UPHEAVAL IN EURASIA AND IRAN´S SHRINKING OPTIONS / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

Upheaval in Eurasia and Iran’s Shrinking Options

With Russia and China mired in crises, Iran has no choice but to deal with the United States.

By: Kamran Bokhari

Eurasia is in a fit of historic change as Russia, China and India each undergo major transformations. 

Less obvious but no less impactful is what’s happening in Iran. 

After decades of trying to change the security architecture of the region, it is now being forced to adapt to pressure from within and without. 

The extent to which Tehran actually alters its behavior is unclear, but what is clear is that it must change, the consequences of which will affect the Middle East, the South Caucasus, Central Asia and South Asia.

Since its founding some 45 years ago, Iran has intermittently engaged in negotiations with the United States on a variety of issues despite otherwise hostile relations and the absence of formal diplomatic ties. 

But there is something different in what is happening now. 

In recent months, the two have been trying to reach a broader understanding rather than the usual narrow agreements on specific issues, particularly with regard to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

And all of this takes place as Tehran tries to pause its rivalry with its primary regional adversary (and American ally), Saudi Arabia.

According to an Aug. 16 report in the Financial Times, Washington and Tehran have been trying to reach an “unwritten understanding” whereby Iran stops supplying drones and spare parts to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine. 

The talks have apparently advanced; Iran reportedly asked Russia to refrain from using the drones, though the U.S. wants “more concrete steps” on Iran's part. 

In return, the United States could not impose any new sanctions in certain areas (human rights excepted) and would be willing to more loosely enforce existing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. 

Meanwhile, the commander of the of the Quds Force, the overseas arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, met with pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq and instructed them to “stop all military operations against the U.S. and the global coalition forces at this time.”

Moreover, the Wall Street Journal reported on Aug. 11 that Iran had significantly slowed the pace at which it was accumulating near-weapons-grade enriched uranium and diluted some of its current stockpile. 

These moves come as Tehran and Washington negotiate the release of four American citizens in exchange for freeing up $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue. 

Western officials have informed their Iranian counterparts that if tensions ease this summer, there is a chance for broader negotiations later in the year. 

It’s in this context that on Aug. 18 Iran sent its foreign minister to Saudi Arabia – the first time in eight years – for talks with his counterpart and with the kingdom’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

There is nothing that suggests this flurry of diplomatic activity will actually lead to an accommodation, but the fact that it’s happening at all underscores just how much Iran needs to change with the new global climate. 

Until now, Iran has been able to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, facilitated as it was by four factors: The United States had been heavily focused on the Middle East and South Asia; Russia and China were on an ascendant trajectory; the Arab world was in a state of turmoil; and the domestic political and economic situation was manageable. 

This is no longer the case.

After 9/11, Washington spent two decades entangled in issues that intersected with Iranian interests. 

The fallout from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gave Tehran a great deal of room to maneuver. 

The government fully exploited the situation and played a large role in shaping the circumstances that had Washington bogged down in the Middle East and South Asia. 

It took the U.S. years to extricate itself, but extricate itself it did, giving it the time and resources to focus on Russia and China.

Both Moscow and Beijing have long shielded Tehran from the outside, allowing the clerical regime to continue to push ahead with its radical foreign policy, which they saw as a useful tool for creating problems for, and thus concessions from, the U.S. 

However, Russia’s attempts to fix its position in Ukraine have made matters worse – hurting its relationships with many countries, including Iran, which now questions how serious Moscow is as a global player. 

That the world’s second-largest military force with its own industrial base is having to rely on Iranian drones to fight the Ukrainians means that Tehran can’t count on Moscow for its own geopolitical well-being. 

Similarly, China’s economic downturn and the pressure Washington is bringing to bear has seriously degraded Beijing’s ability to project influence abroad. 

Tehran has certainly noticed. It was only two years ago that it was hoping for hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. 

Tehran knows that the truce that it recently reached with Riyadh, ostensibly mediated by China, wasn’t so much the result of Beijing’s determination as it was a distraction from its own economy. 

The heavy lifting was done by Iraq and Oman, which along with Qatar serve as the middlemen of U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.

More important are the regional circumstances that compelled Iran to halt its aggressive push into the Arab world. 

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have stabilized a region that has been in disarray since the Arab Spring, in part by neutralizing Islamist forces backed by Turkey and Qatar. 

The Islamic State is no longer the threat it was. 

The Syrian government is being reintegrated into the Arab world. 

And the Abraham Accords signed by Israel, the UAE and other Arab states are bringing the Israelis and the Saudis together. 

These various developments have narrowed Iran’s room to maneuver.

At home, the government is trying to manage a crisis created by its inability to both finance an assertive foreign policy and maintain domestic stability. 

Social and economic conditions are in disrepair. 

The public is no longer willing to accept the Islamist edicts on which the current administration has double-downed. 

The country is fast approaching an impasse and will invariably undergo a regime change once the ailing 84-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is no longer at the helm.

The way Iran will change remains unclear, but it is increasingly mired in uncertainty. 

Its way of doing business is becoming untenable. Something has to give. 

Iran cannot face a hostile United States without significant third-party support or a diversion. 

The evolution in U.S.-Iranian relations is a result of the shifts in global forces. 

The United States is systematically building coalitions that include former hostile powers to improve its position relative to Russia and China in the event they emerge from their current crises. 

Iran is a key element in that regard.

Under the present circumstances, Iran cannot afford the risks of confrontation with the United States. 

It may be the case that Russia and China regain their footing and once again create problems for the United States. 

But the global system is definitely in flux for an extended period of time.