European Views on US Global Posture
Perceptions aren't consistent with reality.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
The notion that all countries operate within constraints is one of the main pillars of geopolitics.
It came up repeatedly during my recent visit to the United States, where I attended several talks on European and Russian affairs.
Though we at GPF try to stay out of the D.C. bubble, it’s nonetheless important for us to know what those in the bubble are saying, especially since Europe right now appears so consumed by what’s happening in Washington.
I traveled to the U.S. with a delegation of experts and policymakers from Romania.
Analysts and officials from other parts of Europe, including Germany and Poland, were also in attendance.
The main topics on the agenda were security and, of course, Ukraine.
The event coincided with heated discussions in the U.S. Congress over aid packages for Ukraine and Israel.
Though the situation in Israel is potentially hugely impactful for American politics, the conflict in Ukraine is the main focus for many policymakers in Europe.
After all, the war there has shifted NATO’s containment line and transformed Eastern Europe into a literal battleground.
Considering that Kyiv is hugely dependent on military aid from Washington, European lawmakers are making concerted efforts to learn more about the constraints within which U.S. politics and politicians operate.
Europeans typically have a narrow view of U.S. politics, mainly focusing on the presidency and the administration, which they perceive as ultimately responsible for maintaining the United States’ global leadership role and, by extension, the Western security structure.
That’s because the Europeans tend to believe the U.S. political system mirrors those in Europe, where foreign policies are forged by governments and primarily driven by urgent security threats to their borders.
The Europeans thus get either nervous or excited every time another U.S. presidential election comes around, believing that a change in the presidency could alter how Washington interacts with the world.
In doing so, they misjudge the way U.S. politics works, believing falsely that the presidency overrides every other institution in the United States, especially when it comes to strategy and foreign policy.
In fact, the U.S. president isn’t as powerful as many assume – and that’s by design.
The nation's founders didn’t want to assign too much authority to one person in the political hierarchy.
They instead built a system of checks and balances, splitting power among three branches of government: the legislative (Congress), the executive (the president) and the judiciary (the courts).
This division of powers guarantees that no branch can overpower the others.
Congress enacts legislation, which the president can veto, which Congress can in turn override with two-thirds majorities in both houses.
Congress also controls the federal budget, and thus can limit funding for the president’s agenda.
The president is commander-in-chief of the military but cannot declare war; that power belongs to Congress.
The president also appoints federal judges and other officials, but the Senate must confirm the appointments.
The courts, meanwhile, interpret laws and can strike down legislation that they rule unconstitutional.
All this means that a president’s powers are limited by the legislative and judicial branches of government – even if his party holds a majority in Congress.
The president thus has a limited ability to wield power over U.S. foreign policy.
Moreover, the United States’ global posture isn’t a product of its politics or policymaking to begin with.
America's evolution as the leader of the Western world was largely driven by economic interests and the idea that global markets, mobility and interconnectivity would bring profit to U.S. businesses and drive economic growth and development.
The role of the private sector – sometimes in coordination with the government – is central to the country’s global standing.
Though interactions between companies and politicians are complex, one of the ways in which businesses influence foreign policy is by lobbying representatives in Congress to pursue policies that meet their interests abroad.
This pressure resulted in legislation that made it possible for administrations to implement strategies that, over time, turned the U.S. into an economic leader and superpower.
This role enabled the government to maintain domestic stability and pursue growth.
Still, the United States’ approach on Ukraine is often perceived in Europe as a reflection of the administration’s global priorities.
During my visit to Washington, Congress was discussing a new Ukraine aid package, which was finally passed on Saturday.
Many of the Europeans present at the talks tied the matter to America's leadership role in the world.
To many Americans, however, aid for Ukraine is treated more as a matter of domestic politics than foreign affairs.
Recent polls indicate Americans are equally split between thinking the U.S. is doing too much for Ukraine and wanting the U.S. to do more.
Another topic of discussion was the security situation around the Black Sea.
In 2022, a bill was introduced in Congress that would authorize the National Security Council to direct an interagency strategy to increase coordination with NATO and the European Union, deepen economic ties, and strengthen the security and democratic resilience of partners in the Black Sea region in accordance with U.S. values and interests.
The bill was passed in 2023 and has become of increasing interest to the business community in both the U.S. and the Black Sea region.
Western businesses increasingly see opportunities here, especially with the Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia disrupting more traditional routes through which they conduct trade around the world.
The Danube has become an alternate trade route linking the so-called Middle Corridor (which connects Southeast Asia to Europe through Central Asia and Turkey instead of Russia) to Germany’s North Sea coast.
New rail and road projects linking Romania’s port of Constanta to Gdansk in Poland also have been discussed to help integrate European markets and build a strong containment line in Eastern Europe.
The future of these and other infrastructure projects will depend on how states and businesses address the fallout of the war, its duration and the strategies of both Russia and Ukraine for rebuilding after its conclusion.
Any investment plans in Ukraine will need to take into account Russia’s long-term strategy, announced in 2023, to counter Western influence around the world.
Thus, the Black Sea region can’t be decoupled from the future of Ukraine – as some suggested during my trip to Washington.
Should Ukraine be forced to negotiate ceding parts of its territory to Russia, Kyiv could fall under Russian influence in the longer term – which wouldn’t require a massive investment from Moscow considering the socio-economic realities in Ukraine today.
The biggest risk many grappled with was that Ukraine could become a failed state, a black hole between Europe and Russia that Moscow could eventually control.
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