THE FUTURE OF DRONE WARFARE / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Future of Drone Warfare

The battlefield in Ukraine may provide a blueprint.

By: Ronan Wordsworth

It’s been said for years that drones are the future of warfare. 

Their advantages are obvious: They are light and maneuverable and can deliver payloads without directly risking the lives of their operators. 

The United States used them extensively in its campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq to execute precision strikes as well as large-scale sorties. 

But the drones the U.S. used were expensive, complex and reusable, and they employed highly advanced, multi-role technologies that differ markedly from smaller, cheaper swarm drones – the kinds that have featured so prominently in the Ukraine war, which, in some ways, has revolutionized their usage. 

Defense officials and executives alike understand as much, and though there are some obvious disadvantages to relying too heavily on unmanned aerial vehicles, their plans for the future of drones will shape the arms industry accordingly.

Since the term “drone” refers to any remotely piloted aircraft, there is a wide variance in what they can do and what they can be used for. 

Over the past decade, most technological advancements have focused on how drones can be used on land targets. 

The U.S. has a massive fleet of these kinds of drones, which perform such tasks as carrying out loitering munitions strikes and precision strikes, long-range aerial surveillance, and target acquisition. 

(For reference, one Gray Eagle drone and one Reaper drone, both of which conduct precision strikes, cost more than $20 million and $30 million, respectively.) 

The war in Ukraine has shown that while these weapons will always have a place in modern military arsenals, other, less “sophisticated” drones have earned their place on the battlefield. 

These include small commercially produced drones that are predominantly used as one-way attack vessels but are increasingly employed for targeting, reconnaissance and surveillance operations. 

The constant drum of overhead drones also has had an effect on the psyche of troops, who are fighting in positions they know are now exposed.

From the beginning of the war, Russia has used “dumb” attack drones to complement its missile strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure – hundreds of drones with explosives going off all at once. 

Precision isn’t the goal; no one even expects all of them to hit. 

The goal is twofold: to get enough drones through to damage an area, and for Ukraine to have to expend a commensurate amount of resources to fend them off.

So prolific have Russian aerial vehicles been that Moscow has tried to reinforce its arsenal with Iranian Shahed 131 and 136 drones. 

Russia reportedly bought 6,000 136s in 2003 for $193,000 each but is now building its own under license from Tehran. 

It has since used them to successfully attack Ukrainian positions as far as 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) away.

Fortunately for Ukraine, its air defenses have adapted to the threat. 

Using an increasingly effective early-warning network consisting of fixed radar, electro-optical and acoustic sensors, it intercepted as much as 94 percent of incoming Shaheds in May, according to Ukrainian military data. 

A multifaceted approach to shoot them down with specialized teams is still being developed and refined. 

If successful, they will likely be replicated by militaries the world over in future use.

Meanwhile, Kyiv has searched for ways to use drones offensively. 

Faced with a tight budget, it has elected to improve its indigenous production. 

The AQ 400 Scythe, for example, is a low-cost drone made of plywood that costs less than $15,000 to make, while the AQ 100 Bayonet, a dual-use artillery spotting and loitering munition platform, is even cheaper at roughly $2,000 per unit. 

These small drones are capable of carrying a variety of cameras, sensors and kinetic munitions. 

Last month, they were effectively used as flamethrowers as they launched thermite into Russian trenches.

Ukrainian drones have been effective on naval forces too. 

They have sunk patrol boats and landing craft and have destroyed corvettes using swarms of highly maneuverable, precise surface vessels. 

The Magura V5 USV (unmanned surface vehicle), which costs $273,000 to build, has been responsible for sinking at least eight Russian naval vessels. 

Moscow struggles to defend against these attacks despite having modernized much of its navy over the past decade. 

Combined with missile attacks, Ukraine has managed to sink approximately a third of Russia’s entire Black Sea fleet cheaply – and without a traditional navy of its own.

It’s no surprise, then, that militaries around the world have begun to increase investment in new drone technologies. 

Under the trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS, for example, maritime offensive and defensive drone capabilities are being developed for deployment in integrated systems. 

Existing research and development on older drones is now being applied to smaller swarm drones, and countermeasures to swarm drones are being formulated. 

Having witnessed their effectiveness in Ukraine, Washington, Paris and London are all striving to ensure their arsenals are equal to the task. 

In August 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense launched the Replicator program in a bid to create tens of thousands of autonomous systems for naval and air applications, ostensibly to counter China and increase deterrence surrounding Taiwan. 

The multibillion-dollar program, slated to be completed in two years, will feature large fleets of cheap drones that can overwhelm potential adversaries. 

Working as an integrated network, thousands of drones attacking simultaneously have the potential to challenge traditional naval, air force and army units in their respective realms.

Similarly, Turkey and Iran – two of the most prolific drone manufacturers in the world – are using their expertise for geopolitical ends. 

Many leaders in Africa have decided that they need drones to help cover their vast territories, and Ankara and Tehran have leveraged those decisions into favorable trade and political relationships. 

Their drones may not be as sophisticated as Washington’s, but their rapid production, cheap construction costs and proven effectiveness make them no less desirable. 

These factors also make them attractive to non-state actors such as the Houthis in Yemen, who have struck ships passing through the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles and drone swarms. 

The cost of repelling such strikes is on an order of magnitude higher than the cost of producing the drones, illustrating just how cost-effective drones can be when properly used.

Traditional military action follows what is known as the combined arms doctrine, which requires the use of a range of different forces in unison to make a military stronger than the sum of its parts. 

Drones are simply another piece of the doctrine. 

In some ways, they will change the battlefields of the future, but they won’t change the fundamentals of war. 

They won’t replace the need for boots on the ground; they will support and complement “traditional” military capabilities. 

This is why we expect them to be integrated even further into conventional military doctrines. 

Drone warfare in Ukraine has provided something of a blueprint for how that will look.