Japan’s Curious Calls for an Asian NATO
Ultimately, Tokyo wants more autonomy from Washington in its defense relationships.
By: Victoria Herczegh
Starting next year, the U.S., Japanese and Australian militaries will conduct trilateral amphibious training in northern Australia, marking the first deployment of Japanese troops for joint training in Australia.
In another first, Australia will join Orient Shield, a field training exercise between Japanese and U.S. forces, in 2025.
Additionally, the U.S. defense secretary said Japan is expected to join the advanced technology component of AUKUS, known as Pillar 2, in the near future, though specific projects have not been disclosed.
For Japan, a country whose constitution renounces war, these are important developments.
They align with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s vision of uniting the region’s major powers into an “Asian NATO,” combining military capabilities under multilateral treaties and sharing intelligence.
But joint exercises and technology sharing are a far cry from a mutual defense treaty, and Ishiba’s envisioned alliance is impractical at the moment.
In the Japanese prime minister’s version of such an alliance, Japan would lead alongside the U.S., exercising shared control of their joint military bases and authorized to deploy Japanese troops on U.S. soil.
Why the U.S. would agree to these terms is unclear.
Even less likely is the notion that potential members of the alliance would agree on a strategy to deter and contain the bloc’s chief adversary, China.
India’s foreign minister, for example, firmly rejected his country’s participation in any mutual defense pact, citing India’s historical nonalignment.
Although Japan’s ambition to play a larger role in regional security is clear, pushing for a large, fragile alliance risks undermining its existing credibility and established partnerships.
A more pragmatic approach could involve strengthening bilateral ties instead.
Ishiba has wanted an Asian NATO for years.
More than a decade ago, he advocated plans to combine existing security groupings and multilateral frameworks involving the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and the Philippines into one security bloc led by Tokyo and Washington.
The newer model is less ambitious, but it, too, means to redefine Japan’s relationship with the U.S. – an especially important prospect for Tokyo in light of the election of Donald Trump, who is widely expected to take a stronger anti-China posture.
Tokyo is concerned that Washington could compel it to spend more on defense to counter China, while anti-China tariffs could undermine Japanese exports, the majority of which end up in the United States.
Changing its relationship with the U.S., then, makes sense for Japan, but it’s an impractical prospect for a variety of reasons.
After all, military influence in Tokyo would undermine the U.S.-led regional security network.
For all his talk, Ishiba would never do anything to risk the alliance with Washington.
It’s true that Japan has slowly been rebuilding its military capabilities, but it’s been a slow process fraught with limitations.
Japan would still need U.S. protection in an armed conflict.
Entering a collective security organization, let alone leading one, doesn’t change that.
But what could change is Japan’s ability to sign more agreements to develop its military further, albeit only to a level the U.S. is comfortable with.
Supporting Japanese defense safely and profitably benefits Washington so long as Japan doesn’t become a competitor.
Joint drills with Australia, then, serve U.S. interests.
The same logic applies to South Korea.
Geographic proximity and the common goal of deterrence regarding China and North Korea make South Korea a natural security ally for Japan, and their complex relationships with the U.S., and a shared desire to restructure them, foster bilateral cooperation.
South Korea’s defense relationship with the U.S. is even more imbalanced than Japan’s; the U.S. has historically restricted South Korea’s access to advanced military technologies and has pressured it to allocate more funds to the alliance.
This has added to Seoul’s military burden and, consequently, encouraged it to pursue more autonomy in its defense.
But like Japan, South Korea would not be able to withstand a war without U.S. help.
Washington knows as much and, despite its preoccupation with Ukraine and the Middle East, remains involved in bilateral and trilateral military arrangements.
To be sure, Tokyo and Seoul are not about to become fast friends; their historical issues limit their ability to fully trust each other, and their common goals – countering China and avoiding nuclear conflict with North Korea – live and die on their relationship with the United States.
And because bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea will always be constrained, Tokyo will always struggle to establish a close-knit regional security alliance.
The larger problem is that collective defense is extremely difficult.
Almost all nations in the Indo-Pacific are wary of China and North Korea, but their approaches toward them differ greatly, as do their respective enthusiasms for adopting active defense postures.
For example, Ishiba wants not only Taiwan to be a member of the Asian NATO but also for its protection to become the main concern of the new bloc.
Forcibly protecting Taiwan is not something East and Southeast Asian nations agree on.
Australia, which has recently repaired its trade ties with China, would be reluctant to get involved in a conflict that is not its immediate concern, especially at the risk of its economic well-being.
South Korea has been trying to diversify its economic dependencies but is still vulnerable to Chinese economic reprisals.
The Philippines has plenty of issues with China, but it is more concerned with settling its own territorial and maritime disputes than it is with going to war on behalf of Taiwan.
Domestically, Ishiba has only so much room to maneuver.
Even though his Liberal Democratic Party lost a parliamentary majority in the most recent elections, he earned the public’s trust by criticizing LDP policies and denouncing its corruption.
He has vowed to continue his predecessor’s economic program to ease deflation and raise salaries, all while trying to reverse the declining birth rate and strengthen Japan’s resilience to natural disasters.
It’s an ambitious platform, and it’s unclear if he has the political capital to pull it off if he’s preoccupied with an Asian NATO.
If we presume Ishiba understands the difficulties inherent to international organizations – or if we consider the way he has begun to cobble together “participants” in the would-be Asian NATO – it’s likely that his goal is simply to gain more influence in regional security alliances, bilateral or otherwise, and create more balance in Japan’s relationship with the U.S.
He can’t afford to alienate the U.S., but he wants to make sure he insulates Japan from staunchly anti-China U.S. policies.
As evidenced by the drills with Australia and the overtures to South Korea, Japan can continue to build new and closer security alliances without collective defense.
Ultimately, foreign alliances aren’t worth much to Ishiba if he can’t stay in office.
He has domestic problems to solve, and even if Japanese voters are fully on board with renouncing pacifism once and for all, it will be difficult and expensive to pull off.
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