VENEZUELA ON A DANGEROUS PATH / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Venezuela on a Dangerous Path

Caracas is no longer in a position to negotiate. 

By: Allison Fedirka

It’s been two weeks since Nicolas Maduro claimed victory in Venezuela’s presidential election, and the country is poised only to destabilize further. 

Whereas Venezuela previously this year was a nation that, antagonistic though it may have been, would still engage with other countries in the Western Hemisphere, it is now at risk of becoming utterly isolated. 

The Maduro government and the opposition have roughly five months to break their political impasse despite the many obstacles that remain in their way. 

And if they fail to do so, Venezuela may become a pariah state in which Maduro doesn’t necessarily call the shots.

Caracas isn’t one to shy away from political repression, but the government’s response to the contested election results has been its most violent in decades. 

The Prosecutor's Office is investigating opposition leaders Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez on charges of insurrection for publicly claiming Gonzalez’s victory, while security forces, and even informal government-aligned groups, crack down on political opposition. 

More than 1,300 politically motivated arrests have been confirmed since July 28, but reports of informal detentions and disappearances abound. 

Anecdotal evidence paints a picture of a police state where citizens can be arbitrarily stopped on the streets for questioning, and where family members of opposition figures are spirited to safe houses at night.

The government’s response has eroded what little faith remained in the credibility of its political institutions. 

Upon request from Maduro himself, the supreme court verified his win without allowing an appeal. 

To make sure the opposition could not contest the results announced by the Federal Electoral Council, the government temporarily suspended the use of Twitter/X in the country until after its decision was released. 

Meanwhile, the legislature continues to advance regime-friendly measures that would give the government indiscriminate powers to crack down on public dissent and dismantle opposition groups. 

In addition, a new cybersecurity force is being introduced, and its main task is public surveillance.

Rather than succumbing to defeatism as many expected, the opposition is using its persecution as an opportunity to rally international support. 

Plenty of countries have declined to recognize the official election results. 

Stalwart Venezuelan allies like Russia and Iran have given their full backing to Caracas, but other traditional allies like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia have called on authorities to show the validated election materials and impartially verify the results. 

Opposition leader Machado has called on Venezuelans worldwide, as well as anyone sympathetic to their cause, to protest on Aug. 17. 

The goal of the protests is not to overthrow the Maduro government but to encourage the international community to double down on its nonrecognition of the Maduro regime, remain invested in Venezuela’s future and keep the possibility of a negotiated settlement alive.

However, meaningful international support will be hard for either side to come by. 

Some 90 percent of Venezuelans do not expect the international community to help much in the current situation, according to a recent Meganalisis poll. 

So far, the international community’s response has been far more muted than in 2019, when the government fought back against the opposition’s supermajority in the National Assembly and Juan Guaido declared himself president. 

But the limit to which the international community was willing to do anything other than offer rhetorical encouragement has called into question the opposition’s ability to convert public support – or at least public opposition to the government – into regime change. 

Most countries are unwilling or unable to assume the economic and political burden associated with an intervention. 

But many have a vested interest in Venezuelan stability, especially when instability creates spikes in migration. 

Following the elections, some 43 percent of Venezuelans said they planned to leave the country, and an additional 35 percent are contemplating whether or not they will leave. 

Officials from Brazil, Mexico and Colombia are thus in talks to meet with Maduro, leading to speculation that it could be a step toward meeting Gonzalez. 

These countries’ stance toward Venezuela suggests a new dynamic is taking shape in the region. 

The ideology initially promoted by Hugo Chavez (and now Maduro) is no longer resonating. 

Left-leaning leaders in other Latin American countries like presidents Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Gustavo Petro have adopted political doctrines based less on ideology and more on socio-economic issues. 

Between the ideological evolutions and waning confidence in Venezuela’s institutions, Caracas can no longer count on these countries as it did in the past. 

Importantly, the evolution underway also reflects Washington’s desire to offload some of the responsibility for regional security onto others in the region and gives Brazil an opportunity to act as a regional leader.

But once again, the question comes down to whether the government and opposition can reach some sort of negotiated settlement. 

Those advocating talks – some in the opposition and a subgroup of Chavistas – argue that the window between now and the official start of Maduro’s next term (Jan. 10, 2025) leaves time for a graceful exit and a transition government. 

Talks on such an arrangement were underway in early July, when a Venezuelan delegation met with officials in Washington to discuss the details of impunity for Maduro and select cronies in exchange for fair elections and an abdication of power. 

The opposition has said repeatedly that it would not seek revenge in transition talks and that it supports strategies based on incentives rather than punishment.

Even so, there is growing evidence that the government is in no position for talks and will thus opt to remain in power by any means. 

The fact that Maduro has never single-handedly controlled the government – he relies on a network of various power brokers – created space for open press, private business with the West and, importantly, Maduro’s participation in hemispheric affairs. 

The bottom line is that there is plenty of room for draconian measures heretofore, as the recent crackdowns attest. 

There are rumors that Maduro may have been ready to resign but that his political peers forced him to stay. 

That’s not inconceivable; he spoke with the U.S. this summer, he held a press conference on July 28 in which he looked defeated, and the post-election security crackdown was led by factions associated more with Diosdado Cabello and Vladimir Padrino Lopez, two powerful figures in the regime, rather than to Maduro himself.

True or not, security forces are the biggest factor keeping the Maduro regime in power. 

And this makes a negotiated settlement nearly impossible because immunities will be a much tougher sell. 

It’s unlikely that Maduro will resign since doing so would threaten his personal well-being, resulting in an even stronger crackdown by the remaining actors. 

The most plausible outcome is that the state security apparatus will consolidate power, putting Venezuela on a path toward complete state control and extreme international isolation.