THE DRIVERS OF TURKISH-SYRIAN RAPPROCHEMENT / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Drivers of Turkish-Syrian Rapprochement

A successful entente would alter the security landscape of northeastern Syria.

By: Caroline D. Rose

Despite the efforts of the U.S., Europe and regional actors to isolate the Syrian government, Turkey in recent weeks has conducted several high-level intelligence, defense and diplomatic meetings with Syrian officials. 

A meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar Assad looks increasingly possible. 

The two sides are likely too far apart for complete normalization, but circumstances will continue to compel Turkey to pursue influence within Damascus and forge a Turkish-Russian-Syrian entente that would alter the security landscape of northeastern Syria.

From the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has staunchly opposed the Assad regime. 

In 2011, it severed diplomatic relations with Damascus and threw considerable support behind the Syrian opposition and armed rebels in the country’s north. 

Turkey has refrained from engagement with the Syrian regime, focusing instead on constraining Kurdish armed groups – such as the People's Protection Units (YPG) – that Turkey says sponsor Kurdish separatism and violence across Syria, Iraq and Turkey. 

Second, Ankara has worked to establish a peace corridor – a buffer zone to repatriate Syrian refugees and prevent violent spillover into Turkey – along the border. 

For the past six years, Turkey has reverted to a cycle of military escalation to counter Kurdish militants and establish this corridor under Operation Claw. 

Though these attempts have garnered some ground and leverage in northeastern Syria, one obstacle has stood in its way: the U.S. military presence in Syria’s northeast and Washington’s partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish group that Turkey contends is aligned with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party. 

Turkey’s and America’s competing interests in northeastern Syria have created friction between the NATO allies and have frustrated Turkish attempts to establish its corridor.

However, recent shifts in Turkey and elsewhere have created opportunities for a Turkish pivot in northeast Syria. 

Worsening economic conditions in Turkey have translated into political frustrations at home, including anger directed at the 4 million Syrian refugees residing in Turkey. 

This, combined with rising friction between Turks and Kurds following a Nov. 13 terrorist attack in Istanbul, has increased Erdogan’s urgency to secure a repatriation zone in Syria’s north and counter Kurdish armed groups. 

In November and early December, the Turkish government failed to accomplish this militarily through Operation Claw-Sword, stopping short of a ground incursion amid international pressure and signs of blowback among dormant Islamic State cells throughout northeastern Syria.

Having exhausted the military option and eager to act before June 18 elections, the Turkish government has begun to explore incremental engagement with the Assad regime, supplemented by mediation with Russia. 

Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has calculated rapprochement with the Syrian regime into its electoral strategy, gaining approval not only from key AKP officials and coalition partners such as the far-right Nationalist Movement Party but also from the main opposition force, the Republican People’s Party. 

The Turkish government has proceeded cautiously, initiating high-level meetings between intelligence and defense officials and building momentum to eventually convene both countries’ foreign ministers and heads of state. 

One key feature of these efforts has been the mediating role of Russia. 

Moscow hosted the first high-level meeting between Turkish intelligence and defense officials and worked to draft plans for an amended Turkish-Syrian-Russian “roadmap” in Syria’s northeast. 

The plan could reportedly reopen the Aleppo-Latakia highway, expand joint patrols between military forces and set the groundwork for incrementally pushing the YPG from Turkey’s intended buffer zone along the border – Ankara’s ideal alternative to another failed military intervention.

Amid the slew of engagements with the Syrian government, Turkish officials such as Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin have tried to counterbalance with affirmations of support for the Syrian opposition and expressions of Turkey’s commitment to a fair constitutional process within U.N. parameters. 

And despite a chorus of support from AKP political allies and adversaries alike, public demonstrations in Turkey against engagement and cautionary statements from NATO allies have put pressure on the Turkish government. 

Without a change in the Syrian regime’s position, full-scale normalization between Turkey and Syria remains a distant prospect. 

But a combination of electoral, economic and security pressures in Turkey will drive Ankara to shape a new status quo with Russia and Syria along its southern border.