RUSSIA GETS TOUGH ON MIGRATION / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Russia Gets Tough on Migration

Softer approaches apparently didn’t work. 

By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Russia understands that it’s approaching a demographic crisis. 

Problems such as falling birth rates would be difficult enough for Moscow to solve even if it weren’t trying to manage migration, assimilation and integration, all while maintaining its own cultural traditions. 

But it is, and its early failures have all but forced the Kremlin to enact heavier-handed policies. 

Russian demography has never been a point in the country’s favor. 

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced a few episodes of demographic decline. 

In these instances, the government would try to reverse course through various state-sponsored support programs and by encouraging the migration of Russians back to Russia. 

When that didn’t work, it expanded its immigration policies by offering special privileges to former Soviet territories. 

Immigrants came mostly from Central Asia; today, nearly 90 percent of foreign laborers in Russia are from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 

As is always the case, some locals bristled at the arrival of new cultures.

But the Kremlin has felt the challenges even more acutely since the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent anti-Russia sanctions campaign. 

The military needs warm bodies to replenish its ranks, and the economy needs more buyers to raise demand, goose business productivity and replenish the budget. 

But falling birth rates have drained the pool of human resources. 

Moscow’s best solution is to attract more immigrants. 

To mitigate the discontent of native Russians, the Kremlin even tried to sell population slogans that said Russia was historically a multinational state that had become greater than the sum of its parts.

But it seems as though the government has decided soft measures – slogans of unity, incentives for procreation, punishment for illegal immigration – are no longer enough. 

This decision is due largely to security. 

After the high-profile terrorist attack at a concert hall near Moscow, which killed 145 people and was conducted by Tajik nationals, there has been growing hostility toward migrants in Russia. 

This sentiment has led to expensive internal security measures that are difficult to maintain. 

Fair or not, this has compelled the Kremlin to adopt a much firmer stance on its immigration policies. 

(The invasion of Kursk by Ukrainian forces has also given the Russian public a greater sense of urgency, even if it has nothing to do directly with migration.)

Thus the government has settled on a two-prong approach for addressing its demographic crunch: maintain tighter control over immigration and emphasize birth rates. 

Let's start with migration. 

Importantly, the Kremlin knows it cannot simply halt migration. 

The country still needs foreign labor, and it can’t afford to harm its relationship with the countries whence most of its laborers come. 

Even so, the Ministry of Internal Affairs believes there are some 630,000 foreigners in the country who do not have legal grounds to stay in Russia, while other sources, such as independent demographers, estimate the number of illegal migrants in Russia at around 3 million to 4 million. 

Since the beginning of 2024, more than 30,000 foreign citizens have been expelled from Russia – twice as many as in 2023, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs – and as many as 100,000 were denied entry to the country. 

From now on, illegal immigrants will be unable to use banking services and drive cars, nor will they be able to marry or divorce, register property or enroll children in schools.

Additionally, the Ministry of Education recommended limiting the number of foreign children with poor Russian language skills to three per class. 

Across major Russian cities, authorities continue to conduct raids in search of migrants living in the country illegally. 

Since they are not captured in official statistics anyway, Moscow assumes that their evictions will not meaningfully alter the nation’s demographic outlook, nor does it expect much resistance to their return from Central Asian governments. 

Moreover, the Russian economy has outpaced most growth expectations despite a severe labor shortage, with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development recently lifting its forecast for Russia’s 2024 growth to 3.7 percent, 1.1 percentage points higher than its May assessment. 

Reducing the number of people living in Russia illegally could further boost the growth rate by shrinking the gray market and shifting labor into the formal economy.

While its approach to managing immigration remains cautious, the Kremlin’s stance on boosting the birth rate has become more aggressive. 

For years, Russia has offered financial assistance to women who give birth to at least two children and subsidized mortgages for families, but the results have disappointed. 

Given the high cost of the Ukraine war, the Kremlin sees no room for additional funding and has scaled back mortgage programs. 

As a result, the government is moving toward harsher measures, such as potential penalties for childless families and aggressive pronatalist propaganda. 

Muscovite women were offered free anti-Mullerian hormone tests, which assess fertility, at city clinics. 

Meanwhile, childless women have been targeted with insults, particularly from the Russian Orthodox Church, whose representatives suggested that such women should become boys. 

A bill has been introduced in the State Duma to ban childfree propaganda, with proposed fines of up to 400,000 rubles ($4,300) for individuals, 800,000 rubles for officials and 5 million rubles for legal entities. 

Several Russian regions have also passed laws banning “inducement to abortion.” 

Meanwhile, discussions about pro-birth policies have intensified, with proposals to incentivize childbirth even among minors. 

One suggestion is to consider childbirth as an individual achievement when applying to universities. 

Separately, to address Russia’s low population density in Siberia and other underpopulated regions, biotechnologists have proposed creating a network of small, self-sustaining bio-eco-settlements in uninhabited areas, housing 400-1,000 people and using eco-friendly technologies for food, energy and waste disposal.

Many Russians have not received these suggestions well. 

Discussions on social media reflect widespread skepticism. 

Critics lament the government’s obsession with childbearing over more pressing issues such as housing and wages, or complain that it is not doing more to limit migration, including the legal variety.

Given the financial and human costs of the war and related sanctions, the Kremlin has to tread carefully on such sensitive personal matters. 

With so many resources tied up at the front, the government might struggle to cope with popular dissent. 

Some in the government also worry that the state is spending too much to stimulate the birth rate – with little to show for it – when that money could be directed toward the war effort. 

This is especially true considering that the proposed measures on migration and reproduction will not yield immediate results. 

Nonetheless, the Kremlin may feel that it is preferable to spotlight its efforts on the demographic front to distract the public from its failures at the front, the presence of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region and extremely sensitive issues like possible changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine.

Russia’s policy toward migration is evolving, and the state is making a risky foray into its citizens’ most private affairs. 

The emphasis is on toughness – toward irregular migration and childless families – even as another deficit is planned for next year’s state budget and Ukrainian drones are striking deeper and deeper into Russian territory. 

Perhaps this is another indicator that things are not going as the Kremlin planned.