A Russian View of the Ukraine Peace Talks
They’re better thought of as a reorientation of Moscow’s foreign policy.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
On Feb. 19, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia and the U.S. have “started to move away from the brink of collapse” and that their bilateral relations now have a “positive atmosphere.”
He praised U.S. President Donald Trump for being the first Western leader to understand Moscow's position on Ukraine and NATO.
Later, Washington condemned the use of the word “aggressor” in a G7 communique to describe Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Yet the road to true U.S.-Russia reconciliation, let alone to a lasting peace in Ukraine, is still a long way off.
Commenting on the Saudi summit, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov seemed to agree, saying that despite this first step in restoring relations, the meeting alone fails to guarantee a positive outcome.
This is partly a reflection of how Russia views the context in which the talks are taking place.
Traditionally, Russia’s concept of the West was more about Europe – even the parts that often go overlooked by most Americans – than it was about the United States.
Their relationship was often adversarial.
But after the Soviet Union fell and the European Union emerged, Europe began to see the places vacated by the Soviets as opportunities for growth, and thus they became a more immediate military threat – or so the thinking in Moscow goes.
Russian strategy, then, was oriented to the west of its borders.
The U.S. embroilment in this strategy is due to its alliance with Europe.
The war in Ukraine stems from this long-term standoff: Russia could not live side by side with the growing anti-Russian government in Ukraine, and it could not tolerate EU and U.S. support of Kyiv in the war.
This explains why the Russian public was generally eager for Trump to win the presidency: He vowed to end the war on day one.
He didn’t, of course, but many Russians see him as someone with whom their leaders could at least negotiate.
This is important since they believe the U.S. is at once the stronger power and the instigator of the war.
Trump says this is a European war.
And in many ways, it is.
The geographical proximity to Russia distinguishes the European reality from the American one, where European countries have expressed concern about possible Russian military expansion westward.
In addition, the main flow of refugees from Ukraine has been to the European Union rather than the United States, which also indicates the EU's greater involvement in the conflict.
The Russian public’s reaction to the talks ranges from muted to cautiously optimistic.
The public understands that negotiations entail concessions, which they can stomach to a point, and that a war that’s been raging for three years won’t magically end in a day.
Still, the market reaction was optimistic.
After the first phone call between Putin and Trump, capital growth reached 500 billion rubles ($5.7 billion).
The enthusiasm owes to the possibility that sanctions will be lifted.
Already there are rumors that Visa and MasterCard will return to the country.
The Russian stock market, however, fell after no tangible agreements came from the Saudi summit.
Polls conducted on the eve of Trump’s inauguration showed that Russians tempered their expectations ahead of his second term.
According to the polls, just over 50 percent of Russians did not believe he would make good on his promise to resolve the conflict within six months.
Their doubts may be due to Trump's constantly changing rhetoric and overly ambitious promises.
What has not been tempered is their desire for the war to end.
Polls in January showed that 61 percent of respondents believed peace negotiations should begin immediately, while 31 percent believed the war should continue – the latter the lowest figure yet observed.
But central to the resolution of the Ukraine conflict is an understanding of where Moscow stands with the West.
Russia has not managed to become self-sufficient; it remains dependent on imported technologies and goods.
In addition, Russia needs investments and an influx of currency, as evidenced by Moscow's plans to sharply reduce spending from the National Welfare Fund this year.
It doesn’t even plan to spend money from the fund to cover the budget deficit, whereas last year it used 1.3 trillion rubles for this purpose.
Restoring relations with the West, which includes the European Union, seems unrealistic.
Sanctions aside, there is a more fundamental obstacle to overcome: Both see the other as a threat rather than a partner.
Russia no longer views the EU as the major customer it once was.
The ongoing fragmentation of the EU amid the declining economic growth of Germany, the Continent’s economic engine, has convinced Moscow that demand for its resources won’t return anytime soon.
Thus the outreach to the U.S. was a move born of need and aided by opportunity.
Having turned away from the West, Russia needed to reconsider its foreign policy toward the East.
The most obvious partner was China, with which Russia had complementary interests that ensured sustained future cooperation.
But it would be a mistake to assume Russia will be satisfied only with growing relations with China.
It still aspires to become a global power, so it strengthened trade with neighbors and, crucially, its military readiness.
Russia is stepping up military exercises and its military presence in the Pacific region and is promoting the Northern Sea Route, which ends in the Bering Sea.
As the eastern vector strengthens, the Kremlin has begun to pay special attention to the Far East, increasingly focusing on the possibility of developing the territory.
This opportunity would not be possible without the crack that has formed between the U.S. and the EU.
Brussels may have a direct interest in Ukraine, but under Trump, the U.S. does not.
Moscow understands that Washington is changing its position, prioritizing economic development and offloading security costs and responsibilities to allies overseas.
In simple terms, Washington no longer sees European security as a fundamental U.S. concern, especially if it knows Moscow cannot successfully project power there.
Russia understands that any serious decisions over Ukraine will take time to make, so it’s trying to develop postwar relations now.
This is why, during the Saudi summit, both sides discussed future economic cooperation, including global energy prices, and agreed to pave the way for future cooperation and investment.
It was as much a forum for ending the Ukraine war as it was a platform for future interaction.
If that interaction continues, it will solidify Moscow’s turn to the East, where any potential U.S. threat is likely to come from.
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