THE MIDDLE EAST´S RESTIVE MINORITIES / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

The Middle East’s Restive Minorities

Ruling elites in the region aim to subdue minorities rather than include them in the political process.

By: Hilal Khashan

The Middle East is a religiously and ethnically diverse region. 

Its complex history has only intensified these divisions, especially after the rise of modern nation-states in the 20th century. 

In each of these countries, a dominant ethnic and religious group seized power, invariably failing to integrate the other components of society into the political system. 

Discrimination, exclusion and prejudice are prevalent, and the concept of universal citizenship has failed to take hold, having devastating consequences in places like Syria and Iraq.

The legacy of the distant past continues to shape politics today, as evidenced by the widespread disenfranchisement of minority groups throughout the region. 

Leaders of various coups and revolutions claimed that they would establish a partnership with all segments of society, regardless of ethnic and religious differences. 

Though some were sincere in their pledges, they all failed, as religious, sectarian and ethnic divisions proved insurmountable.

Iraqi Kurds

On the eve of his ascension to the throne in 1921, Iraq’s first monarch, King Faisal I, asked British Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston Churchill about the boundaries of his kingdom. 

Churchill replied saying that the country’s borders would extend to the Hamrin Mountains, and beyond the mountains would be another country called Kurdistan. 

He was likely referring to the 1920 Sevres Treaty that provided for the Kurds’ right to self-determination, implying their entitlement to statehood.

In its early years, the Iraqi monarchy – which earned its legitimacy with a broad range of ethnic and sectarian groups due to its relation to the family of the Prophet Muhammad – attempted to construct an inclusive concept of Iraqi nationalism. 

But Faisal soon encountered obstacles from the Sunni-dominated officer corps, which showed little interest in integrating members of other sects into political life. 

He realized that Iraq came into existence by putting together patches of land and people with no common foundation. 

After establishing the kingdom, he expressed his pessimism, saying “there is no Iraqi nation yet, but there are imaginary human conglomerates, devoid of any unifying national idea.”

Since then, many have tried to integrate the Kurds. 

Abd al-Karim Qasim, who overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, believed he could transform Iraq into a nation-state. 

He wanted to include the Kurds in the political system and establish the Republic of Arabs and Kurds, as he called it. 

However, he found himself captive to his comrades in the military elite, who refused to expand the base of politics to include non-Sunni Arab participants. 

Saddam Hussein also wanted to resolve the Kurdish question once and for all. 

In 1970, he signed an autonomy agreement, which gave the Kurds political and cultural rights that no other Middle Eastern country seemed willing to offer. 

However, Iraqi Kurds fell into the trap of the shah of Iran, who manipulated them into believing that they could win more concessions and declaring a rebellion in 1974. 

The shah used the Kurds to coerce the Iraqi government into reaching a favorable agreement with Iran on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. 

When the Iraqis acquiesced to Iranian demands in 1975, the shah suspended military support for Kurdish insurgents.

Turkey’s Alevis and Kurds

Like the Christians, Jews and Yazidis in Turkey today, the Alevis were victims of religious persecution for centuries in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. 

The Alevis are a distinct minority with a faith, philosophy and culture largely compatible with secularism and humanism. 

Estimates indicate they represent 20 percent of the population, but because the Turkish government does not recognize them as a distinct group, there are no concrete figures.

The Alevis derive their rituals from the Shiites and Sufis, which makes them apostates in the eyes of a Sunni majority that has committed many atrocities against them. 

The most gruesome occurred in 1993 when 37 people, mostly intellectuals and writers, died in an arson attack in Sivas province during a Sunni protest against a celebration honoring an Alevi translator of Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses.”

As for the Kurds, the Turkish government barely acknowledges their existence. 

It often issues announcements in English, French, German and Arabic but not in Kurdish, despite the fact that more than 20 million Kurdish people live in the country. 

The Turkish state assigns ethnic and religious identities to its citizens regardless of how they view themselves. 

Other nationalities are not seen as equals unless they call themselves Turks.

Radical nationalism is one of the biggest dangers facing Turkey today. 

Hatred of minority groups is increasing as extremist tendencies continue to rise. 

While democratic countries make efforts to remove monuments and other reminders of their colonial pasts, Turkey is glorifying its nationalist historical figures. 

In 2020, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, governed by the opposition Republican People’s Party, named the city park after Nihal Atsiz, an ultranationalist ideologue, at the request of the nationalist Good Party. 

Atsiz was the most prominent Nazi sympathizer in Turkey and one of the most controversial figures in the country’s political history. 

He wrote articles accusing Jews of unrestrained greed and disloyalty and claimed that Germany had become the first country to solve the Jewish problem. 

He was also highly critical of Islam, describing it as “a religion created by the Arabs, for Arabs.”

Shiites in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain

Shiites constitute about 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s total population. 

In 1913, when the Saudis occupied Eastern Province, where the majority of the Shiite population is concentrated, the Shiites didn’t resist, agreeing to join the Saudi state in exchange for Ibn Saud’s promise to protect their religious freedom. 

Today, however, they are often victims of discrimination and persecution, including in education and the judicial system. 

Those who express their beliefs may be subject to arrest, especially in the Great Mosque of Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. 

Government officials exclude them from senior positions and openly criticize the sect, often describing Shiites as rejectors of true Islam.

 

Shiites have sought to reconcile their differences with the regime, engage in civil action and avoid confrontation with the authorities. 

They seem keen to demonstrate that they are partners in the homeland, stressing their desire to build a civil society and participate in governance alongside other groups. 

They aspire to gain full citizenship and recognition of Shiite rights, and to end sectarian violence and hatred. 

The government, however, reminds them often that Saudi Arabia follows the Sunni doctrine, which they must respect.

The Shiites in Bahrain, who make up 70 percent of the population there, suffer from political marginalization and religious persecution. 

Discrimination intensified after the 2011 uprising, which was suppressed with the help of Saudi troops. 

Since then, Bahraini authorities have cracked down on opposition groups and human rights activists and, in 2016, dissolved the moderate al-Wefaq Shiite movement. 

The government often prevents Shiite clerics from visiting the holy shrines in Najaf, Iraq, especially during the annual Ashoura ceremonies, and has revoked some activists’ citizenship.

Egypt’s Copts

There are historical precedents for intolerance against the Coptic Christians in Egypt. 

They experienced persecution by the Umayyads in the seventh century because they were not Arab and by the Abbasids in the eighth century because they were not Muslim. 

Their treatment has deteriorated as Egypt has shifted from secular nationalism to religious dogmatism. 

The Egyptian Football Association, for example, doesn’t recruit Coptic players for the Premier League because they can’t read the Quran.

Social and political discrimination against Copts has been reinforced by authoritarian policies, laws and practices rooted in the Egyptian state. 

Political polarization intensified after the 2013 coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sissi and endorsed by the Coptic Church, resulting in churches across Egypt becoming the target of attacks. 

Sectarian violence against Copts has increased, as the Egyptian government has failed to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the attacks.

Syria’s Alawites

The Alawites in Syria are a religious sect that descends from mainstream Shiism. 

The Alawite sect is described by some Muslims as a cult because it deified the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin, Ali Ben Abi Taleb. 

The founder of Hanbalism, an austere Sunni school of jurisprudence, proclaimed in the 14th century that the Alawites were not Muslim and urged that they be exterminated.

Syria was born after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 from a heterogeneous population with diverse religious, sectarian and ethnic affiliations. 

In 1936, the Alawites pleaded with France not to integrate them into a Syrian state dominated by Sunni Arabs, who viewed them with contempt. 

The Alawites were described as ignorant, murderers and bandits and were not allowed to participate in Syrian politics until the 1963 military coup.

Poverty and persecution were commonplace for the Alawites until they came to power in 1966. 

Alawite President Hafez al-Assad introduced changes that forced most Alawites to abandon their villages and relocate to major cities, where they joined the army and security forces, in order to consolidate the foundations of his regime. 

He made no effort to improve their dismal living conditions, depriving their villages of utilities, schools and hospitals. 

He lured them to the cities, especially the country’s capital, Damascus, with the promise of government jobs. 

He promoted divisions among Alawites and marginalized their political, intellectual and even religious leaders. 

He fostered an environment where his authority provided a haven for Alawites against threats to their interests and existence.

Although they account for only 10 percent of the population, Alawites have emerged as Syria’s dominant sect. 

They have suffered greatly in the civil war that has raged since 2011. 

It’s difficult to find a single Alawite household that hasn’t lost a loved one in the conflict. 

It has decimated an entire generation of young Alawites, with more than 100,000 killed in the fighting.

Lingering Questions

The concept of power sharing has no roots in the Middle East. 

There is no evidence to suggest that the region’s countries take the minority question seriously. 

Ruling elites aim to subdue minorities and silence their demands rather than include them in the political process. 

The regimes often interpret minority activism as foreign conspiracies and a betrayal of their countries. 

Their insistence on stalling legitimate demands is likely to exacerbate the frustration of minority groups. 

Resisting change will take a heavy toll on the viability of these countries, as we’ve already seen through the disintegration of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Lebanon.