In Armenia, Russia Takes a Wait-and-See Approach
Moscow has bigger worries and Yerevan has no good alternatives.
By Ekaterina Zolotova
By all appearances, Russia is losing an ally in a part of the world where it can least afford to have enemies.
Armenia, the small (and shrinking) country in the South Caucasus, has a number of grievances with Russia, most notably that the Kremlin failed to come to its aid when Azerbaijan attacked it over disputed lands.
Desperate to show Russia that it has alternatives, Yerevan has paired strident criticisms of Moscow with an unusual degree of openness toward the West.
In the past few days, it dispatched its foreign minister to Washington at the same time as a NATO summit in the U.S. capital, and it announced plans to host U.S. forces for joint exercises focused on peacekeeping from July 15 to July 24.
Often described as Russia’s underbelly, the South Caucasus separates the country from Turkey and Iran.
Even when relations between them and Moscow are good, as they are now, the three powers regularly compete to dominate the region and shape it into a buffer zone.
Making matters worse for Russia, its resources and attention are largely preoccupied along its western border.
It understands Western powers’ growing interest and influence in Armenia as part of this larger confrontation, and it would consider a loss of influence in the South Caucasus as a substantial defeat.
However, Russia is confident that Armenia cannot escape its orbit and that it eventually will be forced to accept its diminished state, or risk the sort of upheaval that would prompt Moscow to intervene.
Caucasus | Armenia & Russia
Strategic Mistake
Since gaining independence amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus republics have long sought to exercise political and military sovereignty and develop economically without Russian interference.
Armenia exemplifies this trend.
Anti-Russian sentiment in the country has risen, particularly after the 2020 war with Azerbaijan and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 amid an Azerbaijani blitzkrieg.
Armenians believe Moscow failed to support Yerevan and instead balanced between the warring parties, despite their military alliance and the presence of several thousand Russian soldiers at garrisons in Gyumri and Yerevan.
Disappointed, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan criticized the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and Russian authorities for their inaction and declared in September 2023 that relying on Russia for security was a strategic mistake.
The Ukraine conflict further alarmed Yerevan, casting more doubt on Moscow’s reliability as a security guarantor even as it demonstrates how far it will go to achieve its objectives.
The war has proved extremely costly, and Russia’s eastward pivot in search of stable partners could limit the relationship’s economic benefits for Armenia given the threat of sanctions and Moscow’s increased focus on developing new trade routes and wartime industries.
With the war looking increasingly like a stalemate, the takeaway for Yerevan is that Moscow is constrained militarily and unprepared to fight on two fronts.
The final insult from Yerevan’s perspective was the rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan, including the construction of a north-south trade route, which bypasses traditional European routes that are now mostly closed to Moscow.
For Russia, prioritizing relations with Baku, the South Caucasus’ largest economy, was a no-brainer.
The decision to withdraw Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh ahead of schedule, made solely through consultations between Baku and Moscow, further cemented Azerbaijan-Russia relations and shattered Armenia’s hopes for an eleventh-hour Russian intervention on its behalf.
Slow and Steady
Armenia’s discontent is worrisome and an unwelcome distraction for Russia.
Yet, there are two reasons Moscow is not rushing to address Armenia’s grievances.
First, Armenia’s political system is unstable, ensuring Moscow always has allies there, and deep political contradictions and insecurity have caused some Armenians to leave the country.
Many of these emigres end up in Russia because of language skills and family ties.
In fact, about 1 million Armenians live in Russia, while Armenia’s population is just over 3 million.
This enormous diaspora, combined with heavy Russian investment in Armenia, gives Russia significant influence over Armenian society and politics, which tends toward an authoritarian oligarchy.
The second reason Moscow remains calm is that it believes Armenia’s economic dependence and lack of alternative partners will keep it close.
More than 30 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is still Armenia’s largest trade partner, supplying significant volumes of gas and maintaining more than 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) of pipelines.
Armenia’s membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union boosted its foreign trade, further integrating it into the post-Soviet space.
Armenia has recently benefited from an influx of young Russian IT specialists and businessmen who fled mobilization, resulting in higher domestic consumption and entrepreneurship.
It also sees advantages as a transit hub. Despite sanctions, trade between Armenia and Russia grew by 43 percent in 2023, reaching $7.3 billion, with Russia accounting for 35.3 percent of Armenia’s foreign trade.
Armenian Trade With Russia
By contrast, the West, particularly the United States, has little interest in another military conflict – even indirectly – and is more concerned with other global hotspots than the South Caucasus.
For Washington, involvement in Armenia primarily serves to irritate Moscow. Although the European Union and the U.S. maintain diplomatic missions and conduct military exercises in Armenia, their troop presence is small and temporary, whereas Russia’s is permanent.
For Europe, deep engagement with Armenia risks straining relations with Azerbaijan, which offers substantial amounts of non-Russian energy as well as a trade route to the East that bypasses Russia.
Armenia’s small market also limits economic interest from other countries.
This leaves the Armenian economy few alternatives.
Iran offers minimal diversification, a pivot to Turkey may provoke social backlash, and engagement with more distant powers such as China or Europe is hampered by inadequate transport routes.
Moscow has taken a wait-and-see approach because it expects to use the crisis to secure Azerbaijan’s support and replace Armenia’s government with one more loyal to Russia.
Pashinyan’s willingness to negotiate a peace agreement with Azerbaijan enables Moscow to deepen cooperation with Baku, an important partner for securing and expanding transport routes critical for Russia’s diversification.
Moscow believes Pashinyan can finalize this agreement and is giving him time to make unpopular decisions, including transferring territories to Azerbaijan and changing the constitution.
Since the spring, protesters in Yerevan have demanded the government’s resignation; the Tavush for the Homeland movement, led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, is already uniting critics of the government with a more radical agenda.
Any steps to acknowledge Armenia’s defeat and consolidate the prime minister’s power might cause a large enough shockwave to bring down Pashinyan’s Western-oriented government in favor of more neutral leaders.
Russia won’t relinquish its influence but will delay intervention, conserving its limited resources.
Moscow’s softly-softly approach works as long as the balance of power in Armenian society is maintained without causing the country’s collapse.
However, if things spiral out of control, Moscow will intervene to prevent the emergence of more instability on its borders.
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