GERMANY IS DIVIDED AGAIN / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Germany Is Divided Again

The country is polarized at a time when cohesion is critical.

By: Antonia Colibasanu

Germany’s next government will inherit a country more polarized than at any time in recent history. 

Every German federal election since World War II has ended with the same parties in the top two spots: the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). 

In last Sunday’s elections, however, the SPD collapsed into third place, winning just 16.4 percent of the vote, behind the CDU (28.6 percent) and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which won 20.8 percent. 

CDU leader Friedrich Merz, a shoo-in for next German chancellor, aims to form a coalition by Easter but has ruled out any collaboration with the AfD. 

The question now is whether Merz can govern effectively in an era of economic uncertainty, regional divisions and a rising populist right that no longer sits on the political fringes.

Extraordinary voter turnout – 82.5 percent, the highest since reunification – is a testament to the nation’s fierce polarization. 

One factor fueling voter engagement was the involvement of U.S. Vice President JD Vance and presidential adviser Elon Musk, both of whom openly backed the AfD. 

But if arguable election interference by a nominal ally were not worrisome enough for Berlin, the election results also exposed a deepening political divide between eastern and western Germany. 

In the east, where economic stagnation and disillusionment with the political mainstream run high, the AfD dominated. 

In the more prosperous west, mainstream parties maintained stronger support, with many voters casting ballots to block a far-right surge. 

This split is not new – similar trends have shaped European Parliament elections – but in Germany, it carries unique historical weight. 

The AfD’s strength in the east has reignited debates about lingering cultural and economic disparities more than 30 years after reunification.

Economic Policy Changes

The likely CDU-led coalition will face immediate challenges, particularly in bridging Germany’s economic divide. 

Merz’s economic agenda includes loosening the constitutional debt brake and reducing the tax and regulatory burden on corporations, much of which will be met with opposition from the AfD and The Left (successor to the East German communist party).

The debate over whether to reform the debt brake, which strictly limits government borrowing, is already contentious. 

A looser cap would enable the federal government to invest more in the country’s military, infrastructure and technology. 

However, because the debt brake is enshrined in the constitution, opposition from just one-third of the Bundestag (210 seats) would be enough to block any changes. 

Together the AfD and The Left are projected to have 216 seats, and both parties oppose debt brake reform, albeit for very different reasons. 

It might not matter, however, because even Merz’s CDU is divided on the issue; though Merz has signaled his openness to reform on multiple occasions, the party pledged to uphold the debt brake in its election manifesto.

Corporate tax reform will be another battleground. Merz, with his finance background, wants lower business taxes and less regulation to attract investment and defend German manufacturing. 

Even among European nations, Germany’s corporate tax rate is unusually high. 

But although the intention is economic stimulus, tax cuts and deregulation could stir up controversy if they are perceived to disproportionately benefit western Germany’s industrial hubs. 

Allegations of favoritism toward Germany’s western states have been a common refrain among populist parties campaigning in former East Germany.

Finally, there is energy policy. 

Though the CDU supports the transition to renewables, it plans to ease some of the previous government’s more aggressive climate policies, particularly the rapid phase-out of coal. 

A reversal on coal may be popular in eastern Germany, which still relies on coal for much of its power generation, but it is unlikely to exceed easterners’ resistance to job-threatening green policies. 

Meanwhile, the AfD strongly advocates a full return to nuclear energy, which the CDU rejects – setting the stage for further political conflict.

Security and Foreign Affairs

Economic disparities between eastern and western Germany remain a challenge, but divisions over security policy and foreign affairs are even more pronounced. 

Under the CDU’s leadership, Germany is poised for major shifts in defense strategy and foreign policy. 

Merz has committed to raising defense spending, deepening NATO commitments and pursuing greater European autonomy in defense – i.e., reducing reliance on U.S. military support while strengthening ties with France and the U.K. 

This aligns with Washington’s long-standing demand that Europe shoulder more of its own security burden.

Merz plans to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product by 2027, with a long-term target of 3 percent. 

(Defense spending in 2024 was approximately 2.1 percent of GDP, an amount made possible only by the creation of a temporary fund.) 

Should Berlin deliver on this pledge, it would not only strengthen European security but also serve as an economic strategy, boosting Germany’s defense industry and creating jobs – particularly in the west and south, where high-tech and military production are concentrated. 

At the same time, the CDU will maintain Germany’s staunch support for Ukraine, aligning it with the more forceful approach to countering Russia that France and the U.K. advocate.

Again, however, these policies will face sharp resistance, particularly in the east, where skepticism toward NATO and European military integration run deep. 

The AfD, now the dominant force in the region, has previously questioned Germany’s NATO membership and advocates closer ties with Russia – a direct challenge to the CDU’s agenda. 

Similarly, The Left, still influential in parts of the east, opposes military spending increases, arguing that social spending should take precedence.

The result is an intensifying east-west divide. 

In the west, the CDU’s policies are seen as a necessary response to global instability and Europe’s diminished influence. 

But in the east, where there is greater economic hardship and lingering distrust of Western institutions, the CDU’s agenda appears to prioritize foreign affairs over domestic problems. 

If the CDU fails to articulate the economic benefits of greater military investment, the AfD could exploit the issue to fuel further discontent.

International Implications

Beyond Germany’s internal divide, the center-right’s return to power and shifting geopolitical dynamics signal a potential realignment of European alliances. 

With the CDU in power, Germany appears poised to recalibrate its foreign policy, particularly regarding France and the U.K. 

The Franco-German axis remains central inside the European Union, but new challenges – including Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency, an increasingly assertive China and ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East – are reshaping European strategic priorities.

Merz has emphasized a renewed commitment to Franco-German cooperation, seeking to close gaps in policy coordination. 

His economic conservatism and Atlanticist outlook suggest that, while Germany will maintain strong trans-Atlantic ties, it will push harder for European defense autonomy. 

This aligns with French President Emmanuel Macron’s vision of European strategic autonomy, though questions remain about implementation given Germany’s historical reliance on NATO and the U.S. for its security. 

Meanwhile, the U.K., previously distanced from EU affairs post-Brexit, is signaling renewed interest in European defense cooperation. 

The Franco-British Lancaster House Treaties, initially designed for bilateral defense collaboration, could expand to include Germany, forming a security triangle at the core of European defense.

Yet, several questions remain. 

Trump’s presidency introduces major uncertainty, as his administration seems intent on demanding higher European defense spending while simultaneously undermining EU cohesion on trade and security. 

In the highly unlikely event that Washington reduces its military commitments to NATO or completely shifts its stance on Ukraine, Germany, France and the U.K. may be forced into tighter coordination, potentially reinforcing programs like the European Sky Shield Initiative or strengthening support for a joint European defense fund. 

At the same time, domestic political instability could complicate this realignment. 

Germany must form a stable governing coalition, France faces a fragile economy and a critical 2027 presidential election, and the U.K. remains politically volatile.

Additionally, Eastern European states, particularly Poland, Romania and the Baltic nations, are alarmed by the possibility of diminished U.S. security commitments in Europe. 

Their preference would be for stronger NATO commitments, though they would have to accept closer European coordination if the U.S. were to curtail its engagement with the alliance. 

Moreover, besides a tougher approach to Russia, they also tend toward a more hawkish view of China – something that could complicate efforts to create a unified European security strategy.

If the incoming German government can navigate these competing pressures, Germany could position itself as a bridge between Western and Eastern European security priorities, reinforcing its leadership in the EU. 

A Franco-German-British defense realignment appears to be in motion, but its success depends on balancing NATO commitments, internal EU politics, trans-Atlantic relations and shifting geopolitical threats. 

Germany’s next steps may determine whether these emerging alliances solidify into a lasting framework or remain tentative and reactive.