly likely that any resolution will resemble a managed truce rather than a lasting peace.

On March 25, for example, a tentative agreement to cease hostilities in the Black Sea, meant to ensure safe navigation and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes, seemed to have been reached. 

This would have played to Russia’s advantage, as it no longer has an active fleet in the Black Sea and now relies on the area primarily for hybrid attacks – while Ukraine continues to use it for offensive operations. 

But one day later, Russia introduced new conditions for the agreement’s implementation, including the lifting of sanctions on its agricultural exports and the reconnection of Russian financial institutions to the SWIFT payment system. 

Naturally, these additional demands have complicated the enforcement of the ceasefire.

Following these announcements, the European “coalition of the willing” made two important decisions: first, to limit discussions about stationing troops and military capabilities strictly to NATO countries bordering Ukraine; and second, to formally appoint the British prime minister and the French president as Europe’s representatives in the negotiations. 

These moves show that Europe is not only supportive of Ukraine but also seems to be in close contact with the U.S. and, as such, is trying to accommodate a more trans-Atlantic approach.

Meanwhile, Russia has also complicated negotiations by declaring on March 27 that it stands ready to “defend its interests in the Arctic.” 

This assertion comes at the same time as a major conference in Murmansk dedicated to the Arctic region, and on the heels of the new government of Greenland being formed on March 11 and the announcement of Vice President JD Vance’s high-profile visit to the territory, raising questions about the broader implications of the Arctic region in global power dynamics. 

These events are hardly coincidental.

Separate from the Ukraine talks, the Trump administration and the Kremlin also opened discussions on nuclear arms control, the primary focus of which was the future of the New START treaty, set to expire in 2026. 

President Donald Trump expressed a desire to negotiate a broader trilateral arms control agreement that would include China, but Beijing repeatedly declined to participate. 

So, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met in February on the sidelines of the Riyadh negotiations to lay the groundwork for potential bilateral agreements. 

Both sides acknowledged the importance of reducing nuclear risks and considered measures to limit tactical nuclear weapons and extend transparency on strategic arsenals. 

In subsequent discussions, Russia proposed maintaining New START’s verification mechanisms while exploring deeper cuts to deployed warheads. 

U.S. negotiators, however, insisted that any new treaty should address Russia’s tactical nuclear capabilities and hypersonic weapons.

Incidentally, the Arctic has since 2023 become Russia’s preferred destination for testing new weapons capabilities. 

Moscow has continued to upgrade its Arctic infrastructure, reopening and modernizing Soviet-era bases while deploying advanced weapons systems and strategic assets. 

Russia has also enhanced its Arctic airfields to enable year-round operations for long-range bombers and air defense systems like the S-400. 

New radar installations, such as the Resonance-N over-the-horizon radar at Rogachevo Air Base and the Sopka-2 radar complexes on Wrangel Island and Cape Schmidt, extend Russia’s surveillance capabilities deep into Arctic skies and waters. 

In the maritime domain, the Northern Fleet’s submarine force has intensified under-ice operations, including covert maneuvers from the Barents Sea to the Pacific Ocean via polar waters.

Russia has also significantly strengthened its Arctic military capabilities in recent years, focusing on advanced hypersonic and nuclear weapon systems. 

One of the most prominent developments is the deployment of the 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missile, capable of reaching speeds of Mach 9 and striking targets up to 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) away. 

Deployed on Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates and Yasen-M-class submarines, the Zircon’s speed and maneuverability make it nearly impossible to intercept, giving Russia a powerful tool to challenge NATO’s maritime presence in the High North.

Another important weapon is the Kinzhal hypersonic missile, launched from MiG-31K aircraft and capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads over a range of 2,000 kilometers. 

Its speed and evasiveness make it a formidable first-strike or retaliatory option. 

More, Russia has developed the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, designed to create a radioactive tsunami capable of devastating coastal targets. 

Launched from the Belgorod submarine, Poseidon’s unique underwater propulsion makes it almost impossible to intercept. 

Alongside these new weapons, Russia’s Borei-A-class ballistic missile submarines patrol Arctic waters armed with Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles, which can carry multiple nuclear warheads. 

These submarines are designed to launch from under the polar ice. 

Together, these systems enhance Russian first- and second-strike capabilities.

By contrast, NATO and the United States have adopted a more cautious posture in the Arctic, despite recent efforts to strengthen their presence. 

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has expanded the alliance’s footprint in the High North, but Russia’s entrenched military infrastructure still dwarfs Western capabilities. 

U.S. and NATO exercises, such as Cold Response 2022, have showcased improved readiness, but their activities are far more sporadic than Russia’s. 

Greenland’s Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), upgraded with enhanced early-warning radar, remains crucial for missile defense and Arctic surveillance – which makes the island key for strategic defense.

This phased-array radar scans for sea-launched or intercontinental missiles coming over the pole, forming a key layer of NORAD’s shield for North America. 

About 150 U.S. Space Force personnel are stationed at Pituffik year-round. 

Its formal conversion into a Space Force base in 2023 highlighted its growing importance as global powers jockey for influence in the Arctic.

Obviously, this was not the first time that the U.S. highlighted the importance of the base or the island. 

In 2019, Trump expressed interest in acquiring Greenland, which is technically an autonomous Danish territory, due to the island’s strategic importance and resource potential. 

His interest brought home the brewing geopolitical tension surrounding the Arctic, prompting Russian President Vladimir Putin at the time to voice concerns over NATO’s expanding influence in the region and consider U.S. presence in Greenland a threat. 

Eventually, however, in response to escalating tensions and to maintain strategic stability, the U.S. and Russia extended the New START treaty in February 2021, for an additional five years, until Feb. 5, 2026. 

This extension maintained the treaty’s verifiable limits on the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of both nations. 

However, in 2023, Russia announced the suspension of its participation in the treaty and intensified its military buildup in the Arctic. 

Most recently, the Russian president stated that he had no objection to the U.S. “taking” Greenland – after all, such a move would echo Russia’s own expansionist actions in Ukraine.

But Trump’s desire to acquire Greenland was met with high criticism from Europe, albeit less loudly outside Denmark. 

While Danish officials expressed strong opposition, other European countries remained relatively quiet – almost as if they didn’t fully understand what was going on. 

Compare that with Ukraine, the discussions over which continue to generate active European responses.

Reacting to the renewed interest in Greenland, Moscow said on March 27 that it is prepared to defend its Arctic interests. 

At the same time, European leaders made it clear they would not lift sanctions on Russian banks, rejecting Russia’s demands to support its agricultural sector and enforce a negotiated ceasefire on the Black Sea ports and energy infrastructure. 

Though Trump suggested that the United States might consider helping Russian agriculture (and even went so far as to say sanctions are not inviolable), the reality is that any significant changes would require European consent. 

This is due to the fact that SWIFT, the global financial messaging system, is headquartered in Brussels and operates under European law.

The EU’s reluctance to accommodate Russian demands might also be linked to Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on EU exports to the U.S. 

The proposed tariffs are framed as retaliation for Europe’s trade “imbalances” and high tariffs on U.S. goods like cars. 

The U.K. – officially outside the EU – has also been threatened with tariffs against its automotive industry. 

This may explain why, on March 27, the EU and the U.K. said not only that Russian sanctions would not be lifted but also that they could even increase. 

However, their statement may also be tied to both the U.S. and Russia’s posturing in the Arctic at a time when Europe finds itself in a tense environment.

All this highlights the complex dynamics at play, where U.S. rhetoric, European caution and British assertiveness shape the broader response to Russian actions in Ukraine, the Arctic and beyond. 

With so much in play, it is becoming increasingly clear that the outcome of the negotiations will not be a lasting peace, but rather a managed conflict – suspended in a fragile truce and prone to reignition unless a truly comprehensive agreement is reached. 

The question remains whether this tentative equilibrium can hold or whether (and how fast) new flashpoints will emerge.