The Constraints Shaping US Conflict Resolution
Diplomacy demands compromise, which comes with risks at home and with allies.
By: Kamran Bokhari
The international system has been in flux for more than three decades, yet the United States has relied on outdated tools and strategies to manage this upheaval.
The second Trump administration is responding to the fragmentation of the old global order with new approaches that are unsettling many people at home and, more importantly, around the world.
Change of this magnitude is inherently chaotic.
But while Washington is driven by political and geopolitical imperatives, it is the often overlooked constraints that will shape how much transformation is realizable and at what pace.
In his March 4 address to Congress, President Donald Trump focused primarily on domestic matters, but he also outlined key foreign policy shifts that his administration is pursuing.
In particular, he reiterated his resolve to end the Russia-Ukraine war and conflicts in the Middle East.
Trump confirmed receiving a letter from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in which the Ukrainian leader expressed regret over the Feb. 28 altercation during his White House meeting and declared his openness to peace talks.
On the Middle East, Trump referenced the Abraham Accords from his first term, calling them the foundation for his administration’s efforts to foster “a more peaceful and prosperous future for the entire region.”
Public statements aside, the administration is cognizant of the complexities surrounding these diplomatic initiatives.
Both the president and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have admitted uncertainty about their chances of success but remain committed to pursuing negotiations.
Diplomacy demands compromise, which carries risks – both domestically and with allies in these conflict zones.
The War in Europe
Ending the Russia-Ukraine war hinges on the reality that the Russian Federation is not the threat that the Soviet Union used to be.
This became clear only after the Russian military performed dismally in Ukraine.
Even so, it is hard to part with net assessments that have been in place for decades.
Analysts often cling to their outdated frameworks long after they lose relevance.
The other key challenge for U.S. efforts toward conflict resolution in Europe is Europeans’ dependency on U.S. security leadership.
The Trump administration’s demand that its European allies take charge of regional security has triggered a crisis in Europe.
Building a new European security architecture could take years – assuming European countries can even reach a consensus and commit the necessary financial resources.
On Tuesday, Germany’s probable next chancellor announced plans to amend the constitution to exempt from fiscal limits defense spending beyond 1 percent of gross domestic product, vowing to do “whatever it takes” to defend the country.
Britain and France are making similar moves.
But until Europe establishes its own security arrangement, NATO will have to remain the primary framework, albeit with greater European involvement.
Even after the Russia-Ukraine war ends, Europe will need a new defense architecture for the long term given the risk that Russia, once it has had a chance to recuperate, may resume its westward advance.
These realities inform U.S. efforts to negotiate with Russia.
Last Friday’s public spat between Zelenskyy and Trump is perhaps the most acute manifestation of the constraints Washington faces.
Though the Ukrainians had no choice but to quickly make amends with the Trump administration, the U.S. still faces the challenge of Russian imperatives and constraints, which, in turn, create domestic political risks for the Trump White House.
The Middle East Battlespace
Even before taking office, Trump brokered ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, but both remain fragile.
Hezbollah has been severely weakened as a military force, creating an opportunity to strengthen the Lebanese state over the pro-Iran Shiite Islamist movement.
Hamas, though also significantly weakened, remains at large, making Gaza’s situation more precarious.
In Gaza, the U.S. faces two key challenges: securing the release of hostages and forcing Hamas out of power.
The Trump administration proposed taking control of the Palestinian territory and rebuilding it, but its plan involved relocating Gaza’s approximately 2 million residents to Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan.
This was never a serious plan but rather a pressure tactic to push Washington’s Arab allies to take responsibility for the Palestinian issue, which historically they have avoided.
The United States wants Saudi Arabia to pilot this effort.
After all, for decades the Saudis have wanted to terminate Iranian domination of the region and assume leadership.
This would require direct Saudi engagement with Israel – a step that the Trump administration sees as potentially leading to the integration of Riyadh into the Abraham Accords.
The Arab states have been working on their own Gaza stabilization plan, but the U.S. found the initial draft wanting.
Meanwhile, the United States also needs to reach an understanding with Turkey, the largest Muslim power in the region.
This has become even more urgent after Bashar Assad’s ouster in Syria sparked a geopolitical struggle between Turkey and Israel, as well as a Turkey-Iran confrontation.
At the same time, Trump has expressed interest in reaching an understanding with Iran, exacerbating Tehran’s internal power struggle amid an impending leadership transition.
The common denominator in both conflicts is Russia, which has strategic interests in the Middle East, especially in Syria.
Moscow has even offered to help Washington navigate its dealings with Tehran.
Ultimately, Trump’s push to end the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East faces significant hurdles.
The administration must align multiple competing actors and interests, and the midterm elections are closer than they appear.
0 comments:
Publicar un comentario