THE INCOMPARABLE RISK OF AN ISRAELI WAR WITH HEZBOLLAH / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Incomparable Risk of an Israeli War With Hezbollah

A conflict could quickly spread to Syria and Iraq – before enveloping the whole region.

By: Kamran Bokhari

Israeli forces have been waging war in Gaza for eight months, yet the countries to Israel’s north currently pose its greatest security challenge. 

On June 18, Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant group released nearly 10 minutes of drone footage – filmed in daylight – apparently overlooking Haifa in northern Israel. 

Captured in the video were residential and commercial areas near the port city, a military complex belonging to Israeli weapons manufacturer Rafael (complete with Iron Dome batteries, radar sites and missile stores), military and commercial ships, and oil storage depots. 

On the same day, Israel’s military brass approved operational plans for an offensive in Lebanon. 

Israel is “very close” to a decision to “change the rules of the game against Hezbollah and Lebanon,” said Foreign Minister Israel Katz after Hezbollah released the drone footage.

A war between Israel and Hezbollah would be much larger and longer than what the Israel Defense Forces are facing in Gaza against Hamas. Syria and Iraq could join the war and greatly enlarge the battlespace. 

Most important, the fighting could draw in Iran, whether because it senses an opportunity to build influence closer to the Mediterranean or because Israeli gains threaten the survival of its clients in the region or both.

Hezbollah and Israel have traded blows for months. 

IDF airstrikes have killed several commanders in the Lebanese Shiite militia, whose lethal but measured counterstrikes resulted in the unprecedented evacuation of border areas that tens of thousands of Israelis call home. 

In recent weeks, Hezbollah rockets have sparked wildfires across large swathes of northern Israel. 

Israeli military and diplomatic pressure has failed to compel Hezbollah to withdraw its fighters north of the Litani River, some 30 kilometers (19 miles) from the border. 

Therefore, Israel appears to be moving toward a major military campaign.

Israel is reluctant to initiate a major conflict with Hezbollah while the IDF is still fighting to dismantle Hamas’ regime in Gaza, where a very high civilian death toll and the hostage situation have impeded operations. 

Hezbollah is similarly hesitant; a financial meltdown and ensuing political crisis have weakened the group at home, while its support for the Assad regime in Syria has stretched its resources. 

But although Israel is wary of overstretching its forces and losing its remaining international backing, equally threatening is the risk that Iran and its allies could seek to take advantage of Israel’s fragile position. 

With its spy drone video, Hezbollah hopes to remind Israel of its capabilities and deter a larger Israeli assault against Lebanon.

The last major war between Israel and Hezbollah was in the summer of 2006. 

It ended inconclusively with a cease-fire after only 33 days. 

The strategic situation has changed significantly since then. 

Syria was the dominant external power in Lebanon until the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, which in Syria rapidly devolved into a full-blown civil war. 

The Assad regime traditionally had kept a lid on Israeli-Hezbollah hostilities, but amid a Sunni rebellion, the regime could no longer play this role. 

By December 2016, it was evident that the Assad regime would survive, but vast stretches of terrain in the country’s east had been lost to Kurdish separatists and the Islamic State group. 

The regime had relied heavily on support from Hezbollah and Iran, which together mobilized as many as 100,000 transnational Shiite fighters to defeat the Sunni rebels. 

Significant help also came from Russia, but since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the Kremlin has been unable to offer the same level of support.

Today, the Syrian regime is effectively a vassal of Iran, heavily dependent on assistance from Tehran and its proxies. 

The Iranians’ entrenchment in Syria was a key reason that Israel and Iran went beyond simply fighting by proxy and started directly attacking one another in April. 

For Israel, the threat on its northern flank is no longer just from Hezbollah in Lebanon but also from Iranian proxies in Syria. 

Therefore, any major Israeli military operation in the north will not be confined solely to Lebanon but will also be fought in Syria. 

Hezbollah would have to divide its resources to fight Israel while maintaining its presence in Syria, but on the other hand, Syrian territory would provide the group with strategic depth.

By extension, the Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq could also be expected to join the fray, especially if Hezbollah were to suffer setbacks. 

Tehran’s formidable position in the region took decades to build and came at great cost to the domestic political economy. Iran will mobilize all its assets accordingly. 

In the event of a major escalation – and now with the precedent of direct attacks on each other – Israel could decide to strike at Iran as well. 

Iran's direct involvement would take the conflict to another level.

If it materializes, this war will decide the balance of power in the region. 

Should Israel inflict heavy losses on Hezbollah and its partners in Syria, it could loosen Iran’s grip in the region. 

The Sunni Islamist insurgency in Syria could try to stage a comeback against the Assad regime and its allied Shiite militias. 

The Islamic State group could also try to take advantage of the disorder and try to resurrect its lost caliphate.

The Syrian Kurds, who control large parts of the northern and eastern areas of the country, could also be drawn into the conflict. 

Most significantly, Turkey, which is currently blocked by Iran in the Levant and sees the Syrian Kurds as a threat, would also want to exploit the situation and enhance its strategic position on its southern flank. 

For the Gulf Arab states, this would be a nightmare scenario, especially with the threat from Iran’s Yemeni ally, the Houthis.

Considering the circumstances, it is little wonder why the United States has been trying to contain the existing conflict. 

What is most alarming is that it is not succeeding.