Trump and the Elusive Middle Eastern Balance of Power
The incoming administration will have to handle Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey simultaneously.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Much of the public discussion about U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s forthcoming strategy for the Middle East, especially in light of the nominees to his national security team, is binary.
In this oversimplified view, which reduces the complexities of the region into a struggle for supremacy between Israel and Iran, Trump is expected to strongly support the Israeli government and get tough on the Iranian regime.
However, the second Trump administration’s attempts to deal with the extraordinary scale of conflict in the region and end the United States’ “forever wars” must also take into account the Middle East’s present imbalance of power.
To this end, the U.S. will have to deal simultaneously with the Israelis, the Iranians, the Saudis and the Turks.
The first stirrings of what will be a complex diplomatic process are already evident from the negotiations for a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah.
Obviously, these efforts are being led by the Biden White House, but not without the critical influence of Trump’s transition team.
Likewise, tech billionaire and close Trump associate Elon Musk reportedly met with the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations to discuss ways to deescalate tensions from their dangerously high level.
The Iranians denied that such a meeting occurred, but they did so only several days after the initial report, while expressing a keen interest in negotiating with the incoming U.S. administration.
Perhaps the most intriguing recent development from Tehran is the regime’s shifting position on the 2015 nuclear deal, which was nixed by Trump during his first term.
Thus far, the Iranians had been pressing – albeit unsuccessfully – for a return to a similar arrangement.
But in a Nov. 14 interview on state television, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the defunct nuclear agreement could serve only as a reference and that it had lost its previous significance.
Any new deal must be “feasible,” he added.
The U.S. position for some time has been that the nuclear deal is dead.
Although Joe Biden was serving as Barack Obama’s vice president when the agreement was concluded, he was reluctant to revive it as president.
That Tehran is now assuming the same stance, however, is a function of its deteriorating position in the conflict with Israel, especially the massive losses suffered by its premier proxy, Hezbollah.
The Iranians know that the incoming Trump administration will seek to force them not only to accept stricter limits on their nuclear program but also to desist from using militant proxies to destabilize the Middle East.
Iran realizes that its ability to exert influence has peaked.
In addition, Israel’s Oct. 26 strikes exposed the weakness of Iran’s conventional military capabilities.
Therefore, Tehran is likely ready for a broader negotiation with the U.S. regarding not only the nuclear issue but also its regional assets.
From Tehran’s point of view, it may be better to negotiate now and preserve some of its regional influence before it shrinks further amid greater pressure from the Trump administration.
With regard to its nuclear program, Iran will continue to use it as leverage to try to gain respite from sanctions.
This is the foremost imperative of the Islamic Republic, which has experienced significant reversals on the foreign policy front and needs financial relief to carry it through its historic and imminent political evolution.
Besides, the nuclear issue is less important to the Iranian regime than preserving its regional influence – which will frustrate the Trump strategy for the region.
The central focus of the incoming administration’s approach to the Middle East will be to advance the 2020 Abraham Accords, which saw the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan normalize relations with Israel.
Missing from the accords is the region’s leading Arab nation, Saudi Arabia.
The Biden administration continued its predecessor’s efforts to bring the Saudis on board – and made considerable headway – until it was torpedoed by the Iran-supported Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7 and the subsequent regional conflict.
Differences in Israeli and Saudi imperatives, especially regarding the Palestinians, will test the diplomatic acumen of the Trump White House.
Though a cease-fire in Lebanon could come in the next few months, a cease-fire in Gaza will take much longer.
Israeli forces have considerably weakened Hamas, but they have yet to prove to themselves that the group will not reanimate as soon as they leave.
Therefore, Israeli troops are likely to remain in Gaza for some time, exacerbating the humanitarian disaster in the strip.
Under these circumstances, it will be terribly difficult for the Saudi kingdom to normalize ties with Israel, but Riyadh is hoping that the influence it enjoys with Trump and Israel’s desire to establish relations with the kingdom will enable it to steer the situation in Gaza toward recovery.
Normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel could help to counter Iran’s regional ambitions.
However, considering the significant obstacles to such a deal, the Trump team appears to want to deal with Iran separately.
Obviously, problems with either of these two diplomatic tracks could bring the whole thing down.
As if this were not complicated enough, Turkey, which has been on the sidelines for much of the current crisis, is hoping to benefit from the weakening of Iran.
It is also hoping that Trump’s return to the White House will bring better relations between Ankara and Washington.
As Washington works to bring the Saudis and the Israelis closer and at the same time deal with the Iranians one-on-one, it also will need to factor in the Turks as a stakeholder in the region.
Achieving a four-way balance of power, though not impossible, will be excruciatingly challenging.
0 comments:
Publicar un comentario