Putin’s Humiliation in Syria Reverberates in Russia
The collapse of the seemingly all-powerful Assad regime shows how fragile dictatorships are.
By Amy Knight
Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Dec. 16. Photo: Vadim Savitsky/Zuma Press
As Russia withdraws forces and equipment from Syria, its missile attack Friday against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure suggests that the Kremlin is determined to show its military might after a humiliating failure in Syria.
The collapse of the Assad government, which Moscow has been supporting militarily for almost a decade, and the possible loss of Russia’s key naval base, Tartus, along with its air base in Latakia, has been a devastating blow for Russia’s image as a key player on the global stage.
The upheaval in Syria also threatens Vladimir Putin’s standing at home.
Time and again, Mr. Putin pledged to protect the Assad regime.
In July he welcomed Mr. Assad to the Kremlin for one-on-one talks.
As recently as Dec. 2, in a phone call with the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, Mr. Putin expressed unconditional support for the Syrian president.
But Mr. Putin had already decided to throw Mr. Assad under the bus.
The Syrian leader reportedly visited the Kremlin on Nov. 28 to plead for Russian military intervention against rebel forces in Syria and was given a negative response.
The Kremlin’s attempts at damage control only highlight its failure in Syria.
Speaking in Doha on Dec. 7, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the rebel Islamic group that toppled Mr. Assad, as a terrorist organization.
But by the next day the Foreign Ministry was calling it an “armed opposition group.”
As political analyst Maksim Katz observed: “Russian aviation in Syria was intensively bombing the advancing forces of the most terrible people on earth, practically Satan’s deputies.
But suddenly . . . these bandits and terrorists were reborn. . . .
They turned from terrorists into opposition right in the middle of time zones; in the Far East they were still terrorists, and in Moscow they were already an armed opposition.“
According to a source close to the Kremlin, Mr. Putin demanded an explanation for why Russian intelligence services failed to detect the growing threat to Mr. Assad’s regime until it was too late.
But the buck stops with the Russian president.
While members of Mr. Putin’s top elite haven’t dared to criticize Russia’s strategy in Syria, foreign-policy experts close to the Kremlin are openly discussing the negative repercussions.
Pyotr Akopov, a pundit for the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti, lamented: “Now in the West, triumphant voices are saying that Iran and Russia have lost, and even that this ‘historic defeat’ should become an additional incentive to increase support for Ukraine. . . .
It would be fine if such statements were made simply as part of a propaganda war, but some Western elites believe them.”
Ruslan Pukhov, a Russian defense analyst who previously hailed Russia’s military intervention in Syria as a huge success, has changed his tune.
Writing in the Russian daily Kommersant, Mr. Pukhov criticized Moscow for “protecting the decaying and delegitimized Assad regime” and concluded that the Syrian venture demonstrated “the great limitations for Russia’s ‘great power’ and interventionist policy abroad.
Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority for effective intervention by force outside the former USSR.”
A few years ago Fyodor Lukyanov, who heads a Kremlin foreign-policy advisory board, wrote an article (with a photo of Mr. Putin hugging Mr. Assad) praising Russia’s 2015 military intervention in Syria to support the Assad regime: “Russia has indeed established itself as the most influential player in the region.
Almost nothing gets done in Syria without Moscow’s approval and involvement. . ..
Thanks to its activities in the Middle East, Russia’s status in the international hierarchy has risen considerably.”
Last week, in a piece for RT, a Kremlin-controlled news network, Mr. Lukyanov said that “the symbolic quest to restore Russia’s great-power status—a key motivation for the 2015 Syrian operation—is now obsolete.”
Another problem for Mr. Putin is that he granted Mr. Assad—an international war criminal whose brutalities are the focus of world attention—political asylum in Russia.
Mr. Assad’s presence in Moscow, along with that of his extended family, can’t be easily ignored.
He issued a statement from Moscow on Monday, defending his decision to leave his country.
The former Syrian leader will need plenty of security, and so will the Russian population.
Islamic terrorism has plagued the Putin regime from its inception.
Many of the rebels who brought down the Assad regime were Muslims from the North Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan) and Central Asia, who share a deep hatred of the Kremlin.
It is possible that when these fighters return from Syria, some will resort to terrorism.
As shown by its failure to heed warnings of the attack in March at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall concert venue, the counterterrorism force of the KGB’s successor, the Federal Security Service, will face a challenge in protecting Russians from this new threat.
If Russia continues to score military victories in Ukraine, Mr. Putin will probably redeem himself with his domestic critics.
But the collapse of Mr. Assad’s seemingly all-powerful regime must unnerve the Russian president, especially given the serious challenge to his rule from Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023.
Could something similar occur in Russia, despite Mr. Putin’s resounding electoral victory less than a year ago?
Russian author Viktor Shenderovich observed: “13.5 million Syrians voted for Assad in 2021. . . . What are they doing at the moment?
Aren’t they among those who are destroying his monuments and joyfully firing machine guns into the sky?”
Whatever its repercussions in Russia, Mr. Assad’s fall is a reminder of the fragility of dictatorships, including that of Vladimir Putin.
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