WHEN RUSSIA PREPARED FOR THE INCONCEIVABLE / GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES

When Russia Prepared for the Inconceivable

Thoughts in and around geopolitics.

By: George Friedman

Many of our readers have challenged my idea that Russia invaded Ukraine out fear – fear that, deprived of the strategic depth Ukraine provides, Russia might be invaded and occupied. 

Rather than debate the moral implications of Russia’s decision to invade, I have argued that having Europe’s easternmost “border” less than 300 miles from Moscow was for Russian leaders unacceptable, and that the invasion was, rightly or wrongly, an act of premeditated self-defense.

The counter to this argument, of course, is that the war is based on a nonexistent threat. 

Ukraine was not in a position to invade Russia, and no potential enemy had any intention of invading Russia. 

How, then, could Moscow feel justifiably threatened?

It’s true that at the time of the invasion no one was threatening to attack Russia. But it’s also true that international relations are dynamic. 

The interests and powers of potential enemies may change over time, and the fact that a country is immune to attack right now doesn’t mean it is immune in perpetuity. 

As interests evolve, absurd fears can turn into dangerous realities. 

As balances of power shift, and as the unthinkable emerges, acting preemptively can become a national imperative. 

For Russia, ignoring the vulnerability of Moscow due to the short distance for a military drive from a now powerful Ukraine, equally afraid not of Russia’s current intent but its intent and power in the future, would have been irresponsible. 

I am American and I also have fears of a Russian victory that brings them to the border of NATO and forces us to assume the worst case and engage in a new Cold War. 

Neither fear is frivolous, even if it isn’t currently real. 

Anyone buying stocks is playing the future. 

Nations play for higher stakes, with each nation obsessed with its own fears, and both playing the future.

This is compounded by the nature of war. 

One of the rules of war promulgated by Clausewitz and universally acknowledged is the overriding advantage of surprise, particularly when initiating war with a powerful enemy. 

Surprise comes in three parts: the political goal of war, the vulnerability of the enemy, and the timing of the attack. 

The classic case of the surprise attack was Pearl Harbor. 

Japan had to secure the Western Pacific to import raw material that the U.S. had embargoed or sealed up. 

The Japanese understood they could not defeat the United States in a full-scale war but hoped to bring the U.S. to a negotiated settlement. 

That was the political goal. 

The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to be psychologically stunning, and Japan had to initiate the war in order to generate American insecurity.

U.S. officials assumed that if there was war it would start in the Philippines, astride Japan's trade routes. 

Therefore, the Japanese attacked a place the U.S. regarded as invulnerable, if only because of its sheer distance from Japan. 

The attack was a failure. It destroyed the Pacific fleet but did not force the United States to negotiate a settlement. 

Japanese fear crafted a desperate strategy that failed to understand that the loss for the U.S. of any part of the Pacific would open the door to invasion of the U.S. homeland, which, however it might have appeared, was too dangerous to risk. Japan drove into a war it could not win.

The attack on Pearl Harbor is instructive for a variety of reasons. 

First, an attack can come at any time and indeed will likely come in unexpected ways. 

Second, initiating a war without understanding the enemy’s imperatives can lead to disaster. 

Third, understanding an enemy’s military capabilities is essential.

For Russia, surprise is what they feared and what they achieved. 

The Russians did not anticipate a national imperative in Ukraine that created unity. 

And they did not understand the weapons that were being supplied to Ukraine and how those weapons would stymie the Russian advance. 

Russia fundamentally miscalculated Ukraine’s imperatives and thus failed to appreciate its military capability.

The argument I am making is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine flowed from its vulnerability in an uncertain future, as did the Ukrainian, European and American responses. 

If Russia isn’t doing this to defend itself, then it has merely done this because it is greedy or evil. 

Evil certainly exists in the world, but I have found that most people and nations do not on the whole regard themselves as evil. 

Nations tend to act militarily out of a fear that is not obvious to anyone else.

War yields the unexpected as well as a fear of the future. 

When there is too much of both, the results can be catastrophic.