Trust Issues in China’s Military
The removal of ideological stewards raises some serious questions.
By Victoria Herczegh
There’s been another shakeup in China’s People’s Liberation Army.
Beijing recently revoked the membership of two high-ranking military officials, You Haitao and Li Pengcheng, for “violation of law and discipline,” while PLA Commissar Qin Shutong was abruptly replaced by air force officer Chen Hui.
The reshuffling comes just a month after Central Military Commission member Miao Hua was suspended for “violations of law and discipline” – a thinly veiled catchall for corrupt activities within the PLA.
It’s not that corruption is unusual, or even much of a secret.
It’s rampant in China’s entire defense sector, and purges happen all the time.
Typically, most crimes take the form of the misallocation of funds (frequently without the approval of the central leadership), illegal outsourcing, the purchase and use of low-quality components, and so on.
Hu Wenming, the leading architect of China’s aircraft carrier program, was recently arrested for bribery and violation of party discipline.
Liu Shiquan, head of North China Industry Corp., was also detained, as was Wu Yansheng and Wang Changqing, leaders of China’s two largest missile manufacturers.
There have been reports of allegations on the misuse of $16 billion in research and development funds for fighter jet engines.
(Though the investigation into Miao was originally due to generic “corrupt activities,” authorities have since leveled allegations that he was responsible for dozens of appointments and promotions of junior officials who continue his “unlawful” practices.)
It’s the profile of officials removed – and the removal of so many of them at once – that makes this episode interesting.
All of the alleged perpetrators had a lot of influence over ideology and political education within the military, and as such were handpicked by President Xi Jinping.
In the PLA, ideological education and morale is as important as developing new capabilities.
A political commissar (heretofore held by Qin) is in charge of exactly that – making the position one of the most indispensable in the PLA.
The post’s appointment, moreover, requires approval of the president himself after years of close monitoring and evaluation for party loyalty.
The CMC post previously held by Miao is similar: As the director of the commission’s political work department, he held a lot of influence over ideology, defense education and even the appointment of top officials.
Qin and Miao’s respective appointments were meant to improve the ideological environment of the military.
Xi explicitly said as much, writing in state media of how important it is for the military to stay loyal and for cadres to always be prepared to “face their own shortcomings deeply rooted in their thinking.”
Operationally, the vacancies themselves won’t create a military crisis.
The seats won’t remain open for long, and in the worst-case scenario, the CMC may be unable to finalize certain decisions on personnel and development before they’re filled.
The bigger issue is that until now, Xi’s closest proteges did not seem to be in danger of falling out of favor.
Their removal suggests Xi believes morale and corruption are so bad that he cannot trust even his closest allies in the military.
To be sure, he would not make the decision to remove them lightly.
Removing personally appointed proteges in such a short period of time is widely considered to be a failure, and it raises serious questions about Xi’s decision-making.
It can therefore be assumed either that Xi believed the two officials could pose a direct threat to his power and to the PLA, or that he is removing anyone with even a whiff of suspicion.
It may be that any or all of those removed were guilty, to some degree or another, of violating party discipline.
Still, it’s hard to believe ideological purity is the only thing animating Xi’s decisions.
Beijing has made every effort to allocate as much of its vast resources as it can to rapidly modernize the military, so the president likely believes that rampant corruption and the misuse of funds will undermine arms procurement and high-quality modernization.
Already there are criticisms of inadequate logistics and subpar performance of some new capabilities, raising questions about the reliability of the country’s missiles, naval platforms, aviation programs and land warfare weapons.
The fact that the PLA has been openly flaunting its new capabilities and increasing its provocative military presence in the South China Sea and around Taiwan also suggests a desperate need to project power at a time when the extent and quality of that strength is doubted both inside and outside of the nation.
In fact, reports suggest that the leadership has recently constructed more than 200 new sites of “liuzhi” detention facilities – part of a highly controversial prison system in which people of “public power” under investigation can be monitored, often having to endure abuse and coercion in order to reveal information.
Xi seems to be prepared to sacrifice his respectability as a leader in order to secure his position of power and reform the military.
So far, it’s unclear whether the benefits justify the costs.
While the military modernization is progressing, the quality, reliability and efficiency of the PLA’s capabilities in an actual conflict is likewise unclear.
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