Egypt, Caught in the Crossfire
The death of a border guard represents the biggest risk of escalation in the Gaza conflict yet.
By: Kamran Bokhari
On May 27, an Egyptian border guard was fatally shot at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
According to a Reuters report, the victim was killed after he opened fire on an armored vehicle carrying Israeli troops that had crossed a boundary line near the border in pursuit of Palestinian refugees.
Several Israeli soldiers were reportedly wounded and a few Palestinians killed in the exchange.
Though the death toll is small, especially compared to an Israeli military campaign in Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of civilians, the incident is perhaps the most dangerous escalation in the conflict to date.
Neither Egypt nor Israel has an interest in fighting the other, but the risks of unintended consequences are rising.
At stake is not just the relationship between Egypt and Israel but the stability of Egypt itself and, by extension, the security of the region.
Israeli-Egyptian relations have never exactly been warm; they fought wars against each other in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973.
But shootouts between their militaries are practically unheard of thanks to a U.S.-brokered 1978 peace treaty, which ended decades of hostilities and has stood the test of time, weathering several regional crises over some 50 years.
Yet the treaty came at a cost.
For years, Cairo was treated as a pariah in the Arab world over what was seen as its abandonment of the Palestinian cause.
A mere three years after he signed the treaty, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in October 1981 by a group of soldiers who were angry with his decision.
Egypt’s membership in the Arab League was suspended for a decade, until 1989.
Five years later, the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel reached the 1993 Oslo Accords, followed a year later by the Israel-Jordan treaty.
As pioneers of Arab-Israeli peace, the Egyptians thought their position not only had been vindicated but also was becoming the mainstream view in the region.
But by the time the Israelis and Palestinians got down to final status negotiations – which could have culminated in the establishment of a Palestinian state – Islamist forces such as Hezbollah and Hamas, having gained popularity over Arab nationalist forces, were torpedoing peace efforts.
Cairo understood that it could do little to curb Hezbollah and that the Levant was quickly being solidified as part Iran’s sphere of influence.
For Egypt, Hamas represented a much bigger problem – one far closer to home.
Not only did its suicide bombing campaign of the 1990s play a critical role in derailing the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, but it also empowered the Israeli right under current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – with both forces reinforcing the other.
Cairo was never very enthusiastic about the establishment of a Palestinian state, not least because it would compromise Egypt's national security interests, but unremitting hostilities were even worse.
The Fatah-led PLO, no longer dominant in Palestinian politics, was being seriously challenged by Hamas, which reintroduced armed struggle into the Palestinian national scene.
While Israel neutralized Hamas’ suicide bombing capabilities, PLO leader Yasser Arafat died in 2004, dealing a major blow to the organization and fragmenting the mainstream Palestinian movement.
A year later, the newly established Palestinian Authority held its second legislative elections.
Hamas won 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council.
This was as significant a turning point for Egypt as it was for the Palestinian territories.
Cairo now saw itself as stuck between Israel and Hamas, whose stronghold stood at the Egyptian border.
Hamas was not just an external problem that could undermine peaceful Egyptian-Israeli ties.
As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt, Hamas had organic ties to a massive Egyptian opposition movement – and thus became a domestic political problem.
The situation went from bad to worse when the Palestinian civil war broke out in 2007, during which the militant wing of Hamas seized Gaza.
Matters came to a head during the Arab Spring uprising.
In 2011, President Hosni Mubarak, who had led Egypt practically since Sadat’s death, was ousted and, a year later, replaced by a candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood.
(The Brotherhood also won parliamentary elections.)
Though the government refrained from aiding Hamas during the 2012 Gaza war, the Egyptian military was wary of how it would handle Israel moving forward.
In any event, the military seized power in 2013 and installed current President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi in 2014.
The takeover laid to rest the domestic concerns about Hamas, but the radical Palestinian group was nonetheless firmly ensconced as the government of Gaza, while Fatah and the internationally recognized PA were confined to the West Bank.
Cairo developed a two-pronged approach to the situation.
First, it cooperated with Israel to blockade the Gaza Strip in order to force Hamas to negotiate with Fatah.
Several rounds of Egyptian-mediated talks failed, but the role of intermediary served Cairo well.
Second, it liaised with Hamas when the group wanted to secure cease-fires after inciting wars with Israel (2008-09, 2012, 2014 and 2021).
For about 15 years, Egypt maintained a semblance of order to the chaos coming out of Gaza.
Things changed when Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, turning Gaza into a wasteland and creating an impossible diplomatic situation for Egypt.
Under intense pressure to broker a cease-fire, Cairo is a pivotal player in indirect talks between Israel and Hamas.
It makes sure to involve the United States and Qatar, which provides sanctuary to Hamas' central leadership.
It’s Cairo’s way of telegraphing to its people, for whom the Palestinian issue resonates deeply, that it is working feverishly to bring about an end to the death and destruction in Gaza.
The El-Sisi government, which secured a third term last December, is facing serious economic problems and has struggled to maintain domestic order.
As recently as March, Egypt needed a $50 billion bailout package, following the approval of an $8 billion International Monetary Fund loan.
Put simply, the death of a soldier at the hands of Israel is the last thing Egypt wanted, especially considering the precarity of its socio-economic situation and the danger of a full-blown conflict on its doorstep.
But this is the situation Egypt finds itself in.
And with Israel’s national security adviser saying military operations in Gaza will likely last the rest of the year, the risk of further clashes, however accidental, only rises.
Now that Israel controls the Rafah border crossing, it’s become even more difficult for Egyptian security forces to just sit by and let the Israelis conduct their operations, especially if they result in the death of Egyptian citizens and Palestinians.
It's unclear what led the Egyptian soldier to open fire on Israeli troops – whether he perceived a threat or there was a breakdown of professionalism – but no nation's armed forces can be totally immune to popular sentiments.
Either way, the future of Gaza remains a source of deep uncertainty for Egypt.
That said, Egypt has no desire to be responsible for security in a post-conflict Gaza, which is why it and other Arab leaders rejected the Israeli proposal to station an Arab force there until a Palestinian administration is up and running.
However, neither can Cairo accept an Israeli reoccupation.
According to a May 23 Politico report, the Biden administration is considering appointing a U.S. official – potentially based in Sinai – to serve as the top civilian adviser to a mostly Palestinian force when the conflict ends.
It's part of a plan for Washington to play a “prominent” role in lifting Gaza out of desperate chaos.
This means Egypt, irrespective of its preferences, will have a key role in the shaping of post-war Gaza.
The Israeli imperative to dismantle Hamas is unlikely to end, even as the infighting within the Netanyahu-led government intensifies.
The road to the end of hostilities appears long and uncertain, and from Egypt’s point of view, a lot can go wrong before then.
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