IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR´S SPREAD TO THE WEST BANK / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Implications of the War's Spread to the West Bank

It will be a much more complicated battlespace than Gaza, with a high risk of spillover.

By: Kamran Bokhari

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza has yet to break Hamas, and now the security situation in the West Bank is rapidly deteriorating. 

The volatility there is driven by the actions of two forces: extremist Jewish groups trying to expand settlements and radical Islamist groups trying to revive their operational capabilities. 

These dynamics, along with Israel’s attempts to control the area and the Palestinian Authority’s ineffectiveness, render the West Bank a much more complicated battlespace than Gaza. 

International efforts to stabilize Gaza are predicated on the PA filling the vacuum there, even as the PA risks losing control in the territory it ostensibly governs – an event which would have major implications for Iranian influence and Jordanian security.

At least nine Palestinians were killed Aug. 28 when Israel Defense Forces and the Israeli Security Agency launched the largest operation in the West Bank in two decades. 

In a post on X, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz wrote that the operation is meant to thwart efforts by Iranian-backed groups to establish themselves in the areas of Jenin, Tulkarm and Tubas. 

According to a CNN report, the Israeli operation involves drones, bulldozers, military and security forces, four battalions of Israel Border Police, and an elite unit of undercover troops. 

Katz added: “We must address this threat just like we’re handling the terror infrastructure in Gaza, including temporary evacuation of Palestinian residents and any step necessary. 

This is a war just like any other [war], and we must win it.” 

Initial reports are sketchy, but it seems Israeli security forces are targeting militants from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a group much smaller than Hamas but much closer to Iran. 

PIJ acknowledged in a statement that its fighters were battling Israeli forces in northern West Bank towns. 

Separately, Hamas issued a call for a “general mobilization” against Israeli occupation and Jewish settlers. 

The evolving crisis reportedly forced PA President Mahmoud Abbas to cut short his trip to Saudi Arabia to return to Ramallah, the headquarters of the PA.

The last time the IDF launched such a major military offensive in the West Bank was 2002, in response to the Second Intifada. 

Lasting just over a month, Operation Defensive Shield – itself the largest combat operation in the West Bank since the Israelis captured it from Jordan during the 1967 war – likewise targeted militants but left some 500 Palestinians dead and another 1,500 wounded. 

As many as 7,000 were arrested. 

Since then, the West Bank has not seen much militant activity. 

One reason is that the area has been the stronghold of Hamas’ secular rival, Fatah, which controls the internationally recognized Palestinian Authority.

Yet over the years the PA has weakened for a few reasons. 

First, corruption is so widespread that its international supporters from the West and from the Arab world alike have begun to lose faith. 

Second, it has lost credibility among Palestinians due to poor governance in the areas it controls and its inability to stop Israel from expanding nearby Jewish settlements. 

The government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has become increasingly right-wing, and the settler movement has gained traction among Israeli extremist groups accordingly. 

The PA’s fecklessness and Israel’s assertiveness have created the conditions under which groups like Hamas and PIJ thrive. 

As has the war in Gaza: Since Oct. 7, tens of thousands of Palestinians have died and nearly 2 million have been displaced.

This at least partly explains Israel’s decision to launch such a large operation in the West Bank, even as the IDF continues to fight Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in the north, the Houthis in Yemen and even Iran directly.

Having long supported its Palestinian proxies in Gaza, Iran would like to gain similar entree in the West Bank to help resurrect Hamas and PIJ. 

This has been a key project of the Quds Force, the overseas operations arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

The Quds Force has had a long time to entrench itself in Iraq, thanks to the 2003 U.S. invasion, and in Syria, thanks to the civil war (2011-16). 

Unsurprisingly, in recent months there have been reports of attempts to smuggle weapons into the West Bank.

Israel has interdicted Quds Force supply chains for years to prevent Iran from establishing forward operating bases near Israel's northern border, where it already faces serious challenges from Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

But it will struggle to do so if Iran uses Jordan to similar ends. 

Israel has long had a close security relationship with Jordan, especially after the 1994 Peace Treaty, which formally established diplomatic relations between them. 

Moreover, any Israeli strike in Jordan will destabilize the monarchy and thus create the very conditions Iran and its allies seek. Jordan may bristle at Iranian encroachment from the east, but it is much more concerned about instability on its western border with the Palestinian territories. 

More than anything, this is why Amman has opposed the expansion of settlements and why it has relied on the U.S. to pressure Israel.

In the West Bank, Israel thus itself faces a conundrum. 

It needs to act against Iran-backed militancy, but doing so could create a much bigger conflict in the Palestinian territory, which could then spill over into Jordan. 

It is not in Israel’s interest to see Jordan weakened further. 

Nor is it in Israel’s interest to have far-right factions capitalize on the domestic political climate since Oct. 7 to expand the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. 

The problem is that Netanyahu relies on those right-wing groups, which are also in his Cabinet, to maintain his government. 

The current Israeli government is therefore unwilling to block the settlement activity. 

And as a result, extremists on both sides are feeding off of the actions of the other.

The situation in the West Bank is therefore likely to deteriorate. 

Its destabilization will have harmful effects on Jordan and, by extension, Saudi Arabia, which shares a long border with its neighboring kingdom. 

Meanwhile, the PA could break down, and if it does, it bodes ill for both Palestinian territories.