How to Read a Nation’s Intentions
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
Last week, several readers challenged my assertion that China was acting out of fear of the United States.
They said the U.S. had in no way threatened China and had never claimed any intention of going to war with China, and that, in fact, Beijing had frequently threatened fundamental U.S. interests, including those in Taiwan.
China, then, has no reason to fear the U.S. and could not, therefore, be acting out of fear.
These are fair responses, but because they illustrate a critical element of forecasting – determining what matters and what doesn’t – I’d like to articulate my reasons more thoroughly.
Nations don’t evaluate other nations’ intentions by what they say.
They evaluate them by understanding a nation’s imperatives and fears, and, as important, the ways in which another nation can hurt them, particularly militarily.
Intent and ability mean everything.
If a nation concludes it is in another nation’s interest to act against it, then it must assume it is under threat.
This rarely has anything to do with what is said publicly.
The Japanese never threatened to attack Pearl Harbor; in fact, talks between the U.S. and Japan were underway in Washington when Japan attacked.
The absence of words can mean anything.
If I were China, I would note the following about the United States.
First, the U.S. regards China as a long-term threat, one that could someday expand its influence into the Pacific Ocean and thus threaten not just a buffer zone but the foundation of American security.
Second, the U.S. maintains a large naval and air force presence near China.
Third, China does not have a non-nuclear way to counter the U.S. by attacking the U.S. mainland.
Fourth, as China expands its military force to contain the U.S., Washington’s anxiety will only increase the threat.
Last, the U.S. has indeed acted against what it sees as a threat from China’s economic growth – potentially raising the odds of an eventual military threat.
From a strategic point of view, China’s most vital and vulnerable assets are its ports on its east coast.
The trade China’s economy depends on must come through these ports.
U.S. forces, then, could strangle Chinese trade by blockading these ports.
This fear was compounded by the recent deal to allow more U.S. bases in the Philippines, and then by a similar agreement with Papua New Guinea.
This creates a cordon that essentially stretches from the Aleutians to Australia.
The U.S. has gone to great lengths to draw this line.
The ability of the U.S. to block those ports frightens China far more than a hostile statement.
In the real world, unspoken threats like these are the ones that really matter.
So even if Washington never explicitly threatens China with war, China nonetheless feels threatened by what the U.S. has done, not by what it has said.
With little ability to respond militarily or diplomatically, China must for now accept the reality the U.S. has imposed on it and seek accommodation until the balance of power changes.
The U.S. is content with the arrangement so long as China doesn’t threaten U.S. interests in the Pacific.
Both act on the potential threat, not on verbal abuse and charges.
That China placed a listening post in Cuba is minimally threatening.
If it installed nuclear weapons on the island, that would be another matter.
It is the significance of the threat that generates fear, and the U.S. has generated fear.
As I formulate a forecast, I will watch how China responds.
Will it break the American threat or impose a threat of its own?
Until then, the Chinese fear of the United States will be real and rational, which is why now is the best time to negotiate with China – and this is precisely what Secretary of State Antony Blinken is doing.
China is concerned about U.S. intentions because of U.S. capabilities and its past actions.
Or, put differently, China fears the U.S.
The U.S. fears China too.
The fact that the U.S. hasn’t attacked China with words means nothing to a Chinese policymaker – that's certainly not something to bet a country on.
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