AMERICA RECREATES A WARFIGHTING COMMAND IN JAPAN / THE ECONOMIST

Less Nimitz, more MacArthur

America recreates a warfighting command in Japan

The threat from China hastens the biggest military transformation in the Pacific in decades

KADENA AIR BASE in Japan (pictured), America’s largest in the Pacific, is roughly 650km from the coast of China as the missile flies. 

Jets roar constantly over children’s playgrounds on their way to and from patrols. 

But American forces there have been on a peacetime footing since the end of the Vietnam war. 

That changed on July 28th, when Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, announced the creation of a new warfighting command to oversee all American forces in Japan.

The “historic” shift, as Mr Austin calls it, is a sign of the alarm with which America and Japan regard the threat from China, which is rapidly building up its armed forces. 

The new headquarters will help strengthen the defence of Japan—once a seen as a rear base for operations but increasingly likely to be on the front line of any conflict with China. 

It will also mirror Japan’s own plans to create an American-style joint command to fuse air, sea, land and other forces early next year.

“This is finally the transformation of US-Japan relations from what used to be mainly a basing agreement, to project US military power, into a true military alliance,” argues Christopher Johnstone of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington. 

The move may deepen China’s worries about encirclement and intensify complaints that America is building an “Asian NATO”.

That is a long way from reality. 

America’s allies in Asia have no mutual obligation to defend each other, as do members of NATO. 

Right now US Forces Japan (USFJ) is mainly an administrative headquarters for units based in the country, and to liaise with the Japanese government. 

The real warfighting commander, Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of Indo-Pacific Command, is based 7,500km to the east, above Pearl Harbour in Hawaii.

That set-up, dating from when Admiral Chester Nimitz masterminded many of the naval battles and island-hopping campaigns against Japan in the second world war from Hawaii, has looked increasingly implausible. 

Jeff Hornung of the RAND Corporation, another American think-tank, says that in any war with China communications with front-line forces in Japan and elsewhere in the western Pacific are likely to be heavily disrupted, whether by cyber-attacks, sabotage of undersea cables or strikes in space against satellites.

Thus the creation of a forward-deployed operational command, well within the range of China’s missiles, brings memories of Douglas MacArthur, who fought many of the battles against Japan—in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea—much closer to the action than Nimitz (sometimes dangerously so). 

He later ruled Japan after its surrender.

The revamped USFJ will be run by a three-star general, who will answer to Admiral Paparo. 

The Japanese had pushed for a four-star officer, akin to General Paul LaCamera, who commands American forces in South Korea. 

American officials note, however, that in wartime the general would take over command of both American and South Korean forces. 

In Japan the two armed forces take orders from their separate chains of command, even in a crisis.

Nevertheless, the aim is to integrate exercises, planning and ultimately fighting more closely. 

“When this transition is complete, USFJ will have a direct leadership role in planning and leading US forces, in both peacetime and potential crises,” says a senior American official. 

“They will be doing that side by side with Japanese forces like never before.”

Mr Austin was joined in Tokyo by Antony Blinken, the American secretary of state, for a meeting of the “2+2”—ie, of American and Japanese foreign and defence ministers. 

They warned of the “increasingly severe security environment” created by North Korea, Russia and above all China, not least through their nuclear threats and build-up. 

Against that, they hailed their alliance as “stronger than ever”. 

Beyond building the joint commands, they agreed to boost production of scarce air-defence and long-range strike missiles, and to increase deployments around Japan’s south-western islands close to Taiwan. 

America reaffirmed its “ironclad” commitment to defend Japan with its full might, including nuclear weapons.

In 2022 Japan announced it would sharply increase defence spending by more than 60%, to 2% of GDP, by 2027, and would acquire long-range missiles able to reach mainland China. 

For the foreseeable future it would be able to launch such long-distance strikes only with intelligence and other support from America.

Building blocks

The new American headquarters will be built in a phased process, about which there are many unanswered questions: the size of the command, its powers, location and area of responsibility, and the scope for other allies in the Indo-Pacific to be incorporated into operations. 

Many of these issues are sensitive, whether because of American inter-service rivalries or Japan’s struggles to shed its pacifism. 

“Both left and right would prefer Japanese forces to retain greater sovereignty,” notes Watanabe Tsuneo, of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a Japanese think-tank.

One question involves American politics. 

President Joe Biden’s administration is seeking to strengthen the growing “latticework” of new security arrangements on top of its old alliances in Asia before the American elections in November. 

This involves institutionalising such things as the burgeoning three-way military co-operation with Japan and South Korea.

And it means beefing up other parts of the “island chain” that girdles China, from Japan to Malaysia. 

At another 2+2 meeting in Manila on July 30th, America announced a big push to modernise the Philippines’ armed forces and coastguard, which have faced intense harassment by China around disputed parts of the South China Sea. 

The tension has eased somewhat in recent days, after a still-undisclosed deal allowed the Philippines to resupply its garrison on a rusting ship grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal. 

But the truce may not hold for long. America’s “once in a generation” package includes $500m in military aid.

With a further 2+2 with Australia due to be held in Annapolis on August 6th, American officials speak of “the ten most consequential days” for the Biden administration’s defence policy in the Indo-Pacific. 

But how much can really be established before its term runs out is unclear. 

The new American headquarters in Japan will probably not be running when the Japan Joint Operations Command (J-JOC) begins work in March 2025. 

Congress, which must authorise the headquarters and appropriate the funds for it, is largely paralysed.

A further uncertainty is what all these efforts would mean in a crisis over Taiwan, a self-governing island which China is determined to retake, by force if necessary. 

How far would the new command be involved if American forces decided to defend Taiwan? 

Conventionally, America has seen its role as the “spear” that would take on Chinese forces, with Japan as the “shield” to defend its territory and American bases. 

Whether such a distinction can be maintained in a war is doubtful.

That said, Japan is fast shedding its coyness about Taiwan, which it ruled for half a century, until 1945. 

The late prime minister, Abe Shinzo, declared that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency”. 

It was telling that earlier this month Japanese and Taiwanese coastguard vessels held joint sea-rescue exercises. 

Japan is donating coastguard vessels and maritime radars to the Philippines. 

Japan has also signed “reciprocal access agreements” with both Australia and the Philippines to host each other’s forces.

If successful, the joint-forces model could spread. 

America last month set up a joint headquarters (under a two-star commander) to improve the defence of Guam, an American island territory. 

Some talk of doing something similar in Australia, where American forces are building up their presence. 

Having several headquarters across the Pacific and expanding when needed would strengthen America’s resilience. 

MacArthur knew all about command under fire. 

But the headquarters back in Pearl Harbour will still prove vital—just as it was to Nimitz and America’s success in winning the Pacific war.