2025 FORECAST: A WORLD WITHOUT AN ANCHOR / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

2025 Forecast: A World Without an Anchor

By: George Friedman

Throughout history, world order has been shaped by great powers. 

In the competition with them – and sometimes among them – lesser powers would tailor their behavior to the interests and intentions of greater powers and act accordingly. 

It wasn’t always pretty, but it was orderly, if nothing else, and the behaviors of all powers great and small were thus predictable.

During the Cold War, for example, the intentions of the United States and the Soviet Union were the anchors around which less powerful countries – even the nonaligned ones – planned and acted. 

The limits of tolerance and interest shaped the global system and even defined the way emerging powers such as China would proceed.

The Soviet Union is long gone, of course, and Russia has never been its equal. 

China is not yet strong enough to claim to be a great power. 

Europe is disunited and in disarray. 

Only the United States is capable of anchoring the world order. 

For years, it didn’t matter that there wasn’t anyone to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. 

Washington was still the primary architect and biggest beneficiary of the post-World War II order, even if it didn’t have an adversary like the Soviet Union to compete against.

But now the world has changed. 

This is partly because the global order has overstretched U.S. interests and capabilities, and partly because Washington is less interested now in trying to govern the global system than it once was. 

U.S. voters reelected as president Donald Trump, a man who explicitly intends to redesign not only the U.S. government but also the country’s relationship with the rest of the world. 

His election, then, is both the cause and a consequence of the changing world order. 

It’s not that the intrinsic power of the U.S. is compromised; it’s that Washington, in focusing on the changes it wants to make from within and without, won’t have the same sense of urgency it once had to dominate the world. 

The new Trump era will thus be characterized by probative economic, martial and political forays into global affairs to see what makes sense, and what doesn’t, in the new world order.

The United States’ (relative) disinterest will give regional powers more latitude in managing their own affairs. 

For example, Israel consulted with the U.S. over how to handle its response to the Oct. 7 attacks, but it never felt compelled to do Washington’s bidding, and Washington never felt like compelling it. 

In Syria, the new Islamist-led government in Damascus isn’t beholden to the U.S. because the U.S. didn’t help it come to power – a move in keeping with Washington’s decision to let others take a more active role in regional affairs. 

In Azerbaijan, the government is enjoying a newfound sense of freedom of action now that, in light of the war in Ukraine, it has become essential in the trilateral energy relationships between Europe, Turkey and Russia. 

Even in Ukraine, the war has become a secondary issue to Washington. 

The U.S. (and the West) responded to Russian aggression, much like it had in generations before, but the urgency of the threat has clearly subsided. 

It’s unclear if the U.S. even cares about the outcome, which it has relegated to a regional, not global, affair. 

Some of these countries likely aspire to be a regional power. 

But regional power is regional; it does not create a global order.

Washington’s pursuit of its own interests, meanwhile, will be fundamentally affected by – and will fundamentally affect – the ongoing restructuring of the global economic system. 

International sanctions continue to cause problems for Russia despite its best efforts to adopt alternative trade patterns. 

Its economic dependence on natural resources and its inability to overcome technological and demographic deficits make its campaign in Ukraine – not to mention whatever kind of recovery comes next – an uphill battle. 

Accordingly, Central Asian nations have begun to reexamine their economic ties to Russia, which they believe is unable to deliver on its once-steadfast benefits. 

They are increasingly turning to other potential benefactors such as Turkey and China. 

China, meanwhile, with its export-oriented economy, is reeling from trade spats with the U.S., slowed consumption growth and government mismanagement. 

Deflation is now a strong possibility. 

Beijing is still trying to transition the country to a consumption-driven economy, but that kind of structural change is slow and difficult to execute. 

India’s economy, in general, is faring better than others in the Eastern Hemisphere. 

However, the country still faces structural issues that have led to a lack of investments and fostered unemployment, two forces that are dragging down its economy. 

The European Union is struggling to meet domestic economic needs, while trade wars (introduced by the U.S.) obstruct its economically important green energy transition and divide the bloc on how best to manage Ukraine. 

Together, these structural economic weaknesses throughout the Eastern Hemisphere will facilitate rather than hinder Washington’s newfound introspection. 

The relative weakness of others means there is less risk to U.S. power.

The net result of this is a system of disorder – though not chaos – that will continue for the next year. 

In time, a new power will emerge to challenge the U.S. and create a new pole around which the international system can be anchored. 

It’s unclear who that will be. 

Oftentimes in the past, great powers were born of great conflict. 

There have been no major wars this generation, at least not like those in the early 20th century, and it doesn’t seem as though there are any on the horizon. 

No one expected the U.S. to become a great power. 

The idea that the United Kingdom before it would have been a global empire was easily dismissed. 

Thus the next great power is in the making, and considering the state of play in 2025, it’s as likely to be a China or an Iran as it is another American-style surprise.

Our global forecast for 2025 is, therefore, the continuity of this new normal: Washington’s continued examination of its relationships, Europe’s continued search for an identity, China’s continued search for internal stability needed to propel it forward, and Russia’s continued efforts to rebuild itself. 

Whether it can do so is unclear. 

Whether China can overcome its weaknesses is equally unclear, as are Europe’s chances of achieving political and economic cohesion among its many constituent members. 

The new normal will persist until a new global power rises. 

In the meantime, we expect more regional conflict.