ISRAELI ASSASSINATIONS CREATE MAJOR CONUNDRUM FOR IRAN / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Israeli Assassinations Create Major Conundrum for Iran

The twin strikes in Beirut and Tehran were a much-needed success for Israeli intelligence.

By Kamran Bokhari 

In the span of only a few hours, an Israeli airstrike in Beirut killed the military commander of Hezbollah and another in Tehran killed the leader of Hamas. 

Assassinations on foreign soil are among the most difficult operations an intelligence organization could undertake. 

To execute two in quick succession, nearly 1,500 kilometers (900 miles) apart, is a major coup for Israel at a time when an invasion of Lebanon appeared to be the only other option to prevent its virtual encirclement by Iranian proxies. 

But despite Israel’s attempt to “escalate to de-escalate,” to use nuclear parlance, the killings and Iran’s inevitable response will push the region deeper into crisis.

Damaged Reputation

The first strike occurred in Beirut on the evening of July 30 and killed Fouad Shukur, one of the most senior, if not the most senior, military commanders of Hezbollah. 

Wanted by the U.S. for his role in the 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marines barracks in the Lebanese capital, Shukur was accused by Israel of orchestrating the rocket attack that killed 12 children in northern Israel last weekend. 

A few hours later, shortly after sunrise on July 31, an “airborne guided projectile” killed top Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in his room in a northern quarter of Tehran, according to Iranian military officials. 

Haniyeh was in Tehran for the inauguration of Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian.

The twin assassinations were precisely the sort of dramatic display of strength that Israel’s government and security establishment sought. 

The Israeli intelligence community’s reputation has not recovered from its failure to prevent the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. 

In the almost 10 months of war that have ensued, Israeli forces have killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians while only partly degrading Hamas’ warfighting capabilities, and Israel’s intelligence services have generally come up empty in the search for the remaining 115 hostages in Hamas’ custody.

Meanwhile, a network of proxies under the direction of Tehran has been turning up the heat on Israel. 

The chief threat emanates from Hezbollah in Lebanon, but lately Israel has also come under fire from drones and missiles launched from Yemen by the Houthi rebel movement. 

Trying to regain the initiative after a deadly Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv, Israel on July 21 executed a complex aerial operation – featuring unknown numbers of F-15s and F-35s as well as midair refueling and reconnaissance aircraft – against Yemen’s port of Hodeidah, a Houthi stronghold. 

Not since 1985, when Israeli jets pounded the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization near Tunis, has the Israeli air force conducted a strike so far from home.

Israel’s attempts to reestablish deterrence have not been as effective against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. 

In April, one such attempt killed several senior Iranian military officers inside Iran’s embassy complex in Damascus, prompting Tehran to lob some 300 missiles and drones at Israel – its first direct attack on Israel. 

Strikes from Lebanon continued, including the weekend rocket attack that struck a soccer field in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. 

Israeli officials threatened an invasion of southern Lebanon, but destroying Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities would require Israeli forces to occupy the region. 

Given Israel’s nearly two-decade experience trying to clear southern Lebanon of potential threats in the 1980s and 1990s and the fact that the Israeli military is already looking at an indefinite occupation of Gaza, it has minimal interest in attempting the same in Lebanon. 

Rather than overburden the armed forces, Israel’s leaders appear to have wagered that a well-targeted one-two punch might shock Hezbollah and Iran into rethinking their risk-reward assessment.

Nowhere to Hide

If nothing else, the twin assassinations will undermine any sense of security among Iran’s military leaders and regional proxies. 

High-value targets are well-guarded and frequently on the move. 

To track such a target through hostile terrain, or to know where one will be at a specific time, entails a very high level of intelligence penetration. 

Even when a critical target is located, the strike force must be able to execute its attack in a timely fashion. 

In this case, it would have been relatively easy for fixed-wing Israeli aircraft to reach nearby Beirut and kill Hezbollah’s top military commander. 

By contrast, the attack on the leader of Hamas took place much farther from Israel and in an environment more hostile toward Mossad operatives than even Lebanon or Syria.

Of course, Israeli intelligence has many years of experience operating in Iran. 

A recent example was in November 2020, when Israel assassinated top Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh outside Tehran. 

Still, no attack can occur without timely knowledge of the target’s whereabouts – something that typically requires a tip from an informant. 

The frequency of Haniyeh’s travels to Iran, particularly since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, may have simplified the operation. 

On the other hand, the killing occurred only hours after the inauguration of Iran’s new president, when a great many foreign officials – as well as leaders of pro-Iran groups in the region – were in the Iranian capital, and security would have been higher than normal.

There were easier places for Israel to kill the Hamas leader. 

For years he has been based in Qatar, where he has likely developed a somewhat more predictable routine. But Qatar is an intermediary for many radical groups, including Hamas, and has brokered negotiations between Israel and Hamas over the release of Israeli hostages. 

Doha is also a close ally of Washington. 

Carrying out an assassination in the Gulf Arab nation may have done more harm than good. 

Striking in Tehran, however, demonstrates Iran’s inability to protect its allies on its own territory, humiliates the Iranian regime and underscores the risks it takes in supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and the militias in Syria.

It is equally a warning to Iran’s regime and security establishment about their own vulnerabilities, despite having infiltrated much of the Arab world. 

Whatever confidence Tehran gained from its direct attack on Israel – not to mention Israel’s highly symbolic response, which only damaged a missile site – has been shaken. 

Iran’s challenge now is how to restore its credibility without incurring additional attacks that expose other weaknesses.

There is not much that Iran can do to tip the balance of power away from Israel, which leads in intelligence, firepower and technological prowess. 

Were it to escalate the confrontation, it might lead Israel to target senior Iranian figures next time. 

The Iranians are reaching the limits of what they can achieve through their proxies, and they have not engaged in a conventional war of this scale since the late 1980s when they fought an eight-year conflict with Iraq.