WHY IRAN´S ESTABLISHMENT LET A REFORMIST BECOME PRESIDENT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Why Iran’s Establishment Let a Reformist Become President

It has a calculated reason for allowing a moderate candidate to win election.

By: Kamran Bokhari

For the first time in nearly a generation, Iran has elected a reformist who is not a cleric as president. 

But Masoud Pezeshkian’s victory doesn’t change the fact that the country’s political establishment is dominated by ultraconservatives, and that it was they who allowed him to run in the first place.

The Guardian Council, which vets candidates based on ideological suitability, has since 2004 made sure to keep reformists out of the presidency and the parliament. 

In recent years, in fact, it has sidelined more moderate conservatives in favor of fringe ideologues. 

The establishment knows that in a competitive race, the public would cast their ballots for the least ideological candidate. 

It’s good at bending elections to its will, and it remembers all too well when reformists 20 years ago controlled both the executive and legislative branches of government as well as the municipalities. 

So, why let Pezeshkian run at all?

Other than miscalculation – which seems highly unlikely – the only explanation is that the powers that be – the supreme leader, his closest clerical associates and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular armed forces – wanted a moderate candidate to win. 

It wouldn’t have been the first time: In 2013, former pragmatic conservative national security chief Hassan Rouhani won the presidency after eight years in office for his hawkish predecessor, 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The important difference here is that Pezeshkian is further to the left of Rouhani, and that his ascension comes amid a looming power transition. 

The supreme leader is 85 years old, and there’s a good chance he will either die or be incapacitated during Pezeshkian’s term. 

Iranian law dictates that under either scenario, a leadership council consisting of the president, the head of the judiciary and a jurist from the Guardian Council selected by the Expediency Council will discharge the duties of the supreme leader until the Assembly of Experts elects a successor.

The establishment understands that public dissatisfaction is at an all-time high, and as a product of revolution itself, it is extremely wary of potential counterrevolutions. 

The hybrid nature of the Iranian political system – a Shiite Islamist theocracy woven into Western republicanism – has allowed the establishment to maintain enough support to forestall any threats to its preservation. 

Voter turnout has been essential in that regard. 

However, there has been a major slump in turnout lately. 

In 2021, when Pezeshkian’s hawkish predecessor Ebrahim Raisi won the presidency, official voter turnout reached a historic low at 49 percent. 

(Notably, he owes much of his victory to the electioneering efforts of the Guardian Council.) 

Four months ago during the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections, turnout was around 25 percent. 

Allowing a moderate to run was a near-surefire way to gin up voter participation and thus allay at least some public concern.

Pezeshkian’s victory is a consequence of that decision – but it isn’t an unintended one. 

A former health minister and lawmaker, he is a regime insider who will work within the constraints of a system dominated by officers and clerics. 

He has gone out of his way to present himself as both a reformer channeling popular discontent and a principalist (the preferred designation of the conservatives) devoted to the ideological foundations of the regime. 

No doubt he has also learned from the mistakes of his ideological forebears such as former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami and prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi.

Meanwhile, many ultraconservative factions have to be feeling threatened by the sudden rise of a reformist to the presidency. 

For them, the most perturbing issue is the timing: They’ve worked feverishly to see one of their own succeed the supreme leader and prevent a pragmatist from taking over. 

Pezeshkian’s ascension is thus an intensification of the power struggles between pragmatists and ideologues. 

And as they intensify, it tips the balance of power from the clergy to the military.

These developments come at a time of increasingly aggressive Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East. 

Through its various proxies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, Iran is in the process of enhancing its power projection capabilities in the region. 

The resulting strategic situation has increased the risk of a greater collision with Israel, which the regime needs to manage while it consolidates its regional position. 

It also needs to reach an understanding with the United States on the nuclear issue to secure badly needed sanctions relief and thus balance its foreign and domestic policy commitments. 

Having a government of pragmatists instead of ideologues will be helpful in that regard.

The United States has also indirectly influenced Tehran’s acquiescence to Pezeshkian. 

There may well be a new presidential administration in Washington soon, and if Donald Trump wins, Iran will need capable leadership to steer the country through what could be some tough dealings.

Ultimately, Iran does not have a solution to its problem of perpetually oscillating between governments led by ideologues and pragmatists. 

This is woven into the country’s fabric; its stakeholders both fear and need pragmatists. 

For now, Iran hopes it can use a Pezeshkian administration to achieve its goals without diluting the ideological essence of the regime. 

But given the unprecedented nature of upcoming changes in the offing and the fluidity of its geopolitical environment, Iran is unlikely to achieve both.