AZERBAIJAN´S ROLE IN RUSSIAN STRATEGY / GEOPLITICAL FUTURES

Azerbaijan's Role in Russian Strategy

An understanding with Baku could help Moscow manage its otherwise vulnerable southern flank.

By: Kamran Bokhari

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the capital of Azerbaijan on Aug. 18 in what was a very curiously timed trip. 

Not only was it the first time Putin had traveled to Baku in six years, but he made the trip amid the first incursion of Russian borders since World War II. 

The Russian leader is many things but not impetuous, so traveling to Baku under the current circumstances was likely part of a broader strategy to manage the biggest crisis to hit Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Judging by joint press statements issued after the trip, it seems unlikely that anything major was discussed between Putin and his host, President Ilham Aliyev. 

There was some mention of increasing bilateral trade and the usual inking of inter-governmental agreements in non-critical sectors such as health care, education, climate change and food safety. 

But perhaps the most significant topic was the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace talks, which have been ongoing since Baku’s victory in the 2020 war. 

While acknowledging that “Russia is also facing crises, first of all on the Ukrainian track,” Putin also said, “If we can do something so that we can sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and Armenia, complete the delimitation and demarcation of the border … unblock logistics and the economy, we would be very glad.”

The statement brings home the fact that Moscow understands how much geopolitical ground it has lost in the South Caucasus, its decline caused by the outcome of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. 

Azerbaijan’s victory, aided as it was by Turkey, shifted the regional balance of power in Baku’s favor, while Armenia’s belief that Russia failed to sufficiently aid it in the conflict soured relations with its former ally in Moscow.

Putin’s choice of words in the offer to help mediate between the two sides is also telling. 

Moscow came late to the party, but it is trying to use its influence in Azerbaijan to position itself as a guarantor of peace. 

It certainly does not want Turkey, much less the West, to claim that role, especially in a region so critical to Russian security. 

Moscow knows that Yerevan is now gravitating toward the West, but Baku’s cold relations with the U.S. and Europe give it an opportunity to disrupt the process.

The question is: How reliable is Russia as a partner if it can’t protect its own territory from Ukraine? 

This is why the timing of this visit is odd. 

Baku may not need Moscow’s help to mediate with Yerevan, but Russia is its northern neighbor, and there are long, deep and extensive ties between the two. 

Azerbaijan can’t help but be worried about what it sees as continued setbacks for the Kremlin. 

The war in Ukraine – and Russia’s overall strategic interests – therefore had to be front and center between Putin and Aliyev, even if it didn’t make it into the official readouts. 

Recall, too, that the two met only a few months ago in Moscow. 

It’s hard to believe that Putin, in such a small amount of time, would need to address more than he already had in April and with someone he had otherwise not bothered to visit in years.

Indeed, Russia’s motivation is fairly straightforward: As the war in Ukraine takes a turn for the worse, it needs to do everything it can to secure its other border areas. 

For now, its strategic backyard is insulated from the West. 

It maintains much security influence in Central Asia, even as China is expanding in a geoeconomic sense. 

Belarus is highly dependent on Russia for its national security, and with the West so focused on Ukraine, Moscow likely believes it is safe on that front. 

Its southern flank, however, is exposed. 

With the 2008 conflict in Georgia far from settled and Azerbaijan wresting Nagorno-Karabakh away from Armenia, the South Caucasus is heading in an uncertain direction.

Russia was unable to prevent the new military reality in the South Caucasus, but it is now trying to position itself in the peace process – as a means of countering Turkish and Western encroachment in its soft underbelly. 

A settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia would remove a major obstacle in the path of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, which will connect Central Asia to Europe and, critically, weaken Russia’s influence in its near abroad. 

Naturally, Russia has tried to counter the TITR with its own project called the International North-South Transport Corridor. 

But given that Russia is under massive financial constraints and that Iran, a key cog in the INSTC, is likewise under sanctions, the corridor is unlikely to take off anytime soon. 

But the fact remains that Russia cannot cede to the West a presence on its southern flank – let alone in the heart of Eurasia.

Given its geostrategic position, Azerbaijan would want the best of both worlds. 

But there is only so much it can do to help Russia solve its main problem: Ukraine. 

Meanwhile, Baku’s relations with the West need improvement as it worries about its southern neighbor Iran, which is in the throes of unprecedented struggles of its own. 

The Azerbaijanis are also becoming increasingly concerned about Russia's growing dependency on Iran, especially considering the animosity between Baku and Tehran.

Ultimately, Azerbaijan will have to live with the dynamics on both its northern and southern frontiers. 

Russia will try to maintain its influence in its near abroad despite its setbacks in Ukraine. 

But without adequately solving the latter, it will continue to fail at the former.